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ABSTRACT 
Rory M. McGovern:  The School of Experience: George W. Goethals, Professional 
Development, and Reform in the U.S. Army, 1876-1907 
(Under the direction of Joseph T. Glatthaar) 
 
In the culminating achievements of a lengthy U.S. Army career, George W. Goethals 
completed the Panama Canal and managed the effort to sustain over two million soldiers abroad 
during the final year of World War I.  At the outset of that career, neither he nor the Army was 
prepared to accomplish these missions.  This thesis studies not only Goethals’s life and career up 
to 1907 when he was ordered to Panama, but also the Army’s reforms, methods of developing 
rising officers, and attitudes about formal training and education during that period.  Ultimately, 
it finds that Goethals’s career was shaped by a small amount of training and the interplay of his 
own talent, personal connections, and luck.  It also suggests that prevailing attitudes about 
training and education helped create an institutional culture that was at odds with structural 
reforms implemented by Secretary of War Elihu Root after the Spanish American War. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1922, journalist Samuel Crowther interviewed George W. Goethals, who had spent the 
previous three years adjusting to civilian life after retiring from the United States Army.   In the 
culminating achievements of a thirty-nine year military career, Goethals built the Panama Canal 
and successfully repaired and managed the War Department’s dysfunctional logistics system 
during World War I.  Success in Panama had made Goethals somewhat of a celebrity, and 
enterprising reporters like Crowther would, from time to time, seek interviews with the famed 
engineer to produce articles that would appeal to an interested national audience.  Hoping to 
explore the challenges associated with building the Panama Canal, Crowther was perhaps a little 
frustrated when the retired major general observed, “The hardest task I ever had . . . was a bridge 
that I built over the Spokane River . . . when I was a second lieutenant in the Engineering Corps . 
. .  For I never had built a bridge, and I did not know much about bridge building.”1  
The Army in the nineteenth century was an institution that did not actively develop its 
leaders.  Rather, it gained them by a fortunate combination of circumstances.  Those who did 
grow to become talented officers and leaders usually benefitted, at least to some extent, from 
occasional service with high-quality mentors who took seriously their implied duty to nurture 
and challenge junior officers of demonstrated potential.  But for the most part, skilled leaders 
developed largely on their own accord, combining natural talents with exceptional abilities to 
                                                          
1 Samuel Crowther, “Don’t Fear to Attempt a Thing Just Because it Looks Big,”  American Magazine, January 
1922, 93. 
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learn and apply lessons derived from previous experiences.  As in Goethals’s case as a young 
lieutenant in 1882, the Army was an institution that could identify a bridge that needed to be 
built and send an officer utterly lacking expertise and experience to handle the task, either 
completely unaware of the officer’s lack of qualifications or confident that the officer would 
somehow eventually figure it out. 
Although the Army trusted that officers would learn and develop through personal 
experiences, it did very little to control or standardize officers’ careers in order to ensure some 
level of parity in the type and quality of experiences from which its officers were expected to 
learn.  Policies and procedures regulating the process by which officers were assigned to 
different duties throughout their careers were relatively unregulated and highly dependent upon 
the values and attitudes of the individuals who wrote the orders.  Beyond this, officers’ careers 
were shaped to a very small degree by formal, standardized training.  More important in 
determining any given officer’s career trajectory was the interplay of that officer’s talent, luck, 
and personal connections.2   
The lack of career standardization and absence of systems of professional development 
have helped lead many who have studied the history of the United States Army to conclude that 
it was not a profession until reforms in the early twentieth century established a rationalized 
central organization to develop plans and coordinate efforts across the institution, and a formal 
system of professional development to produce competent, well-trained officers capable of 
leading at the most senior levels within the institution.  Adherents of this school of thought have 
                                                          
2 The career patterns of nineteenth-century officers are well developed in Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army:  A 
Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898 (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1986), 42-103 and 
215-286. 
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referred to the last decades of the nineteenth century as a “Military Renaissance” in which a 
small body of far-sighted reformers emerged to help start a period of professionalization.  
According to this interpretation, the Army began to move out of its pre-professional dark ages 
with individual initiatives that collectively helped set conditions for truly transformational 
reforms during Elihu Root’s tenure as Secretary of War from 1899 to 1904.  This school of 
thought views the Root reforms as a sharp line of demarcation separating the “old Army” from 
the new.3 
Such an interpretation is founded upon modern conceptions of professions and 
professionalism.  It is generally agreed that there are several key characteristics that all 
professions share.  Professions provide stable and full-time employment for practitioners who 
regard their occupations as a lifelong calling.  They are systematically organized to control 
recruitment, set performance standards, provide formal professional education for their 
practitioners, and sustain themselves by generating capable leaders and managers.  They also 
possess a service orientation that values the needs of the population on whose behalf the service 
is provided and specified standards of competence above all else.  In short, the most essential 
characteristics of a profession are a unique corporate culture, a sense of responsibility, an ability 
to sustain itself, and expert mastery of a distinct body of knowledge that continuously expands 
by virtue of research and experience within the profession.4  A critical aspect of a profession, 
                                                          
3 This thesis was first formulated in William A. Ganoe, The History of the United States Army (New York: 
Appleton, 1924).  In essence, it has been subsequently ratified, although with noticeably different interpretations of 
the principal drivers and scope of reform, in Walter Millis, Arms and Men: a Study in American Military History 
(New Brunswick, NJ:  Rutgers University Press, 1986) [The first edition was published in 1956]; Russell F. 
Weigley, History of the United States Army, Enlarged edition (Bloomington, IN:  Indiana University Press, 1984) 
[The first edition was published in 1967]; James L. Abrahamson, America Arms for a New Century: The Making of 
a Great Military Power (New York: Free Press, 1981); Coffman, The Old Army; and Edward M. Coffman, The 
Regulars: The American Army, 1898-1941 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2004). 
4 This has been drawn from conceptions and definitions of a profession from Paul Starr, The Social Transformation 
of American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign Profession and the Making of a Vast Industry (New York: Basic 
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then, is a system of education and development that transmits specialized knowledge to its newer 
members, institutionalizes and distributes throughout the profession advances in knowledge 
based on new developments from the field, and actively trains successful practitioners for higher 
levels of responsibility within the profession.   
There is, however, a danger in evaluating degrees of professionalism in the past by the 
standards of modern conceptions of professionalism.  Some scholars have rightly argued that 
soldiers of earlier times were indeed professionals.  They point out that the original meaning of 
“profession” was an occupational group to which one professed to belong.  In the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, this central identity was most commonly expressed by continuous self-
education, and one’s dedication to a profession was measured by degrees of personal 
identification and self-study.5  Although it lacked robust educational and developmental systems 
and institutions beyond the United States Military Academy at West Point, the Army of the 
nineteenth century had important professional features, not least of which being that its career 
officers strongly identified themselves with the Army and its culture and frequently searched for 
opportunities to learn more about their profession.6  
                                                          
Books, 1982), 15; Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957), 8-10, Allan R. Millett, The General: Robert L. Bullard and 
Officership in the United States Army, 1881-1925 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), 3-4; Timothy K. 
Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army:  Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the 
United States Army, 1881-1918  (Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press, 1978), 5-6. 
5 See Ira D. Gruber, Books and the British Army in the Age of the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC:  
University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 3-64; Don Higginbotham, George Washington and the American Military 
Tradition (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1984); and Starr, 30-78. 
6 William B. Skelton, An American Profession of Arms: the Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861 (Lawrence, KS.: 
University Press of Kansas, 1992), 107-362.  The Army of the nineteenth century was not completely devoid of 
attempts to develop systems of education and development beyond West Point.  Examples include the Artillery 
School of Practice from 1824-1828 and 1857-1861, the Infantry School of Practice from 1827-1828, and schools of 
application for the Corps of Engineers, Signal Corps, and Artillery in 1866-1868.  With the exception of the latter 
three schools, these were temporary developments.  See Coffman, The Old Army, 96-97 and 274; and Skelton, An 
American Profession of Arms, 248-254. 
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This was not a significant departure from the general state of professions in the United 
States at the time.  For most of the nineteenth century, American society frowned upon 
consolidated authority of any kind and resisted the broad establishment of autonomous 
professions.  Social views on professionalism and specialization began to change radically late in 
the century as changes wrought by mass industrialization complicated the way of life of most 
individuals and groups within American society.  As complete self-reliance became increasingly 
less feasible, acceptance of professional specialization and consolidated professional authority 
grew significantly.  The late 1870s and beyond brought the rise of leading professional 
associations such as the American Medical Association and the American Bar Association, as 
well as standardization and reform in professional education and training within the fields of 
medicine, law, social work, education, and journalism.  Social acceptance of specialization also 
set conditions for business associations, trade unions, and agricultural associations to become 
more popular and more commonplace.7  Taking these factors into consideration, it appears that 
the subsequent period of reform in the U.S. Army that many scholars have referred to in terms of 
“professionalization” was not the rise of professionalism, but the gradual transition from a 
conception of professionalism based on personal identity and self-study to one based on formal 
training and education. 
Reflecting the trends of the society they came from and served, officers began to agitate 
for significant reform in the late nineteenth century.  As businesses, railroads, and municipal 
governments responded to the demands of industrialization and urbanization by creating more 
scientific systems of management and organization, key Army leaders, up to and including 
                                                          
7 Starr, 17-21 and 79-179; Michael McGerr, A Fierce Discontent:  The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement 
in America, 1870-1920 (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2003), 128-129, and Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for 
Order, 1877-1920 (New York:  Hill and Wang, 1967), 113-127. 
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Commanding General William T. Sherman, realized that innovations in tactics, principles of 
military organization, and technology created complex challenges in warfare that would demand 
a more rationally organized and better-trained institution.  Accordingly, a number of institutional 
reform initiatives flourished in the late nineteenth century, including the establishment of the 
School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry at Ft. Leavenworth in 1881, the emergence of 
professional associations and journals within the various branches of the Army, and reform of 
the promotions system to include qualifying examinations for all eligible junior officers.8   
The reformist impulse grew stronger in light of the waning operational requirements of 
the frontier, which had for more than a century commanded the bulk of Army’s attention and 
resources.  As the United States consolidated its control of the West in the late nineteenth 
century, military leaders and civilian policymakers began to view the role of the Army 
differently.  Without a frontier to police, key figures came to believe that the proper role of the 
Army in peacetime was to prepare for war.  The Army began to close some of its smaller 
outposts and consolidate larger units on the same bases.  It began to conduct training maneuvers 
with large concentrations of troops in 1885.  Lessons learned from these maneuvers as well as 
from recent European conflicts demonstrated that the Army needed to adapt in order to better 
manage the complexities of modern warfare.  But the various reforms of the 1880s and 1890s 
                                                          
8 On late-nineteenth century initiatives, see Coffman, The Old Army, 278-281; Walter Millis, Arms and Men: a 
Study in American Military History (New Brunswick, NJ:  Rutgers University Press, 1986), 139; Nenninger, 3-7 and 
21-31; and Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army, Enlarged edition (Bloomington, IN:  Indiana 
University Press, 1984), 273-281.  On organizational reform and scientific management theories, see Wiebe, 133-
163 and Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, 
MA.: Belknap Press, 1977), passim.  On rising interest in scientific management theories as they could be applied to 
warfare in the industrial age, see Brian M. Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2007), 7-9 and 64-67, and Millis, 137-139.  The interpretation that professional reform in 
the Army developed within the context of changing social attitudes toward professions during the Gilded Age and 
Progressive Era is consistent with interpretations offered by Dr. Coffman and Dr. Nenninger.  For an alternate 
interpretation that professional reform developed independently of society, and was in fact was a product of the 
Army’s isolation from society, see Weigley, 265-292, and Huntington, 227-237. 
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were a somewhat haphazard collection of individual initiatives, often formidably opposed by 
older officers commissioned directly from civilian life before and during the Civil War, rather 
than a concentrated and coordinated system of reform intended to fundamentally transform the 
Army as an institution.9  
Throughout the last two decades of the nineteenth century, calls for professional reform 
grew into a cacophony.  Not long after the Progressive Era’s reforms began to sweep the country, 
Secretary of War Elihu Root harnessed and provided direction to the reformist trend within the 
Army and implemented his far-reaching program of reform between 1899 and 1903.  Among 
structural changes to the Army’s organization and administration, Root intended for professional 
development to become a formally institutionalized process, with schools and training programs 
available to officers at nearly every grade.  As recent scholarship has pointed out, however, the 
fact that the United States Army entered World War I in 1917 only somewhat better prepared 
than it entered the Spanish-American War in 1898 indicates that when taken as a whole, Root’s 
reforms and the period of reform preceding Root’s tenure in office fell far short of achieving a 
fundamental institutional transformation of the Army.10   
It would not be until a younger generation of officers – the generation that included 
George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower – rose to the Army’s higher echelons that the 
transformation would be complete and Army officers would reap the benefits of a modern 
profession with institutions designed to train and develop its leaders to meet the challenges of 
                                                          
9 Coffman, The Old Army, 215-283; Abrahamson, 1-62. 
10 See Daniel R. Beaver, Modernizing the American War Department: Change and Continuity in a Turbulent Era, 
1885-1920 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2006) and Jason Patrick Clark, “The Many Faces of Reform: 
Military Progressivism in the U.S. Army, 1866-1916” (PhD diss., Duke University, 2009). 
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future contingencies.11  The wide space of time between the implementation of Root’s reforms 
and the realization of the promises they offered suggests that there is something that is not yet 
understood about the dynamics of reform in the Army in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  The notion that the transformation was not complete until a new generation of officers 
rose to higher rank and higher levels of authority in the aftermath of a crisis in the form of World 
War I indicates that the missing piece of the puzzle is related to the culture of the officer corps 
during the long period of reform.   
It would be useful, then, to closely examine the formative experiences of a generation of 
officers whose careers spanned the vast majority of the reform period, from the last decades of 
the nineteenth century until the close of World War I.  The generation of officers that entered the 
Army between 1870 and 1890 most readily meets this description.  It included such well-known 
figures as John J. Pershing, Peyton C. March, Tasker H. Bliss, and Joseph T. Dickman.  They 
were junior officers when individual reform initiatives abounded in the late nineteenth century, 
captains and majors during the implementation of the Root reforms, and generals during World 
War I.  The following pages examine that generation through the vehicle of the professional 
development of one of its representative officers, George W. Goethals of the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers.   
Because he was an engineer, some may object to the notion that Goethals can be 
considered a representative officer of his generation.  Compared to the rest of the Army, the 
Corps of Engineers was a relatively small, highly technical branch, and the frequent interactions 
                                                          
11 For excellent discussions of the lasting effects of reforms in training and leadership development, see especially 
Coffman, The Regulars, 233-289 and Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880-1939 
(New York: Viking Press, 1963), 93-269. 
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with civilians that were part and parcel of its civil engineering projects had the potential to 
produce a unique subculture of engineer officers isolated from the broader culture of Army 
officers.  At first glance, some of Goethals’s experiences seem to reinforce this view.  When the 
class of 1880 graduated from West Point, Goethals was one of only two who were assigned to 
the Corps of Engineers.12  Later in life, he would complain that during his service in the Corps of 
Engineers, some non-engineer colleagues believed that he “was not considered as belonging to 
the Army, being then dubbed a ‘mud digger.’”13  But one should neither jump to conclusions 
based on a simple reading of numbers, nor allow the kind of intra-service branch parochialism 
that is still a part of the Army today to mask the larger picture.   
It is true that the Corps of Engineers was smaller and more technical than branches of the 
line – infantry, cavalry, and artillery.  But for Goethals and his fellow engineers, just as it was for 
line officers,  small amounts of training and the interplay of skill, luck, and personal connections 
defined career trajectories.14  In fact, the single major difference was that line officers were 
subject to even less formal training than engineer officers, who received such little formal 
training, as will be shown, that they considered it to be a relatively insignificant component of 
professional development.   
Furthermore, the civil aspects of the mission of the Corps of Engineers did not isolate its 
officers from the mainstream Army officer culture.  Engineers like Goethals still weighed in on 
                                                          
12 U.S. Department of War, Annual Reports of the War Department, 46th Cong., 2nd sess., 1880, House Executive 
Document 2, vol. II, Part 1 (Washington, DC:  Government Printing Office, 1880), 1. 
13 George W. Goethals to George H. Morgan, February 6, 1925, Folder 40, George W. Goethals Papers, Library of 
Congress, Washington, DC. 
14 For a good example of professional development of a highly successful line officer of Goethals’s generation, see 
Edward M. Coffman, The Hilt of the Sword: The Career of Peyton C. March (Madison, WI: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1966), 1-51. 
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the Army’s professional debates and reforms of the day, mixed well with their colleagues from 
the line during war or when assigned to continental departments during peacetime, and were 
integrated into both the General Staff and the newly institutionalized military education system 
after 1903.  This preserved not only their identity as Army officers, but also their acceptance 
within a larger community of Army officers.  As one of his friends and colleagues remembered 
shortly after Goethals’s death, “throughout his life he was their leader and the center about which 
the members of the class gathered whenever they held a reunion.”15  Therefore, in evaluating 
experiences of and attitudes toward professional reform and professional development, Goethals 
cannot be disqualified as a representative officer of his generation simply because he was an 
engineer.   
George W. Goethals graduated from West Point in 1880, when the Army was entering 
the early stages of this transformation.   He served until 1919 and retired at the rank of major 
general, having built the Panama Canal and having led the War Department’s logistics efforts 
during World War I.  Reared in the “old Army” under an informal, learn-by-doing approach to 
professional development, Goethals went on to help implement the Army’s new system of 
professional military education under Secretary Root and then rose to help lead the Army 
through World War I, the first major test of Army systems after the Root reforms.  He 
individually experienced the entire course of Army reform and transformation before and during 
the Progressive Era.16  
                                                          
15 Gustav J. Fiebeger, “George Washington Goethals,” Fifty Ninth Annual Report of the Association of Graduates of 
the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, June 8, 1928 (Saginaw, MI: Seeman & Peters, 1929), 
127.   
16 Joseph Bucklin Bishop and Farnham Bishop, Goethals: Genius of the Panama Canal (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1930).  This is the only existing book-length biography of George W. Goethals.  Produced two years after 
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Goethals’s development as a junior officer is therefore of particular interest.   It is not 
only the story of how one leader grew and developed within a changing institution, but also of 
how the institution itself changed.  He was not born with the requisite knowledge and skills to 
build the Panama Canal and sustain an expeditionary force of over two million soldiers deployed 
across the Atlantic Ocean.  Nor did the Army have any established systems or infrastructure to 
do so at the beginning of his career.  He developed the necessary skills at the same time that the 
Army developed the capabilities and systems needed to meet these challenges.   
Typical of the times, Goethals learned these skills largely through practical experience 
rather than through formal and standardized systems of professional development.  In the 
process, he came to place great value in learning by experience, something he would describe in 
1922 as “the only school that is worth anything.”17  Goethals was part of a generation of officers 
that bridged the gap between the “old Army” and the new, and between two very different 
approaches to professional development.  Yet change did not then, as it does not ever, happen in 
a vacuum.  Those who would implement the change would do so in terms of old concepts that 
they knew well and still believed to be sound.  The generation that built the bridge between the 
“old Army” and the new as the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth would do so with 
familiar tools.   
This is the missing piece of the puzzle.  The culture of the Army officer corps of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries diverged from the spirit of the reforms it implemented.  
Elihu Root demonstrated that it is possible to transform the Army’s organization and systems of 
                                                          
his death by a father-son pair of journalists whom Goethals befriended in Panama, this work has its limitations, but 
is a reasonably accurate source for the major outlines of Goethals’s life and career. 
17 Crowther, 16. 
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professional development with a good amount of political acumen and a swift stroke of the pen.  
Goethals and his generation of officers, however, demonstrated that fundamental institutional 
transformation cannot be achieved without concomitant change in institutional culture.
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CHAPTER 1 
Apprentice, 1858-1885 
 
George W. Goethals was the middle child of John and Marie Baron Goethals.  Belgian by 
birth, John had immigrated to Brooklyn from Amsterdam in 1848;  Marie arrived three years 
later.  Although she had also come by way of Amsterdam, they had not met prior to Marie’s 
arrival in Brooklyn.  The two married and settled into a house on State Street in Brooklyn, with 
John having found secure employment as a carpenter in a well-established shop across the East 
River on 9th Street in New York.  In 1856, John and Marie Goethals received full American 
citizenship and welcomed their first child into the world, a boy named John, after his father.  
George Goethals was born at their home in Brooklyn two years later, on June 29, 1858.  A baby 
girl named Annie was born two years later, completing the recently established Brooklyn branch 
of the Goethals family.1 
Goethals led an unexceptional childhood.  He grew up in a working-class neighborhood 
in Brooklyn, with his older brother as his closest playmate.  Young George was somewhat 
introverted, a trait that he never quite outgrew, and appears to have for the most part followed his 
                                                          
1 “Goethals, Canal Builder, a Brooklyn Boy,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, October 12, 1913, 1; and Bishop and Bishop, 
27.  Very little is known about Goethals’s early family life.  No correspondence between Goethals and his parents or 
siblings survives today.  The relationship was in all likelihood estranged at some point in Goethals’s early 
adulthood, possibly shortly after George entered the Army, when John and Marie moved with Annie to California, 
where they died in 1888 and 1899, respectively.  In later years, George refused to speak to interviewers about his 
family and childhood, and Annie refused to speak to interviewers about George.  George’s older brother John 
granted one lengthy interview to The Brooklyn Daily Eagle, in which he remembers their childhood fondly and 
displays no hostility or ill-will toward his brother. 
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older brother’s lead in their youthful adventures around Brooklyn.  He displayed a boyish 
fascination with the local volunteer fire company and with the soldiers encamped at nearby City 
Park and Fort Greene during the Civil War, who passed at least some of their time by arming the 
Goethals children with sticks and drilling them.  There is no evidence that John Goethals served 
in the military during the war, and the war itself had little impact on the lives of the rest of the 
Goethals family.2 
Along with his brother, Goethals began his formal education in the fall of 1864 at a 
public school near their home in Brooklyn.  At school, he was studious enough to satisfy his 
parents, but frequently demonstrated a penchant for mischief.  Because they were kept after 
school so often, George and his brother John cut holes in the fence surrounding the school yard 
so they could slip away during the noontime recess to eat dinner at home on days they 
misbehaved in the morning and already knew they would be punished and kept late after school.  
At times the punishment would be corporal, but this did not keep the Goethals boys from acting 
out.  “We had a theory in those days,” recalled John, “that a short hair in the palm of the hand 
would keep the strap from hurting.  The great difficulty was to keep the hair in place.”3 
In 1868, the Goethals family moved across the East River to a home on East Fourth 
Street near what is now Manhattan’s East Village so the elder John Goethals could be closer to 
work and avoid the inconvenience and occasional hazards of a daily commute by ferry.  George 
was placed in Public School No. 15 to continue his education, now one grade behind his brother 
John due to his age.  At Public School No. 15, Goethals matured into a more serious student.  He 
caught the attention of Nathan P. Beers, the school’s headmaster.  Seeing promise in George 
                                                          
2 “Goethals, Canal Builder, a Brooklyn Boy,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, October 12, 1913, 1.   
3 “Goethals, Canal Builder, a Brooklyn Boy,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, October 12, 1913, 1. 
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Goethals, Beers advanced him ahead a full year, back into the same class as his brother John, and 
kept a close eye on his progress.4 
Young George Goethals did not begin to become a more serious student out of any newly 
discovered love of learning.  Instead, it had much to do with ambition.  According to his brother 
John, “At that time, George had an idea that he wanted to be a lawyer, and he studied hard.”5  
Marie Goethals had always worked to stoke the fire ambition in her children, and in their friends 
for that matter.  A childhood friend of the Goethals boys later recalled with reverence more than 
a half-century later that Marie would not only foster and encourage her children’s goals, but also 
urged him, whenever she saw him, to work hard and keep pursuing his dream of attending the 
U.S. Naval Academy.6   
Her efforts began to bear fruit as her children became adolescents and young teenagers.  
Both George and John did well enough in school to place lofty goals within reach.  Though 
driven, Goethals was not focused in his ambitions.  Towards the end of his grammar school days, 
he abandoned his legal ambitions and began to dream of being a doctor.  But it was not to be.  
John also had designs on the medical profession, and the family could only afford to fund one 
son’s medical training.7  After graduating in 1872 at the age of fourteen, Goethals would instead 
spend his summer working as a cashier and bookkeeper in a fruit and vegetable market, then 
matriculate with the entering class at the City College of New York, which was then free for 
                                                          
4 “Goethals, Canal Builder, a Brooklyn Boy,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, October 12, 1913, 2. 
5 “Goethals, Canal Builder, a Brooklyn Boy,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, October 12, 1913, 2. 
6 Bishop and Bishop, 28. 
7 Thomas Goethals interview by author, Vineyard Haven, MA, December 21, 2012. 
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male residents of the city who had attended public school in the city for at least twelve months, 
and could pass college’s entrance examination.8 
Goethals applied for admission to City College and took its entrance examination in June 
1872.  The exam was designed to test applicants’ knowledge and aptitude in spelling, reading, 
writing, arithmetic, English grammar, geography, U.S. history, and algebra.  The shy fourteen-
year-old must have been nervous as he prepared to be examined and judged; he allowed the 
registrar to mistakenly record his name as “Goethals, George Washington” without objection or 
correction, if he had even noticed it in that moment.  He had actually been christened George 
William Goethals, but Washington stuck with him for the rest of his life and into posterity.  
Goethals may not have even been aware of the error until he arrived at West Point.  But as he 
later explained, after the Army knew him as George Washington Goethals, he had “never seen fit 
to have the records of the War Department changed, as it requires an unnecessary amount of red 
tape.”9 
Goethals’s performance on the entrance examination was exceptionally unexceptional.  
He fared well enough to be admitted, but not so well as to stand out in any significant way.  
Comparatively, he received a low, but not deficient score in English grammar; average scores in 
writing, arithmetic, U.S. history, and algebra; and high scores in spelling, reading, and 
geography.10  George Goethals had a strong intellect, as Nathan Beers had previously 
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recognized, but was not naturally brilliant or gifted.  He would have to work hard to achieve any 
greatness inside or outside of the classroom.  Ambition had motivated him to become more 
studious during his time at Public School No. 15, yet his ambition had perhaps not been quite 
consistent or focused enough to motivate him to reach his full potential. 
Although Goethals’s sense of ambition never diminished while at City College, his goals 
continued to fluctuate.  Consistently above average, his academic performance reflected this lack 
of focus.  Early in his time at City College, Goethals gave serious consideration to a career as a 
naval officer and directed his efforts toward preparing for admission to the U.S. Naval Academy.  
Accordingly, he performed remarkably well in his studies during his introductory and freshman 
years, finishing his introductory year ranked thirty-first out of a class of 158, and then ranked 
eleventh out of a class of 104 at the end of his freshman year.11  After receiving word from the 
Secretary of the Navy that there would be no vacancies for midshipmen from his district, 
Goethals redirected his ambitions toward going into business.  On at least two occasions, he was 
prepared to drop out of City College to pursue potential business opportunities, but ultimately 
yielded to his father’s wishes that he continue his studies.  Goethals’s academic performance 
suffered somewhat from this ambivalence.  He finished his sophomore year ranked twenty-fourth 
out of a class of seventy-five.12   
Although he certainly showed potential, Goethals’s collegiate career through 1875 was 
generally unremarkable, a fact that was noticed and commented upon by his City College 
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colleagues many years later.  One classmate remembered Goethals only as a “quiet, reserved, 
almost shy boy” who “was one of the group that tried for a high stand.”13  Another remembered 
Goethals as “rather quiet and reserved, undemonstrative, and not a brilliant or exceptional 
student; just one among many.”14  More tellingly, a third classmate declared, “My recollections 
of George W. Goethals at the College include nothing salient.  He was an average student, just 
one of us, without any special distinction.”15 
As fall turned to winter in 1875, Samuel Sullivan Cox, the Democratic congressman 
representing New York’s 6th District, announced that his district had a vacancy at West Point due 
to his previous nominee’s academic failure.  The news immediately piqued Goethals’s interest.  
As the son of an immigrant carpenter, however, Goethals had no strong political connections to 
help him secure the nomination.  He sought advice from his old principal, Nathan Beers, who 
had taken a keen interest in Goethals from an early age at Public School No. 15.  Beers was not 
only happy to help, but was in an excellent position to do so.16   
The maxim that all politics are local was perhaps never more true than it was in New 
York City in 1875.  Nathan Beers had connections with one of his school’s trustees by the name 
of Miehling and a coroner named Henry Waltman, who together constituted the essential 
political power in the Cox’s district.  Beers pressured Mr. Miehling, who in turn took Goethals’s 
case to Waltman.  Here Goethals’s Army career almost failed to launch, as the coroner had 
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already promised the nomination to his nephew.  The nephew, however, was an only child with a 
mother who was aghast at the idea of sending her son into the Army.  She successfully persuaded 
him to decline the nomination.  Beers and Miehling renewed their efforts on Goethals’s behalf.  
Henry Waltman relented and sent word to “Sunset” Cox that he had decided that Goethals should 
have the nomination.  Mr. Waltman even took the trouble to fill out the nomination papers 
himself and forward them to Cox, who waived his usual competitive examination process and 
officially extended the nomination to Goethals on April 17, 1876.  Nominated to matriculate with 
West Point’s class of 1880, George Goethals’s military career began as it would advance at 
several key points in the future, through the timely intervention of interested and influential 
parties.17 
Wasting no time, Goethals reported to West Point and was one of 73 cadets to pass the 
medical and academic examinations required for admission.  Another four would be added to the 
rolls later in the summer.18  He and his classmates were immediately processed and sent to begin 
their military training at their first annual summer encampment at West Point.   
West Point’s most significant military function at that time was to introduce cadets to the 
military profession.  Life at the academy immersed Goethals and like-minded cadets in the 
military culture and imbued them with a sense of purpose and responsibility and a deep personal 
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identification with the Army. 19  Such identification was at the foundation of conceptions of 
professionalism that had taken root in the early modern era and persisted throughout the 
nineteenth century, when the Army – reflecting trends in civilian professions such as the medical 
community – lacked institutional systems of formalized professional development.  It was 
expected that a deeply felt identification with the profession would inspire commitment to it in 
the form of self-study, which would in turn be perceived as the measure of an officer’s level of 
professionalism.20  This unwritten rule from the days of George Washington became a written 
rule at the end of the nineteenth century, when as part of the Army’s effort to institute a system 
of annual efficiency reports for its officers, it required each officer to submit a summary of their 
extracurricular efforts to improve their professional knowledge throughout the course of the 
year.21   
There was an ugly side to the socialization process.  Hazing of new cadets had been in 
practice at West Point since at least the 1830s, but had maintained a generally benign and 
harmless character and was limited only to a cadet’s first summer encampment prior to the Civil 
War.  The postwar years saw a general decline in discipline among the corps of cadets as officers 
assigned to West Point were disinclined to enforce policies and regulations that seemed petty and 
trivial in light of their wartime experiences.  The consecutive assignments of two weak and 
ineffective Academy superintendents between 1864 and 1871 only exacerbated this trend.  
Hazing grew to encompass the entire fourth-class (freshman, or “plebe”) year, and ranged in 
                                                          
19 Skelton, An American Profession of Arms, 167-180; William B. Skelton, “West Point and Officer 
Professionalism, 1817-1877,” West Point:  Two Centuries and Beyond, ed. Lance Betros (Abilene, TX:  McWhiney 
Foundation Press, 2004), 26-35; Coffman, The Old Army, 96-103. 
20 Gruber, 23-34; Starr, 18 and 30-112; and Higginbotham, passim – with a succinct summary of the professionalism 
theme on pp. 118-124. 
21 George W. Goethals, “Officer’s Individual Report,” May 24, 1890, File # 3644-ACP-1880, Box 667, Entry 297, 
RG 94, NARA I. 
21 
 
severity from periodic public humiliation to significant physical violence.  Despite the efforts of 
stronger superintendents, such hazing continued through Goethals’s cadet years and beyond, 
until a congressional investigation in the wake of a cadet’s death in 1900 produced legislation 
barring the worst forms of hazing in 1901.22 
The immediacy of the sharp change from a civilian to a military existence and the hazing 
that accompanied it made the transition a harsh experience for all cadets at the time.  Although 
Goethals had as difficult an adjustment to military life as all of his classmates, he adjusted well 
to life at the academy.   Perhaps this was because the competitive environment at West Point and 
the clear end of a commission as a U.S. Army officer finally provided George with a well-
defined goal on which he could focus his ambitions and energies.  He emerged from his summer 
training in a frame of mind that would allow him to reach his full potential in the classroom. 
Goethals attended the academy during a time when it was relatively stagnant as an 
institution of higher education.  Significant changes were being implemented elsewhere in higher 
education, including the transition to the elective system, expansion and diversification of 
curricula, and adoption of more inclusive and engaging forms of pedagogy.  But West Point 
remained committed to a highly technical curriculum focused on mathematics and science and 
conducted instruction through rote recitation and frequent grading through which cadets’ 
academic proficiency would be assessed and competitively ranked.  This was a conscious 
decision by the Army and by West Point’s leaders, who believed that theirs was the best method 
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to condition cadets’ minds to analyze and solve military problems, and that the academic system 
that produced Generals Grant, Lee, Jackson, and Sherman required no adjustments.23   
Nevertheless, Goethals excelled academically at West Point.  The introduction to the 
profession that West Point provided led Goethals to identify deeply with the Army and to 
channel his ambitions toward excelling within West Point’s intensely competitive environment 
and setting early favorable conditions for success as an Army officer.  He put all of his energies 
into his studies.  When “lights out” was sounded at ten o’clock each night, Goethals would lie 
prone on the floor while his roommates draped a large blanket over him, taking care to weigh it 
down along the edges with books at regular intervals, so he could continue to study by the 
undetected light of a kerosene lamp well into the night.24  According to his older brother, their 
father wrote Goethals to express his concern about too much study at the expense of sleep, 
“George’s reply was that he would not be satisfied to merely plod through his studies, that he 
was there for work and he was going to do all in his power to come out at the head of his 
class.”25   Goethals very nearly achieved that goal.  He was rated second in his class at the end of 
every academic year.  At the end of his first-class (senior, or “firstie”) year, he was still rated 
second overall, although he was the top cadet in Civil and Military Engineering after achieving a 
perfect score in that department.26   
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Goethals also thrived outside of the classroom at West Point. Although he remained 
somewhat introverted and clung to a long-held fear of public speaking that he would never 
escape,27 Goethals began to feel more confident and socially at ease in relationships with his 
fellow cadets on an individual basis. As he became more socially comfortable during his cadet 
years, he became very popular.  Gustav Fiebeger, a product of West Point’s class of 1879 and 
one of the few close friends that Goethals carried through his entire adult life, left the following 
recollection of Goethals’s personality shortly after his graduation in 1880: 
It was not long before we discovered in Goethals the qualities which had made him 
popular with his class.  With a winning personality, he was dignified, yet friendly, 
modest, but self-confident, honorable and upright, cheerful in disposition, quick at 
repartee and somewhat sarcastic in a pleasant way, military in carriage and neat in dress, 
never coarse in language or thought.  His loyalty and prompt obedience made him 
popular with all his commanding officers.  His temperament was artistic and his tastes 
were for the beautiful in art.  He loved music, had a fine tenor voice, and thoroughly 
enjoyed the opera at the old Academy of Music in New York, which many of us attended 
several nights each week during the season.28 
Well-liked within the corps of cadets, many of whom referred to him playfully as “Goat,” the 
class of 1880 elected Goethals to be their class president and selected him to design the class 
ring.  Years later, Fiebeger would recall of Goethals’s relationship with his classmates that 
“throughout his life he was their leader and the center about which the members of the class 
gathered whenever they held a reunion.”29   
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Over two June days at the end of four long years at West Point, Goethals received his 
diploma from William T. Sherman, then the Army’s Commanding General,  and was one of only 
two members of the class of 1880 to be commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Corps of 
Engineers. 30  While his formal education was over, what he and his contemporaries perceived to 
be his real military education was about to begin.   West Point provided an introduction to the 
profession and a formal education to its cadets, but only a limited amount of practical military 
training.  Recognizing that the academy did not produce expert practitioners of all its branches, 
the Army generally entrusted lieutenants’ technical training to the units to which they first 
reported after graduation.  The Army experimented with the concept of schools of application – 
formal schools with standardized curricula to provide branch-specific training to newly 
commissioned lieutenants – for infantry, cavalry, and artillery in the 1820s, and again for 
artillery from 1857-1861.  These measures proved limited and temporary due to a lack of 
interest, resources, funding, and in the latter case, the outbreak of the Civil War.  Within three 
years of the war’s end, the Corps of Engineers, the Signal Corps, and the Artillery each opened 
new schools of application.  These evolved in concept and content over time, but remained for 
the most part incomplete experiments when Goethals and West Point’s class of 1880 graduated.31    
After a brief stay at West Point to serve as an assistant instructor of practical astronomy 
until the next Engineer School of Application class began in the fall of 1880, Goethals made the 
short trip from West Point to Willets Point, New York, a post occupying 136 acres on a 
peninsula extending into the Long Island Sound in northern Queens County.   Henry L. Abbot, a 
Civil War veteran with a distinguished record, originally designed the Engineer School of 
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Application “with a view to meet the actual needs of young officers resulting from the fact that 
while admirably trained in the rudiments of their profession . . . they had still much to learn 
about the use and care of delicate surveying, astronomical, and other instruments in constant use 
by the Corps of Engineers.”32   
From such humble conceptual beginnings, Abbot modified the course almost annually 
until 1885, when it had grown into a two-and-a-half year long curriculum, and was declared 
complete and ratified by the War Department.  At the time Goethals attended, however, the 
school was slightly less than two years in length.  In addition to familiarization with specialized 
engineering equipment, Goethals conducted extensive study of survey procedures, military 
reconnaissance, astronomy – Willets Point had a state of the art observatory that would discover 
a comet in June 1881 – meteorology, field fortifications, military photography, harbor mining, 
and coastal defense.33  
While undoubtedly more helpful to Goethals than sending him straight from West Point 
to his first assignment, much of the material had little immediate relevance for a junior officer.  
Not much of the course beyond the familiarization with engineering equipment and the 
instruction in survey and reconnaissance would prove relevant to Goethals’s duties in his first 
twenty years of service.  The Engineer School of Application was still a developing concept, and 
was the last formal training the Army gave to Goethals, who graduated from the school in the 
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second year of a career that would last nearly four decades.  Fortunately for those who came 
later, the curriculum that the War Department officially sanctioned in 1884 included more 
practical instruction in civil and military engineering.34  But these changes came too late to 
benefit Lieutenant Goethals, who reported for duty on the staff of the Department of the 
Columbia in November 1882.35 
Headquartered at Vancouver Barracks in Washington Territory, the Department of the 
Columbia encompassed all of Oregon, Washington Territory, and the district of Alaska, as well 
as most of Idaho Territory.  Since August 1881, the department was commanded by Brigadier 
General Nelson A. Miles, who was famous for his campaigns in the Indian Wars, and who would 
become the Commanding General of the Army by the end of the century.36  Goethals was 
fortunate to be assigned to a functioning frontier department, gaining uncommon exposure to 
Army life outside the Corps of Engineers.  In 1883, only ten out of the 103 officers of all ranks in 
the Corps of Engineers were assigned to commands that included units and soldiers of the line. 37  
At the same time, this undoubtedly proved to be a challenging assignment for a young lieutenant 
whose only previous experiences were in schoolhouse environments at West Point and the 
Engineer School of Application.  As the only engineer officer assigned to the command, he was 
the senior engineer in the department, and was expected to be the resident expert on all 
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engineering matters.  Goethals had only his own theoretical knowledge to rely upon, and had no 
mentor to develop him.  
On the other hand, Goethals was not entirely lucky to be assigned to serve on the staff of 
the ever petulant and irascible Nelson Miles.  “Always fearful of conspiracies,” a twentieth-
century biographer astutely notes, “Miles divided the world into two clearly distinguishable 
factions: those wise enough to agree with him and those mean-spirited enough to allow their 
jealousies to affect their judgment.”38  Surviving service under a commander with an infamously 
quick temper and legendary ability to bear grudges would be a tall order for any officer.  For a 
new lieutenant finding his way in the Army on his first assignment without the benefit of a 
mentor, it would prove to be an impossible task. 
Things started well enough for Goethals.  Miles, who was on leave in Boston and 
Washington for the first six months of the young lieutenant’s assignment to Vancouver Barracks, 
had identified regional development to support the expansion of railroads and white settlements 
at the top of his department’s priorities.39 A considerable amount of land within the Department 
of the Columbia had not yet been adequately explored and mapped.  As the department’s 
engineer, Goethals spent much of his time exploring and mapping, particularly in northern 
Washington and Idaho territories.  The bulk of his assignment to Vancouver Barracks was spent 
in the field on reconnaissance missions and exploration parties, as well as identifying suitable 
routes for and laying out wagon roads, railroads, and telegraph lines. 40   
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Continuing the work ethic he developed at West Point, Goethals was completely 
dedicated to his work.  His energetic efforts drew the notice of all who observed him, even at the 
highest levels.  Notably, Goethals was tasked with reconnoitering and planning the route for part 
of General Sherman’s tour of the Pacific Northwest in the summer of 1883.  Goethals deeply 
impressed Sherman, who reported to Secretary of War Robert T. Lincoln: 
Genl. Miles had intrusted [sic] to Lieut. Goethals, a most intelligent young Engineer 
officer of the Army, the task of reconnoitering the route, who had done so in advance of 
our arrival . . . Lieut. Goethals submitted to me . . . his report with sketches, which I 
found most valuable and accurate, so that I resolved to adhere strictly to his advice 
though it differed somewhat from my own preference based on the best information at 
Washington.41 
Sherman was so satisfied that he told Miles that in his opinion, Goethals was “one of the most 
promising men in the Army,”42 and forwarded the maps Goethals prepared to Lincoln so they 
could be copied and used in the various War Department offices in Washington.43  Miles 
expressed his own confidence in Goethals by entrusting him with escorting General Sherman’s 
party for two weeks in August 1883, before ordering him to assist a cavalry detachment in 
attempting to locate a pass through the Cascade Mountains.44    
 While most of Goethals’s duties involved reconnaissance and mapmaking, he also gained 
limited practice in civil and military engineering while at Vancouver Barracks, principally in site 
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selection and planning for the construction of new buildings on post, planning a new post 
cemetery, and laying roads within the department.45  In October 1883, the Spokane River washed 
out the only bridge that gave access to Fort Spokane, home of the 2nd Infantry Regiment.  Miles 
hurried Goethals to the site to consult with the regimental commander and build a new bridge as 
quickly as possible.  This was the experience that Goethals later described to Samuel Crowther 
as “the hardest task I ever had,” in an interview eight years after he completed the construction of 
the Panama Canal.  Relatively unschooled and completely inexperienced in building bridges 
more intricate than a simple pontoon bridge, and in the unfortunate position of still being the 
most knowledgeable officer present, Goethals set to work.  He quite literally learned on the job 
how to build a bridge.  Goethals would recall in 1922 that “it might not have been hard for a 
bridge engineer.  He would have known exactly what to do.  I did not; I had to find out as we 
went along.  I had to read books all night and give orders all day.  However, we built the bridge – 
and on time.”46 
Goethals entered his second year of duty at Vancouver Barracks glowing with 
satisfaction over his work and the praise it brought him, unaware that he was soon to experience 
the perhaps inevitable fall from Nelson Miles’s grace.  Since assuming command of the 
Department of the Columbia, Miles had developed a keen interest in Alaska, unsuccessfully 
badgering both Secretary of War Lincoln and Congress to appropriate funds for him to organize 
an expedition to explore its interior.  Miles eventually took matters into his own hands.  
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Inventing the justification of “frequent reports of disturbances of the peace between the whites 
and Indians in Alaska,” he dispatched a seven-man expedition up the Yukon River led by his 
aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Frederick Schwatka.  Although they did not reveal much that was not 
already known about the region, Schwatka’s subsequent reports reanimated public interest in 
Alaska and encouraged Miles to dispatch more expeditions.47 
Possibly because of his impressive performance reconnoitering for Sherman’s tour, Miles 
approached Goethals in early 1884 about leading one such Alaskan expedition, a small three-
man party.  Goethals declined the assignment.  Having somehow found the time to begin a 
courtship and become engaged to Effie Rodman, the daughter of a prosperous whaler from New 
Bedford, Massachusetts and visiting sister of one of his fellow lieutenants, Goethals had a 
wedding on the mind.  Lucky to have found and successfully wooed an eligible young lady in a 
remote and barren social setting, Goethals was eager to marry and had no interest in interrupting 
those plans.  The young lieutenant’s refusal enraged Miles.  Always fearful of conspiracies and 
quick to assume ill-intent, it did not take much for Nelson Miles to banish someone from his 
trusted inner circle.  After this incident, Goethals was most definitely on the outside.  Miles 
quickly sent a letter to the Adjutant General requesting Goethals’s relief.  The request was 
promptly forwarded to the Chief of Engineers for consideration, who decided to transfer 
Goethals to an engineering district in Cincinnati, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel 
William E. Merrill.  The Adjutant General issued the necessary orders, and Goethals departed 
Vancouver Barracks in September, 1884.48    
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  His time at Vancouver Barracks provided Goethals with the first practical experiences 
of his career.  He learned much about working with troops of the line, reconnaissance, and 
mapmaking – skills that would prove useful later, during the Spanish American War.  At the 
same time, he was an inexperienced officer in the unenviable position of being the sole expert on 
all things related to engineering in the Department of the Columbia.  While he proved on more 
than one occasion to be capable of learning on the job and performing his duties well, he suffered 
from the absence of a more experienced engineer officer to serve as his mentor.  By 1884, 
Goethals had been an engineer for four years.  In that time, he had gained no practical experience 
in fortification projects and river and harbor improvements to which 53% of the officers in the 
Corps of Engineers were dedicated when Goethals had first reported to Vancouver Barracks.49   
In all likelihood, Goethals was blissfully unaware of this deficiency.  The problem with 
entrusting young officers to develop themselves is that they tend to be very unaware of what they 
do not know.  But Goethals would soon find a legitimate teacher.  By the sheer stroke of luck of 
angering Miles to that point that Miles requested his relief at the precise moment a duty position 
for an engineer lieutenant was opening in Cincinnati, Goethals was about to be assigned to a titan 
in the field who would not only point out his lack of experience, but would take innovative 
measures to teach him. 
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Early in his new assignment with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers First Cincinnati 
District, Goethals was tasked to conduct the preliminary examination for a potential river 
improvement project near New Albany Harbor, Indiana.  The young officer dutifully examined 
the river and its commercial traffic and spoke at length with local landowners.  In his report, 
Goethals wrote, “When the river is high enough to cover the bottom lands, it is stated that the 
force of the current sweeps over these lands from the mouth of Falling Run to Middle Creek, and 
it is anticipated that in time the soil will be entirely cut away, and the channel will then run in 
this direction instead of crossing into the Kentucky shore, as it does now.  What the farmers ask 
for is some protection from erosion.” 50  As Lieutenant Colonel William E. Merrill, chief of the 
First Cincinnati District, prepared to forward a copy to the Chief of Engineers in Washington, 
D.C., he drafted a letter to be included with Goethals’s report.  “It has been suggested,” he 
mused, “that there is a probability of the river changing its channel, and making a cut-off through 
Middle Creek.  I cannot see the slightest likelihood of such a change, as the route by way of 
Middle Creek is as long as the present channel, and there is therefore every inducement for the 
river to continue through the present open door rather than to batter down the side wall to make a 
new channel, neither shorter nor straighter than that in which it now flows.”  Merrill’s 
inexperienced subordinate had much to learn about rivers and river improvements.51 
Before he could be taught to any great extent, Goethals applied for six weeks of leave 
beginning in late November 1884.  He had not taken leave of any kind since September 1882, 
but as Goethals’s refusal of the Alaskan detail attests, he had personal matters to attend to.  With 
                                                          
50 Goethals to Lieut. Col. W. E. Merrill, October 11, 1884, quoted in U.S. Department of War, Report of the 
Secretary of War, 49th Cong., 1st sess., 1885, House Executive Document 1, Part 2, vol. II (Washington, DC:  
Government Printing Office, 1885), 1829-1830. 
51 Merrill to Brig. Gen. John Newton, October 14, 1884, quoted in Report of the Secretary of War, 49th Cong., 1st 
sess., vol. II, 1885, 1829-1830. 
33 
 
the leave approved, Goethals traveled directly to the Rodman home in New Bedford, 
Massachusetts, where he and Effie wed on December 3, 1884.52   
Returning for duty in early January, Goethals found that the First Cincinnati District was 
an excellent place to learn. Its responsibilities included river improvements along the Ohio River 
and several of its tributaries – including the Monongahela River in Pennsylvania and West 
Virginia, the Allegheny River in Pennsylvania, and the Muskingum River in Ohio.  Work on the 
Ohio River demanded the vast majority of the district’s time and resources, so much so that the 
Chief of Engineers created the Second Cincinnati District in 1880 to take responsibility for 
several tributaries of the Ohio and relieve some of Merrill’s burden.  The engineers on the Ohio 
were continuing a half-century effort, as Army engineers had been involved in improvement 
projects on the Ohio since 1824 when Henry Clay included Ohio River projects in his larger 
“American System,”  intending to improve inland commerce by making the river more 
navigable.  At normal stages, navigation was problematic at many points; at lower stages, it was 
impossible.53   
Prior to the Civil War, the focus was on maintaining a consistent channel at least thirty 
inches deep, which would allow easy passage for the shallow-draft steamers commonly used on 
the river.  Engineers busied themselves with dredging channels in some sections of the river and 
constructing wing dams along river embankments in other parts, attempting to increase the depth 
of the water by concentrating its flow.  They also frequently removed snags in the river caused 
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by the buildup of rocks, trees, and other debris after storms and flood stages.  These efforts 
allowed commerce to flow relatively freely, except during winter months when flows of ice 
threatened commercial shipping, especially on the uppermost reaches of the river and its northern 
tributaries.54  
After the Civil War, the Corps of Engineers became more heavily engaged on the Ohio 
River.  In addition to managing improvement efforts, Congress bought the Louisville and 
Portland Canal at the Falls of the Ohio near Louisville, Kentucky, and assigned its operation to 
the Army.  Additionally, technology and shipping techniques were rendering old approaches to 
river improvements obsolete.  By 1870, the heyday of shallow-draft steamboats had passed, 
quickly being replaced by towboats pushing or pulling a system of several interconnected barges.  
The new barge-towboat system was ideal for transporting bulk goods and commodities by river, 
but carried a deeper draft.  A consistent channel depth of six feet was now needed.  Dredging and 
building wing dams would no longer suffice.55            
In June 1870, Merrill took charge of what would later become known as the First 
Cincinnati District.  He had graduated at the top of West Point’s class of 1859 and saw service in 
the Civil War shortly thereafter.  Wounded and taken prisoner while on a reconnaissance mission 
early in the war, he continued to serve after his exchange and became the chief engineer for the 
Union Army of the Cumberland.  Reverting from a brevet rank of colonel to a regular Army rank 
of major after the war, Merrill was assigned to the Mississippi River commission, where he soon 
gained a reputation as a leading expert on the construction of large railroad bridges over inland 
waterways.  He had an aptitude for solving complex problems in nontraditional ways.  This 
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aptitude and the need to change the channel along the upper Ohio River from a depth of thirty 
inches to one of six feet were the major stimuli that produced the Davis Island Lock and Dam.  
This was the most radical and significant improvement project on the Ohio River in the late 
nineteenth century, and the project was entering its final year of construction when Goethals 
reported for duty.56   
The need for the Davis Island Lock and Dam arose because Pittsburgh was a hostage of 
its climate.  Although its position at the confluence of the Allegheny, Monongahela, and Ohio 
Rivers imbued it with vast commercial potential that attracted industrialists to the area, the water 
levels around Pittsburgh dropped sharply during dry weather, often to a depth of mere inches, 
bringing to a standstill all shipping and river trade.   Such dry spells usually lasted for several 
months, causing seasonal economic downturns that extended downriver to Cincinnati, Louisville, 
and other burgeoning towns where industries and communities were utterly dependent upon coal 
shipments from Pittsburgh.57   
The situation in 1871 was particularly extreme.  The Ohio River became prohibitively 
shallow in May, and did not rise again until the following winter.  Coal and goods earmarked for 
points downriver lingered idly in Pittsburgh’s once bustling warehouses.  Moreover, coal mined 
from the Monongahela River Basin that fueled Pittsburgh’s factories and plants no longer had a 
navigable water route to the city’s industrial northern district.  It now had to be transported from 
the landings on the Monongahela in convoys of mule-drawn wagons through the heart of 
downtown Pittsburgh, causing traffic jams and significant damage to city streets not designed to 
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bear the weight of such heavy loads.  Reacting to what had become an intolerable situation, 
Pittsburgh’s industrial and business leaders, with the active support of businesses and 
communities down the Ohio River Valley, petitioned the Corps of Engineers to take action to 
develop a permanently navigable harbor on the Ohio River at Pittsburgh.58  
Merrill had already been considering ways to canalize the Ohio in order to increase its 
channel depth to six feet and had come to believe that a system of locks and dams was the 
appropriate solution.  When the petition to develop a harbor at Pittsburgh reached his desk, 
Merrill proposed to build the first lock and dam in the projected Ohio River system five miles 
downriver from Pittsburgh, near Davis Island.  This drew strong objections from Pittsburgh’s 
coal shippers.59   
Utterly confused as to why coal shippers would oppose a measure that would ostensibly 
make shipping easier, Merrill accompanied a coal barge on a trip downriver.  He learned that 
locks are especially problematic to towboats guiding large numbers of barges.  A boat with 
several barges connected by a complex system of chains and cables would have to pause in front 
of a lock, “break tow” to get all barges through, and pause again on the far side of a lock to 
reassemble their barges.  As the coal fleets could only move downriver on water rises that 
usually only lasted for three days, forcing the fleet to break tow and pass through a lock one at a 
time would mean that only one third of Pittsburgh’s coal fleet could be used during any given 
water rise.60 
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Merrill was forced to reconsider his plans.  He determined that in order to meet the needs 
of all parties concerned, he would have to develop a unique lock and dam system with two 
defining characteristics.  First, the locks would have to be of larger dimensions than existed at 
the time, which would allow single ships and smaller tow-and-barge systems through at any 
time.  Second, the locks would be complemented by not-yet-designed movable dams that could 
be raised in order to build a navigable harbor upriver from the dam at low water stages, and 
lowered to allow large coal shipments to pass through intact during high water stages.  Nothing 
of the sort had ever been attempted in the United States, so Merrill was forced to look abroad for 
inspiration, triggering an unprecedented international exchange of hydraulic technology between 
the United States and Europe.61 
Pouring over European models, Merrill was drawn to the Chanoine dams then in use on 
the Seine River, which employed a series of rectangular wooden or metal panels, known as 
“wickets,” placed side by side.  In the lowered position, the wickets lie parallel with the river 
bottom, resting flat on top of a dam foundation with metal supports and mechanical apparatuses 
that, when activated, raise the wickets upward at steep angle to reach the raised position.  In the 
raised position, the force of the water pushing downriver against the face of the wickets locks the 
supports into place in the dam foundation, thus forming an effective dam.  Merrill planned a 
system in which a Chanoine dam would connect on one side of the river with a lock, which he 
designed to be 110 feet wide and 600 feet long.62   
Researching and creating this plan took a long time; advocating for the plan and 
convincing all interested parties took even more time.  Merrill did not need to expend much 
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effort convincing the Chief of Engineers of the soundness of his lock design; the expanded 
dimensions eventually became the standard for lock chambers constructed on inland American 
rivers and would continue to be the standard until the late twentieth century.  But it took a few 
years of adroit public advocacy before Merrill finally placated local opposition in 1878.  Only 
then did Merrill begin construction.63   
When construction began, it was limited to one lock and dam at Davis Island.  Merrill 
believed that a system of similar locks and dams would prove to be the most effective solution to 
the problem of creating a consistent six-foot channel in the Ohio River.  At the same time, he 
understood that his concept for the Davis Island Lock and Dam was quite radical and needed to 
be proven before it could be replicated.  Seven years after construction began and only months 
before it would be completed, Merrill wrote:  
In building the Davis Island Dam the engineer in charge had two objects in view.  One 
was to improve the harbor of Pittsburgh, and the other, and more important object, was to 
demonstrate the only way of radically improving the navigation of the Ohio River.  It was 
not to be expected that one movable dam would have any appreciable influence on 
navigation, but it could prove beyond cavil or misapprehension what a movable dam 
could do, how far it was adapted to the uses of the craft that navigate the Ohio, and how 
much it would cost.  By the middle of August [1885] the Davis Island Dam will be in 
operation.  It is hoped and expected that the work will be so successful as to lead to a 
demand for others like it, but it has been thought best not to press the matter until the 
pioneer dam has fully demonstrated its usefulness.64 
 Merrill was responsible for more than just the Davis Island Lock and Dam, and certainly 
could not handle his entire mission alone.  Like other engineer district chiefs, he was regularly 
provided with civilian assistants and one engineer lieutenant.  In his dealings with his lieutenants, 
Merrill demonstrated that he was not only a visionary engineer, but also far ahead of his time in 
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the practice of professional development.  His lieutenants came to look up to him as an almost 
fatherly figure as he demonstrated genuine interest in their professional education.65  Merrill’s 
approach to professional development was based on an implicit recognition that lieutenants at the 
time did not follow a standardized career path and had individual bases of knowledge built upon 
individual bases of experience.  Accordingly, he tailored his approach to each officer’s level of 
experience. 
 Prior to Goethals’s arrival, Merrill’s assistant was Lieutenant Frederick A. Mahan, who 
had served under Merrill on the Ohio since 1872.  Mahan was the son of Dennis Hart Mahan, 
who had served as the chair of West Point’s Department of Civil and Military Engineering from 
1832 until his death in 1871 and had written the texts still used in the academy’s engineering 
classes.  The lieutenant arrived with an uncommon breadth of theoretical knowledge and 
practical experience.  This led Merrill to develop Mahan by challenging him with incrementally 
increasing levels of responsibility.  Merrill first had Mahan assist him in studying foreign 
concepts of movable dams, and then brought Mahan into the planning process for the Davis 
Island project.  As the plans continued to be developed, Merrill placed Mahan in charge of 
several smaller dam construction and channel improvement projects elsewhere along the Ohio 
River.  Mahan succeeded at every turn and Merrill decided that he was ready for a major 
project.66  
 In 1875, he approached the Chief of Engineers, Brigadier General Andrew A. 
Humphreys, to extend Mahan’s assignment at Cincinnati so that he could assign Mahan as the 
engineer directly in charge of construction at Davis Island once construction began.  More 
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concerned with the immediate utility of officers’ assignments than with professional 
development through exposing officers to varied duties, Humphreys readily agreed to this 
arrangement.  From 1878 to 1884, Mahan was the engineer in charge of construction at Davis 
Island, with responsibility for the site, the execution of the plan, and the hiring and management 
of a civilian staff and labor force.  Merrill saw to the rest of his district, loosely supervised 
Mahan, and maintained personal control of higher organizational systems and logistics 
supporting the Davis Island project.67 
In 1884, after twelve years of service in the same assignment, Mahan was promoted to 
captain and transferred out of the First Cincinnati District, to be replaced in September of that 
year by Lieutenant Goethals.  Merrill learned of his new subordinate’s background and knew that 
he did not have the requisite knowledge or experience to manage the Davis Island construction 
site.  Accordingly, he made arrangements for one of his civilian assistants to take over for 
Mahan.  He had other plans to remedy the lieutenant’s lack of experience in inland river 
engineering.  Wanting to make a good first impression, Goethals reported to Merrill in his full 
and immaculately clean dress uniform.  Merrill looked him over and curtly informed Goethals 
that if he wished to continue to wear that uniform, he could remain in the office for clerical 
duties; but if he wanted to learn how to be an engineer, he would thereafter report in clothes 
more suitable for hard work in the field.68    
Merrill was as much a product of the school of experience as Goethals would become and 
was an avid proponent of the benefits of experiential learning.  Fittingly, he advised Goethals 
that the best way to learn river engineering was through practical experience.  What separated 
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him from most other district commanders, though, was that instead of sending Goethals out on 
projects of his own to sink or swim, he instead created a controlled and calculated program of 
instruction.   
Frequently wearing overalls on duty, Goethals became a student in Merrill’s improvised 
academy of river improvements.  Some of Goethals’s education involved conducting the 
preliminary examinations of potential new projects within the division, from which he could 
learn how to discern which projects were necessary, desirable, and feasible.  Most of his training 
took place within civilian work crews.  He started at the very bottom and worked his way up as 
he mastered the various tasks, serving first as a rodman on hydrographic surveys, then as the 
chief of a surveying party, then as the foreman of a concrete team, and finally as the chief of 
construction for a small project.  Goethals’s assignments took him not only through the various 
aspects of the Davis Island Lock and Dam project as it finally progressed toward completion, but 
also to various other construction, repair, and dredging projects along the Ohio and some of its 
tributaries from Pennsylvania to Kentucky.69  
Goethals found this practical approach to teaching and learning engineering to be very 
effective, and it stuck with him as the preferred method for professional development for the rest 
of his time in the service.  In 1908, the Corps of Engineers began sending new officers to the 
field to gain practical experience prior to attending the Engineer School of Application.  
Reporting to the Chief of Engineers on his first group of three “student officers,” Goethals wrote, 
“I started them in as chainmen and rodman on preliminary surveys and have worked them up.  
Promotion from one step to the other has been made after proficiency has been established in the 
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particular class of work on which they were engaged.”70 Writing from Panama in 1910 to his 
oldest son, then a lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers who would soon be assigned to the Canal 
Zone, Goethals outlined his plan for his son’s professional development in a manner reminiscent 
of Merrill’s methods, beginning with railroad management.  “I don’t know how long it will take 
you to master the method employed in operating a railroad,” he wrote, “but I shouldn’t imagine 
that it will require much of your time, after which you can go under Mr. Williamson on lock 
work, starting in as a foreman & working your way up as far as opportunity will permit.”71   
The Davis Island Lock and Dam was completed in the late summer of 1885, and 
subjected to two months of tests before it was finally opened for public use on the seventh of 
October.  The Ohio River Commission and Pittsburgh Chamber of Commerce planned a grand 
opening and dedication ceremony for the occasion and asked Lieutenant Colonel Merrill for a list 
of officers who contributed to the effort, so that they could invite those officers to the ceremony.  
Merrill included Goethals on the list, but Goethals was unable to attend, having been ordered to 
West Point in August 1885 to serve as an instructor in the Department of Civil and Military 
Engineering.72 
Goethals served under Merrill for only eleven months, but they were eleven critical 
months of intensive education that was not limited to practical training on how to execute the 
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various tasks associated with engineering on inland waterways.  Merrill provided Goethals with 
equally valuable examples of how to be an effective organizational leader – a topic not included 
in Goethals’s courses of study at West Point and the Engineer School of Application.  Dedicating 
so much time and effort to researching movable dams and developing an innovative new concept 
for the Davis Island Lock and Dam, Merrill likely felt an urge to direct its construction 
personally.  But he was able to step back and delegate authority to trusted subordinates, direct 
higher-level organizational systems and logistics efforts supporting the construction effort, and 
give proper attention to the rest of his district.  By replacing Mahan with a civilian assistant in 
1884, Merrill maintained this practice when Goethals arrived, allowing Goethals to observe an 
effective system of organizational leadership in operation.73 
Furthermore, Merrill provided Goethals with a positive example of leadership, actively 
taking care of those who worked for him.  Merrill’s concern for his subordinates did not stop 
with his lieutenants.  He made a point of negotiating with railroads in his district to secure 
reduced fares for those of his contracted laborers who commuted by rail from their homes to 
their work sites.  Also, while work was nearing completion, Merrill pressed his superiors for 
funds to be included in his appropriations to make a payment to the family of at least one of three 
civilian workers who were killed in construction accidents at Davis Island.74 
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Goethals’s short tour with the First Cincinnati District was especially important to his 
professional development.  He departed Cincinnati with a base of professional knowledge vastly 
larger than he possessed when he arrived.  In fact, it is difficult to imagine that Goethals’s later 
career would have assumed the course that it did without his experiences on the Ohio River 
under Merrill’s tutelage.  He would go on to solve technical engineering problems on the 
Tennessee River and in Panama by applying lessons learned on the Ohio in 1884 and 1885.  
More importantly, the systematic approach to organizational management and the 
accessible and active style of leadership that Goethals would become known for in Panama 
strongly reflect William Merrill’s influence.  In his 1922 interview with Samuel Crowther, 
Goethals described his main concern in Panama in terms of organizational leadership: “My chief 
interest in Panama was not in the engineering but in the men.  I felt that the canal would be built 
if we could manage the men.  We managed the men and the canal was built.”  As he saw it, 
Panama presented more significant organizational challenges than it did engineering problems, 
and Merrill helped prepare him to rise to the occasion. 75 
Goethals’s assignment under Merrill on the Ohio River was the capstone of the 
preparatory phase of Goethals’s career in which he was both a student and an apprentice.  As a 
student at City College, West Point, and the Engineer School of Application, Goethals grew 
intellectually, gained a foundation of engineering theory and principles, and most importantly, 
became socialized to his profession, developing a deeply felt personal identification with the 
Army that captured both his imagination and his ambition.  His first assignment at Vancouver 
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Barracks provided practical experience in reconnaissance and civil engineering; and through the 
high praise he received from senior officers, it also built Goethals’s confidence in himself and in 
his prospects for a successful Army career.  From his subsequent assignment on the Ohio River, 
Goethals learned critically important lessons in river improvements, construction engineering, 
management, and organizational leadership that would prove to be essential as his career moved 
forward. 
Goethals’s success to date was the product of a combination of talent, training, luck, and 
personal connections.  As an individual, Goethals was exceptionally intelligent and ambitious, 
and after he focused his ambitions on the singular goal of a successful career as an Army officer, 
exceptionally dedicated and driven.  As for training, West Point and the Engineer School of 
Application focused and directed Goethals’s considerable abilities and facilitated Goethals’s 
entrance into the profession with a foundation of theoretical knowledge.  Luck was decisive in 
two key instances.  Had Samuel Cox’s original nominee for West Point not failed out, or had the 
mother of Coroner Waltman’s nephew been more amenable to the idea of her son in the Army, 
Goethals would never have entered West Point and may have become lost to history as an 
anonymous shopkeeper in New York.  Later, had Brigadier General Miles not requested 
Goethals’s relief at all, or had he not requested it at the exact moment that Lieutenant Mahan 
earned his promotion to captain and created a vacancy for an engineer lieutenant under Merrill, 
Goethals would have missed a key developmental experience, and the future trajectory of his 
career would have been fundamentally altered.  
Personal connections mattered more than any other factor in this phase of Goethals’s 
career.  The first important connection was Nathaniel Beers, without whose active advocacy for 
Goethals’s nomination to West Point in 1876, Goethals may not have entered the Army in the 
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first place.  Second, and perhaps more important, was Lieutenant Colonel William Merrill.  No 
policies existed at the time standardizing the development of junior officers in the various 
engineer districts.  Merrill’s approach was unique and individually tailored to quickly imbue 
Goethals with knowledge absolutely necessary for success within the Corps of Engineers – 
knowledge that he had until then missed out on due to the nature of his first assignment at 
Vancouver Barracks. 
As Goethals moved beyond this phase of his career, his formal education and 
apprenticeship as an officer, the dynamics of the interplay between training, talent, luck, and 
personal connections would change considerably.  Few institutional professional development 
systems beyond West Point and the schools of application existed in the late nineteenth century 
U.S. Army.76  As a result, the degree to which training influenced the development of any given 
officer decreased sharply, and the degree to which talent, luck, and personal connections affected 
officers’ careers increased dramatically.   
In the late summer of 1885, Lieutenant George W. Goethals was a successful and 
promising young officer.  Armed with his past schooling and with five years of experience, he 
was on his way to join the faculty at West Point to help mold a new cohort of budding officers.  
Neither he nor the Army were masters of his fate, and the Army would from now on do very 
little to develop and prepare him for future challenges
                                                          
76 Coffman, The Old Army, 278-281; Millis, 139; Nenninger, 3-7 and 21-31; and Weigley, 273-281. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Journeyman, 1885-1894 
 
 Orders to serve as an instructor at the U.S. Military Academy were not easy to come by.  
In 1886, at the end of Goethals’s first year as a member of the faculty, the Chief of Engineers 
reported that only five out of 108 officers in the Corps of Engineers were detached for duty at 
West Point.  Four of those officers served under Professor James Mercur in the Department of 
Civil and Military Engineering, responsible for teaching engineering theory and concepts related 
to designing and constructing fortifications and basic structures to cadets in their first-class 
(senior) year.1   
The assignment of officers to academic departments, in this case the Department of Civil 
and Military Engineering, typically began with a request from the department’s professor.  As 
vacancies or the need for additional instructors arose, department heads submitted lists of 
“qualified” officers directly to the War Department, at which point the appropriate bureau chief 
would make the final selection.  Department heads usually determined an officer’s qualification 
based on that officer’s performance as a West Point cadet.  Typically, professors’ lists of 
                                                          
1 U.S. Department of War, Report of the Secretary of War (1886), 49th Cong., 2nd sess., House Executive Document 
1, Part 2, vol. II (Washington, DC:  Government Printing Office, 1886), 4; “Official Register of the Officers and 
Cadets of the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., June, 1878,” Official Registers of Officers and Cadets, 
USMA, http://www.library.usma.edu/index.cfm?TabID=6&LinkCategoryID=49 [accessed April 7, 2013], 6; and 
Betros, 21.  Two of those officers assigned to Company E of the Army’s lone engineer battalion.  The company was 
posted at the academy and was responsible for cadets’ field training in Practical Military Engineering, covering 
instruction of tactical engineering, signaling, and telegraphy. The “Official Register” lists one officer, Lieutenant 
James G. Warren, under both the Department of Civil and Military Engineering and the Department of Practical 
Military Engineering while the Report of the Secretary of War lists him only as assigned to Company E, or the 
Department of Practical Military Engineering.   
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requested officers consisted of their best students from four or five years earlier.  Although 
Professor Mercur had not been a part of the faculty when Goethals was a cadet, Goethals’s 
record as having finished first in his class in the Department of Civil and Military Engineering 
with a perfect score of 300 of 300 possible points was still known at the academy. 2  To fill 
pending vacancies in his department, Mercur submitted a request for two officers to be detailed 
to his department in the summer of 1885.  In the request, he included a list of five desired 
officers, with Goethals first in order of preference.  Brigadier General John Newton, the Chief of 
Engineers, endorsed the request, approving the detail of both Goethals and 1st Lieutenant John 
Biddle, who had been third in order of preference.3   
Interestingly, Newton did not make his decision based on the Mercur’s preferences, the 
developmental needs of the officers under consideration, or on his sense of Goethals’s and 
Biddle’s aptitude for the job.  He selected Goethals and Biddle because he viewed them as 
unimportant to the work in the districts to which they were assigned, stating that for the others, 
“to relieve them from their present duties would be disadvantageous to the interests of the 
service.”  This statement sheds light on General Newton’s philosophy on assignments.  For him, 
“the interests of the service” outweighed all other factors and was viewed through the lens of 
near-term utility.  As with the case of Lieutenant Mahan on the Ohio River, the long-term 
benefits of the developmental opportunities inherent in exposing officers to a variety of 
assignments were not considered to be high on the list of “the interests of the service.”4 
                                                          
2 Ambrose, 202;  “Official Register of the Officers and Cadets of the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., 
June, 1880,” 6, 12, and 28; Richard C. Drum to Chief of Engineers, June 19, 1885, File 2413, Box 49, Entry 52, RG 
77, NARA I. 
3 Chief of Engineers to Adjutant General, June 22, 1885, File 2413, Box 49, Entry 52, RG 77, NARA I. 
4 Ibid. 
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Serving as an instructor in the Department of Civil and Military Engineering was an 
opportunity for Goethals to enhance his knowledge of engineering theory and practice.  If 
serving under Merrill on the Ohio River was an education in and of itself, serving as an instructor 
at the academy was a postgraduate course.  The established methods of pedagogy at West Point 
relied on daily classroom recitation.  While this was not the best way to teach cadets, it certainly 
forced instructors to have a firm command of all assigned texts.  In order to fulfill his duties as 
an instructor, Goethals had to spend many hours studying and committing concepts to memory.5 
This could have been a pointless exercise, as Goethals’s perfect score in the department 
in 1880 indicated that he had already memorized the assigned text, front to back.  But as with 
many things in life, timing is everything.  The Department of Civil and Military Engineering had 
begun to revise Dennis Hart Mahan’s old texts in 1882 in order to incorporate technological and 
procedural advances and innovations.  By the time Goethals joined the faculty in 1885, the 
department was using new texts reflecting the most up-to-date knowledge from the field.  In 
studying to fulfill his responsibilities as an instructor, Goethals had to absorb new concepts, 
expanding and enhancing the base of knowledge he could apply to engineering problems later in 
his career.6 
Goethals spent two years as an instructor before advancing to assistant professor in 1888 
prior to the start of his last academic year in the department.  In his new position, he would be 
responsible for much of the engineering instruction for the rising “firsties” of the class of 1889.  
                                                          
5 Betros, Carved from Granite, 20. 
6 Crackel, 162. 
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One member of this class, Cadet Charles Young, had been born into slavery in Kentucky in 
1864.  In 1889, he was the lone African American at the United States Military Academy.7 
Young was not the academy’s first black cadet.  Twenty-two African Americans had 
been admitted prior to Young, starting in 1870.  These cadets faced many more challenges than 
their white colleagues, however, and only two of Young’s predecessors had actually graduated.  
James W. Smith of South Carolina was the first African American admitted in 1870.  Rather than 
face the usual hazing routine that was the lot of every other fourth-class cadet, Smith faced 
complete social isolation and ostracism from the rest of the corps of cadets.  This would become 
the cadets’ standard response to the arrival of African American cadets.  Smith struggled with 
this situation and became involved in a brawl with a group of cadets late in his plebe year, which 
caused him to be turned back into the next class, and eventually dismissed.  This also marked the 
start of a trend; those African American cadets who broke under the strain of social isolation and 
actively fought back would face a more hostile environment, began to fall behind in their studies, 
and would ultimately resign or face dismissal.8 
Henry O. Flipper was the first African American to overcome the obstacles and graduated 
with the class of 1877, at the end of Goethals’s first year as a cadet.  He found that the officers at 
the academy generally treated him fairly, but that he faced ostracism and derision from the corps 
of cadets.  He responded in kind, bearing the silent treatment silently and refusing to respond to 
personal slights or break down in the face of social isolation.  As a result, he found the pressures 
                                                          
7 “Official Register of the Officers and Cadets of the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., June, 1889,” 
Official Registers of Officers and Cadets, USMA, 
http://www.library.usma.edu/index.cfm?TabID=6&LinkCategoryID=49 [accessed April 7, 2013], 6; Shellum, 3 and 
123. 
8 Crackel, 145; and Shellum, 41-43; and Ambrose, 231-237. 
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to be manageable and graduated in June 1877, ranked fiftieth in a class of sixty-four.  The second 
black cadet to make it through all four years and graduate from the academy was John H. 
Alexander, who emulated Flipper’s quiet and determined approach in the face of adversity and 
graduated a decade later, ranked thirty-second out of sixty-four in the class of 1887.9 
Reporting to West Point on June 14, 1884, and being among sixty-nine out of 130 
nominees to pass the entrance medical and academic examinations, Young joined the class of 
1888 while John Alexander was in his third-class (sophomore) year.  While he emulated 
Flipper’s and Alexander’s responses to adversity, Young did not adjust well to the academic 
demands of the academy.  He performed well in English and French classes, but was one of 
fifteen cadets found deficient in mathematics during examinations in June 1885.  The Academic 
Board elected to retain him, but forced Young and five of his fellow classmates to repeat their 
plebe year and be turned back to the class of 1889.10 
Cadet Young recovered from this setback and managed to meet all standards up to his 
first-class year before again falling into serious academic trouble.  Never gifted in the technical 
subjects, Young finished the first semester of his first-class year ranked forty-eighth out of forty-
nine in Civil and Military Engineering.  He continued to struggle in Goethals’s class.  In the 
spring examinations at the end of his final semester, Goethals declared him deficient in 
engineering, endangering Young’s ability to graduate and receive a commission.11  
                                                          
9 Shellum, 43-45; Crackel, 145-147; “Official Register of the Officers and Cadets of the U.S. Military Academy, 
West Point, N.Y., June, 1877,” 13; and “Official Register of the Officers and Cadets of the U.S. Military Academy, 
West Point, N.Y., June, 1878,” Official Registers of Officers and Cadets, USMA, 
http://www.library.usma.edu/index.cfm?TabID=6&LinkCategoryID=49 [accessed April 7, 2013], 10. 
10 Crackel, 147; and Shellum, 38 and 54-56. 
11 Shellum, 116 and 123-125 
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The Academic Board met in June, and in its initial deliberations, found Young to be 
deficient in engineering and recommended him for dismissal.  However, Goethals’s “sympathy 
was aroused.”12  He intervened and prevailed upon the board to grant Cadet Young a reprieve to 
study and face re-examination prior to September 1, 1889.  While preparing to leave West Point 
at the end of the summer, Goethals set aside one or two hours every day for the entire summer to 
tutor Young and assist him in preparing for his re-examination. Two days after Goethals left for 
his next assignment, Young satisfactorily passed the exam and was awarded a commission as a 
second lieutenant of cavalry.  He was the last in the class of 1889 to graduate, and was both the 
third and the last African American to commission from West Point until Benjamain O. Davis, 
Jr. graduated with the class of 1936.13 
Young was profoundly grateful for Goethals’s efforts.  He would proclaim in later years 
that he could never forget “the disinterested help of . . . General Goethals.”  Thinking about those 
who treated him well during his cadet years, Young went on to rhapsodize that “the world is 
better and only worth living perhaps, because it has its Skerretts, Bethels, Goethals, Gordons, 
Barnums, Haans, and Langhornes with the others of that stripe.”14   
                                                          
12 George W Goethals to Ada M. Young, May 8, 1922, printed in Patricia W. Romero, ed., I Too Am America:  
Documents from 1619 to the Present (Cornwells Heights, PA:  The Publisher’s Agency, Inc., 1978), 190.  Writing to 
Young’s widow after his death in 1922, Goethals described the events of May-August 1885 in a somewhat detached 
manner:  “I regret to state that I know little of Colonel Young’s career at West Point outside of the Section Room in 
Civil and Military Engineering.  He had considerable difficulty with the course and was deficient in it . . . I was 
leaving West Point, intending to remain there during the summer; my sympathies were aroused, and I offered to give 
him a certain amount of time daily in order to assist him in preparation for the examination which he was to take the 
last of August.  This I did and subsequently learned that he successfully passed it.” 
13 Crackel, 147-149; Shellum, 125-128; and “Official Register of the Officers and Cadets of the U.S. Military 
Academy, West Point, N.Y., June, 1889,” Official Registers of Officers and Cadets, USMA, 
http://www.library.usma.edu/index.cfm?TabID=6&LinkCategoryID=49 [accessed April 7, 2013], 11. 
14 Charles Young to Delamere Skerrett, July 13, 1915, reprinted in Shellum, 131-132. 
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Contrary to what Young may have thought, the assistance Goethals rendered Young was 
not the product of egalitarian racial attitudes.  While clearly more forward-thinking than many of 
his contemporaries, Goethals was still very much a creature of his times, subject to the prejudices 
and discriminatory modes of thought that were prevalent in late-nineteenth-century America.  
When the Army transferred an African American cavalry unit to West Point in 1907, he privately 
expressed disapproval, writing, “I am sorry they have sent the negro troopers to West Point.  I 
can appreciate the feeling of the Southerners on that score, and the powers that be ought to have 
considered that point.”15  He also maintained segregation within the Panama Canal Zone, and 
took no action to change a highly racialized and discriminatory pay system that had been 
established for the workforce at the Panama Canal prior to his appointment as Chief Engineer.16  
Instead, the encounter with Charles Young demonstrates that Goethals had, despite such 
prejudices, an uncommon ability to deal with people on an individual basis with genuine 
empathy, and with a keenly felt sense of obligation to care for individuals in his charge.17  
Goethals was always very effective in forging connections and dealing effectively with 
individuals, much more so than with groups.  This trait would inform his approaches to 
management and leadership for his entire career. 
                                                          
15 George W. Goethals to “Toodles” [George R. Goethals], April 4, 1907, Box 3, George W. Goethals Papers, LC. 
16 Greene, 123-158. 
17 While Julie Greene interprets this as paternalistic and perhaps manipulative behavior in The Canal Builders (see 
Greene, 60-62), contemporary observers regularly pointed to these traits as among Goethals’s best and most 
laudable qualities.  See “When Goethals Made the Dirt Fly,” Literary Digest 96, February 11, 1928, 45; Albert 
Edwards, “The Boss of the Job,” The Outlook, June 24 1911, in The Outlook, a Weekly Newspaper vol. 98, May 6 – 
August 26, 1911.  New York:  The Outlook Company, 1911, 394; Joseph Bucklin Bishop, “The Personality of 
Colonel Goethals,” Scribner’s Magazine 57, February 1915, 145-146; and Edgar Young, “General George W. 
Goethals,” New York Herald Tribune, February 5, 1928.  In this case, I trust the weight of contemporary opinion, 
particularly as Greene’s interpretation seems to be unduly influenced by that of Marie C. Gorgas, whose views were 
colored by the personal tension, perhaps animosity, between Goethals and her husband, William C. Gorgas.  See 
Griffin, “Goethals and the Panama Canal,” 332-361. 
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Beyond his interaction with Charles Young, Goethals was an effective and well-respected 
instructor.  Although he sometimes described Goethals as a taskmaster and a “mean cuss,”18 
Charles R. Rhodes of West Point’s class of 1889 recounted that Goethals was included when his 
classmates invited their favorite faculty members to a graduation celebration involving a dinner 
at the Hoffman House in New York City and a Broadway show.19  Near the end of his 
assignment, Professor Mercur demonstrated the regard he held for Goethals by inducing Colonel 
John Parke, then the superintendent of West Point, to petition the War Department to extend the 
lieutenant’s detail to the Department of Civil and Military Engineering.20 
Brigadier General Thomas L. Casey, who had assumed duties as Chief of Engineers in 
1888, refused the request.  With the change in chiefs came a change in assignment philosophy.  
Somewhat ahead of his time, Casey considered officers’ developmental needs to be a priority 
when considering their assignment options.  Explaining why he would not agree to the extension, 
Casey wrote, “The Army Register shows that Lieutenants of Engineers are now promoted to 
Captains after from 10 to 11 years of service.  They then become assignable to the charge of 
works and are needed in that capacity.  Of the 9 years of service of Lieutenant Goethals, he has 
served but 2 on rivers and harbors.”21  Despite the fact that this statement reveals weaknesses in 
administrative systems by wrongly attributing two years of river and harbor work to Goethals 
                                                          
18 Quoted in Shellum, Black Cadet in a White Bastion:  Charles Young at West Point (Lincoln, NE:  Bison Books, 
2006), 123. 
19 Shellum, 162n40.  Rhodes had identified some of the faculty by nickname, and Shellum did his best to match 
names nicknames.  He is unable to identify one faculty member who is identified as “the Goat.”  This almost 
certainly refers to Goethals, whose colleagues from his own cadet days frequently referred to him as “Goat,” as 
indicated in George H. Morgan to George W. Goethals, August 22, 1911, Container 14, George W. Goethals Papers, 
LC.  
20 Thomas L. Casey to Acting Adjutant General, August 28, 1889, pp 253-254, Volume 9, Entry 73, RG 77, NARA 
I. 
21 Ibid. 
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when he had only been assigned to river duty for a mere eleven months, such thinking 
represented a fundamental improvement from the lack of concern for officers’ developmental 
needs evinced by General Newton.  At the same time, the contrasting approaches demonstrate 
that the Army’s approach to professional development was still unsystematic and thoroughly 
subject to the varying beliefs and practices of individual leaders.  
Thus ending in 1889, Goethals’s assignment to West Point’s Department of Civil and 
Military Engineering may be viewed as turning point in his career.  For the first time, there is 
demonstrable evidence of Goethals not only learning and developing as a result of his 
experiences, but also applying lessons learned in the past.  Studying to prepare for his duties as 
an instructor was an important developmental exercise for Goethals.  At the same time, by 
intervening on behalf of Cadet Young in 1889, Goethals demonstrated that he had absorbed and 
was prepared to apply lessons learned from William E. Merrill on the Ohio, particularly with 
regard to taking personal responsibility for a subordinate’s development.  Goethals did not have 
to intervene to change the Academic Board’s decision to dismiss Cadet Young, nor did he have 
to spend his last summer at West Point tutoring Young on a daily basis to prepare him for 
reexamination.  He was compelled to act, however, and played a critical role in the successful 
conclusion of Cadet Charles Young’s West Point odyssey, and the beginning of a successful 
career that would last until Colonel Charles Young retired due to medical disability in 1917.22 
On orders to return to river duty, the recently expanded Goethals family – a son, George 
Rodman Goethals, had been born at West Point in March 188623 – departed West Point at the 
end of August 1889.  His orders instructed Goethals to return to Cincinnati.  This time, he was 
                                                          
22 Crackel, 145. 
23 Bishop and Bishop, 58. 
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assigned to the sleepy Second Cincinnati District, which was still responsible for routine work on 
several tributaries to the Ohio River.24   
He did not have time to settle in before the situation changed.  Another engineer 
lieutenant, Graham D. Fitch, had been ordered to transfer from duties in Milwaukee to the 
Nashville District in order to assist Lieutenant Colonel John W. Barlow’s efforts to improve the 
Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers.  Prior to arriving in Nashville, however, Lieutenant Fitch 
grew ill to the point that his ability to continue serving in the Army was in doubt, and was 
ordered to Washington in to be evaluated by a medical board.  Viewing the projects in the 
Nashville District as critically important, the Chief of Engineers searched for a lieutenant to fill 
the vacancy in Nashville.  Because he had just arrived and did not have time to become an 
essential part of any work in Cincinnati, Goethals received orders to report to Barlow in 
Nashville.25  This was an incredible stroke of luck for Goethals. Challenges on the Tennessee 
River would test his knowledge and abilities more than anything in his career to date, and would 
provide exceptionally valuable developmental opportunities that made possible Goethals’s 
journey to the Panama Canal. 
With a meandering and confused course, the Tennessee River is unique among inland 
American rivers.  Beginning at the confluence of the Holston and French Broad Rivers in the 
mountains east of Knoxville, Tennessee, the river runs in a southwesterly direction until reaching 
Chattanooga, where Lookout Mountain and its neighbors force the river to adjust rapidly in a 
series of sharp, narrow bends before resuming its southwesterly track, crossing into northeast 
                                                          
24 Major H.M. Adams to Redfield Proctor, August 14, 1889, pg 564, Volume 10, Entry 73, RG 77, NARA I. 
25 Captain Thomas Turtle to Redfield Proctor, September 4, 1889, pg 649, Volume 10, Entry 73, RG 77, NARA I; 
and John C. Kelton to Surgeon General, September 28, 1889 and Special Orders No. 238, A.G.O., October 12, 1889, 
File # 3644-ACP-1880, Box 667, Entry 297, RG 94, NARA I. 
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Alabama.  Reaching Guntersville, Alabama, the Tennessee abruptly changes its course, turning 
obliquely northwest to traverse the rest of northern Alabama.  Upon reaching the town of 
Waterloo in the state’s northwestern corner, the river steers almost directly north, flowing 
through western Tennessee and into Kentucky before reaching its mouth on the Ohio River near 
Paducah.26 
 Inhabitants of the Tennessee River Valley developed a strong interest in the commercial 
potential of their river after steamers began plying the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers after the 
steamboat Enterprise’s pioneering journey in 1815.  But there were significant hazards impeding 
navigation of the Tennessee, particularly in its middle section between Chattanooga and 
Waterloo.  The sharp bends below Chattanooga, known in the nineteenth century as “the Suck,” 
were particularly dangerous, even for experienced hands.  The real problem, though, lay 
approximately 195 miles downriver from Chattanooga, in northern Alabama’s Muscle Shoals.27  
 The Muscle Shoals region contained four separate hazards.  Moving downriver from east 
to west, a boat would first encounter an area of wide shallows at Elk River Shoals just after 
passing Brown’s Ferry.   After negotiating the shallows, the boat would next come upon Big 
Muscle Shoals, a fifteen mile stretch of rapids and cascades in which the river fell a total of 85 
feet.  The channel here was narrow where it existed at all.  Big Muscle Shoals had formed 
                                                          
26 Donald Davidson, The Tennessee, Volume One, The Old River: From Frontier to Secession, Southern Classics 
Series edition (Nashville, TN:  J.S. Sanders & Company, 1991), 5-13. 
27 Davidson, The Tennessee, Volume One, The Old River, 230-231; U.S. War Department, Letter from the Secretary 
of War, Transmitting Report of the Surveys on the Tennessee River, Made in Compliance with the Act of March 2, 
1867, 40th Cong., 2nd sess., 1868, House Executive Document 271, 4-7; and “The Mussel Shoals Canal,” Harper’s 
Weekly, October 18, 1890.  Nineteenth century sources are inconsistent in their spelling of the area, usually choosing 
between “Mussel Shoals” and “Muscle Shoals.”  The latter appears relatively consistently in government documents 
and in sources from the twentieth century.  I have chosen to use “Muscle Shoals” in the text, and have changed 
“Mussel Shoals” to “Muscle Shoals” in some quotations for the sake of consistency.  Original spelling will be 
maintained in the footnotes where appropriate, such as in titles of articles. 
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because of the presence of flinty, non-eroding rocks deposited on top of and among the limestone 
and sandstone that is generally prevalent throughout the entire riverbed of the Tennessee.  With 
the river unable to cut a channel through these unyielding rocks, this area became a wide, 
shallow basin full of cascades, reefs, and river islands.  At ½ to 1 ½ miles in width, a fifty-foot 
rise in the river stage at Chattanooga would only produce a five-foot rise at Big Muscle Shoals.  
Three miles after clearing Big Muscle Shoals, the boat would come upon Little Muscle Shoals, a 
four-mile, slightly less extreme version of its larger cousin.  One mile after breaking free from 
Little Muscle Shoals, the boat would pass by Florence, Alabama, and then come upon Colbert 
and Bee Tree Shoals, an eight-mile stretch of shallows and shoals made up of sand, broken 
gravel, and rocks in which the river fell another twenty feet.28 
 While Colbert and Bee Tree Shoals could not be ignored, Little Muscle Shoals, Big 
Muscle Shoals, and Elk River Shoals were more significant.  Together, they constituted 37 miles 
of nearly continuous hazards, with Big Muscle Shoals and Elk River Shoals being an absolute 
obstruction to free navigation of the river, except for during extremely high water stages.  
According to engineers who surveyed the area in 1867, there was “no channel at low water in 
this part of the river; in many places a person can walk across the river without wetting his feet, 
and the lightest flatboat cannot descend the shoals without being assisted in many places on 
rollers.”29 
                                                          
28 U.S. War Department, Letter from the Secretary of War, Transmitting the Information Required by a Resolution of 
the House of Representatives of the 16th January Last, in Relation to an Examination of the Muscle Shoals in 
Tennessee River, with a View to Removing the Obstructions to the Navigation Thereof and the Construction of a 
Canal Around the Same, 20th Cong., 1st sess., 1828, H.Doc 284, 5-9; Letter from the Secretary of War, 40th Cong., 
2nd sess., 1868, 13-19 and 25; and Davidson, The Tennessee, Volume One, The Old River, 284-286. 
29 Letter from the Secretary of War, 40th Cong., 2nd sess., 1868, 25-26; and Davidson, The Tennessee, Volume One, 
The Old River, 284. 
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 The Muscle Shoals, situated roughly at the midpoint of the river, effectively divided the 
upper and lower Tennessee into two separate rivers for trade and commerce.  A major trade 
imbalance developed between them.  Steamboats could ply the waters between Paducah and 
Florence with relative ease, but communities upriver from Florence could only ship goods 
downriver during limited windows of opportunity within two or three months out of the year 
when conditions were good enough to allow flatboats to traverse the shoals.  Otherwise, these 
communities had to rely on small keelboats.  Business owners in Knoxville tried to entice 
steamers to run the gauntlet at high water stages in the 1820s and 1830s, but the journey was 
more risky than profitable.  On average, only one steamer would make the attempt in any given 
year.30 
 The only viable solution to problems posed by the Muscle Shoals hazards appeared to be 
a lateral canal around the lengthy belt of obstacles.  The first attempt to build a canal was 
managed by the state of Alabama.  The plans were ambitious, calling for an intricate system of 
improvements from the confluence of the Elk and Tennessee Rivers at the head of the Elk River 
Shoals all the way to Colbert Shoals, including a long canal along the northern bank of the 
Tennessee River from Brown’s Ferry to Florence.31   
Construction began in 1831, but the Alabama state government mismanaged the funds 
that had been set aside for the project.  The canal engineers were forced to scale back their plans, 
building a canal at Big Muscle Shoals just over fourteen miles long, sixty feet wide, and six feet 
deep, with  seventeen locks to mitigate the descent of the river.  Although the canal’s design and 
construction were sound, the decision to limit all improvement efforts to Big Muscle Shoals 
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doomed the effort to insignificance and oblivion.  The canal opened in 1836 and soon proved to 
be nearly useless, unreachable on either end except at high water stages because its engineers had 
taken no measures to facilitate navigation through the Elk River Shoals and Little Muscle Shoals 
above and below the canal.  The canal at Big Muscle Shoals fell into disuse and disrepair after 
1838.32 
 The Civil War interrupted both commercial traffic and improvement efforts on the 
Tennessee River.  Advocates for improvement resumed their agitations almost immediately after 
the war ended.  Opening the river for commercial navigation from its head to its mouth became 
widely viewed as a way to stimulate the region’s economy and hasten its recovery from the war.  
In his 1868 report on a survey of the Tennessee that Congress had ordered the year before, Major 
George Weitzel advocated for a renewed focus on river improvement projects, including a 
second canal project at Muscle Shoals.  He reasoned that completely opening the river “would be 
the means of giving a poverty-stricken community an opportunity to recover from the disastrous 
effects of a war, and give employment to a large class of deserving people who are said to be out 
of employment.”  The report was endorsed by both the Chief of Engineers and Secretary of War 
Edwin Stanton.33 
 Along the Tennessee River, commercial steamboat traffic gradually increased after the 
war.  The Muscle Shoals area remained impassable for large vessels, and although communities 
on the upper Tennessee built their own steamboats for local trade, they remained unable to ship 
goods downriver to Paducah and beyond.  This was especially frustrating for the rapidly 
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developing commercial-industrial sector in Chattanooga, where businesses produced heavy 
industrial goods that they wanted to ship to ports on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers as cheaply 
as possible.  A viable river route was seen as both a means of transportation and a means of 
checking the rising power and prices of the railroads.  In 1871, responding to advocates for 
renewed Tennessee River improvements, the Corps of Engineers established a new district under 
Major Walter McFarland at Chattanooga.  The district would plan and implement projects to 
improve navigation on the Tennessee, with a goal of ensuring open navigation of the full river 
for at least nine months of an average year for steamboats carrying a burden of up to 750 tons.34 
 Understanding that the greatest impediment to free navigation of the river was Muscle 
Shoals, McFarland devoted the bulk of his time to studying the problem and developing plans for 
a new system of improvements in the Muscle Shoals region.  He developed a concept centered 
on restoring and expanding the first canal at Big Muscle Shoals and addressing the problems at 
Elk River Shoals and Little Muscle Shoals in order to facilitate access to the main canal.  At Elk 
River Shoals, McFarland intended to build a short, two-lock canal and blast a channel through a 
reef that separated the foot of that canal from the head of Big Muscle Shoals.  There, McFarland 
planned to expand, widen, and strengthen the old canal, consolidate its 17-lock system into nine 
locks, dam the creeks and ravines that emptied into the canal, and physically carry the canal over 
the mouth of Shoal Creek by constructing an aqueduct 90 feet long and 60 feet wide.  At Little 
Muscle Shoals, McFarland believed that the channel could be deepened and the rapid current 
managed through dredging and the construction of wing dams along the embankments of the 
river. Ready to proceed, the second effort at Muscle Shoals hit its first delay when the building 
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that doubled as McFarland’s house and headquarters, where the only copies of the plans were 
kept, burned to the ground on January 13, 1874.35  
 In 1875, work finally began at Muscle Shoals under contracted labor, but soon 
encountered more difficulties.  Problems with contractors, disease in the laborers’ camps, and a 
dearth of appropriations caused significant delays.  In 1876, McFarland was reassigned to duty 
along the Canadian border and replaced by Major William R. King, who would stay for a decade 
and make important enhancements and corrections to the effort.  Such improvements included 
firing inefficient or inept contractors, converting to a system that relied on hired labor under the 
district’s direct supervision, and building a railroad along the canal’s towpath to shuttle supplies 
during construction and help guide vessels through after it opened, thus reducing the risk of 
careless pilots damaging the canal.  King also created a systematic organization for the work, 
establishing divisions along the major sections of the project - Elk River Shoals, Big Muscle 
Shoals, and Little Muscle Shoals – and delegating considerable authority to subordinates in 
charge of each division in order to allow for effective and simultaneous efforts at each location.36 
 Still, there were delays at Muscle Shoals.  Funding was a perennial problem that caused 
engineers to cut back on their labor force, further slowing the effort.  Also, work paused when 
the district’s paymaster was robbed by the Jesse James gang while making his way from a bank 
in Florence to the engineer camp at Big Muscle Shoals on March 11, 1881.  Enraged engineers 
and laborers formed a posse and pursued the robbers until losing their trail on the banks of the 
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Cumberland River, effectively putting off any canal work whatsoever for a full week.  With 
delays varying in cause and duration, the work dragged on.37 
 Lieutenant Colonel Barlow replaced King in 1886.  Barlow was a well-regarded engineer 
whose service during the Civil War included campaigns with both the Army of the Potomac and 
Army of the Cumberland, and who was already familiar with the region, having been present for 
both the Atlanta Campaign and the Battle of Nashville in 1864.  At the same time that Barlow 
was assigned to lead the district, the Corps of Engineers expanded its scope of responsibility to 
include improvements on the Cumberland River as well as the Tennessee River.38   
 Drawn to the most recent addition to the district’s enlarged mission, Barlow devoted 
more of his time and energy to the Cumberland than to the Tennessee.  He planned a major 
project to canalize the Cumberland between Nashville and Smith’s Ferry, 377 miles upriver from 
Nashville.  Barlow envisioned improving navigation on the Cumberland by constructing a 
system of thirty locks and dams similar to the Davis Island Lock and Dam on the Ohio.  As work 
began in 1888 a short distance upriver from Nashville on the first lock and dam in this system, 
Barlow moved his district from Chattanooga to Nashville.  When citizens of Chattanooga held a 
mass meeting to protest the move, Barlow insisted that the work on Muscle Shoals was almost 
complete, and he was therefore needed more in Nashville, where the Cumberland project was in 
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its infancy and required his attention.  Lieutenant George Goethals reported to Barlow at the 
Nashville District headquarters in October 1889.39 
 Barlow’s reports leave little evidence indicating how he employed or interacted with 
Goethals.  In Goethals’s efficiency report for 1890, Barlow demonstrated a favorable opinion of 
his lieutenant, writing, “Lieut. Goethals is energetic, industrious, prompt, & efficient in 
performance of duty . . . I consider him to be a true gentleman, an accomplished engineer, and a 
thorough army officer.”  But this report also hints at a lack of familiarity with his subordinate, as 
some of the remaining written comments were copied almost verbatim from the individual report 
that Goethals had to produce summarizing his professional reading and study outside of the 
normal scope of his duties.40  More generally, Barlow’s reports on the district’s operations leave 
little evidence that he had any military or civilian subordinates at all.  From this, one may 
suppose that Barlow was either extraordinarily active, taking a direct and hands-on approach to 
managing work on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers and delegating little to his 
subordinates, or that he was unhesitant to assume full credit for everything that happened in the 
district without acknowledging those in local control of the division’s many projects.  Whichever 
was the case, working for Barlow at Nashville must not have been as profitable an experience for 
Goethals as was working for Merrill on the Ohio.41 
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 It is likely that Barlow attempted to shoulder an impossibly heavy load on his own.  As 
the pace of construction on the Cumberland increased, he began to lose control and awareness of 
work on the Muscle Shoals.  Describing progress made on the canals at Muscle and Elk River 
Shoals between July 1, 1889 and June 30, 1890, Barlow wrote, “the eleven locks were completed 
and are in working order.”  Later, in the appendix attached to this report, Barlow indicated that as 
of June 30, none of the nine locks at Big Muscle Shoals, nor either of the two locks at Elk River 
Shoals were operable because all of the locks were still missing “hydraulic machinery to 
maneuver gates and valves.”  These were valued at $6,000.00 per unit, and that tests of the locks 
had revealed major structural problems in the canal.  He had revealed some of this to a local 
newspaper in January 1890, which reported, “A system of hydraulic engines will have to be put 
in at each lock, to facilitate their working as they are under to[o] high a pressure to be worked 
readily by hand.”42 
   If Barlow’s reports about Muscle Shoals to his superiors were inconsistent, the 
information he gave to the communities affected by the project was worse.  As early as the 
summer of 1889, the town of Florence, Alabama was anticipating the imminent opening of the 
canal and attempting to organize a grand opening ceremony.  This community viewed itself as a 
rising commercial center and looked to the opening of the canal as the key to its future power 
and prosperity.  The issues of the Florence Herald reveal much about the town’s relationship 
with Barlow and his answers to the town’s inquiries about the canal.  In June 1889 it reported on 
the pending grand opening ceremony.  In August, an article proclaimed that “it is confidently 
assured that the Tennessee River will be opened for through navigation on September 1.  The 
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great obstruction, known as the Muscle Shoals, is practically overcome, and only a little 
finishing up remains to be done.”  The following spring, the editors were “reliably informed that 
work on the canal is nearing completion.”  And in May 1890, they “learned that the Muscle 
Shoals canal would be ready to open in June, if no mishap occurred.”43 
 By 1890, work at Muscle Shoals had been in progress for fifteen years, and the 
communities along the Tennessee River, particularly those around and upriver from the shoals, 
were growing restless.  In June, one member of Florence’s Chamber of Commerce, complained 
to his congressman that “Col. Barlow told me 18 mos [months] ago that he thought the canal 
would be opened July 1, 1889, but for some reason the work has dragged along from year to year 
in the most unreasonable manner.”44 An enterprising reporter from the Chattanooga Times 
pressed Lieutenant Colonel Barlow on the matter in March.  The resulting non-answer was 
reported in the Florence Herald shortly thereafter: “The colonel did not give the Times man 
much satisfaction.  He said in effect that if the water didn’t go any higher and if the masonry 
stood the present test and if it didn’t take too long to make the repairs now necessary, it was 
probable that in the course of four weeks he might be able to say something.”45 
 Florence had grown quite tired of Barlow’s equivocations.  The Herald fired a broadside 
at Barlow in its issue of July 9, 1890. The editors lamented that work on the canal had “dragged 
its slow length for more than a generation . . . a formal opening has been promised year after 
year, the patience of those most vitally interested has been exemplary, and still we have no more 
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than promises.”  Demanding a resolution to the problem, they declared, “The time has gone by, 
however, for promises to be satisfactory.  The growing interests along the Tennessee have, 
within the last few years, grown too great and strong to be fed on such airy meat.”46 
 Here was Barlow’s opportunity to assuage the community’s concerns and clearly 
articulate his vision for the completion of the canal.  He did not take it.  In an ill-advised public 
letter written in response to the Herald, Barlow wrote:  
First, the government has not been engaged upon the improvement during a generation, 
the work having been commenced late in the year 1875, less than fifteen years ago.  
Second, no official announcement has ever been published fixing the date of opening the 
canal to navigation.  Several unauthorized statements made by newspaper correspondents 
have been published from time to time, which have been very misleading . . . work now 
in progress must be finished before water can be retained in those sections of the canal 
which require strengthening.  This large amount of unexpected work has not only 
consumed a good deal of time, but has so reduced the available funds that, unless the 
pending River and Harbor bill soon becomes a law, an entire suspension of operations 
will soon become necessary, further delaying the final opening. 47 
The community’s frustration matched that of Brigadier General Thomas Casey, the Chief 
of the Engineers.  Since the fall of 1889, he had been steadily increasing pressure on Barlow to 
explain the delays and articulate an appropriate plan of action so “a final presentation of the 
matter can be made, and the commercial interests of that section of the country know for a 
certainty what it can depend upon in the future.”48  Tired of the delays, concerned about opening 
the river before anticipated decisions in the fall regarding a potential increase in railroad fares, 
and undoubtedly wincing at the public spat that had just taken place between Barlow and the 
Florence Herald, Casey was considering drastic options to resolve the problem. 
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Hearing rumors that he was to be replaced, Barlow wrote to Alabama’s powerful Joseph 
Wheeler, congressman from Northern Alabama, asking if the rumors were true.  “If such a 
project is on foot,” he complained, “it must have originated, I think, from the pressure brought to 
bear on the Washington authorities to have the canal opened at an early day . . . To relieve me 
just now would to my mind imply censure and I don’t think I deserve it.  It would be like 
depriving an officer of command near the close of the battle, on the eve of victory or defeat.”49  
Seeking to save his position, Barlow turned to his lieutenant.  Several days after writing to 
Wheeler, Barlow wrote to General Casey, “I have the honor to report that 1st Lieut. Geo. W. 
Goethals, Corps of Engineers, has been assigned – subject to the approval of the Chief of 
Engineers – to the local charge of the work of improving the Tennessee River, between Decatur, 
Ala. and Waterloo, Ala. – the necessity for his services in local charge of this work, being now 
more urgent than the temporary duty to which he was assigned at Nashville, Tenn.”50 
Willing to wait see how this new arrangement would work out, Casey agreed to the 
request and allowed Barlow to continue his duties at Nashville.  At the time, Goethals was 
already in the area leading a survey of Little Muscle Shoals.  Barlow ordered him to finish the 
survey, then “establish an office, and take station temporarily at Florence, Ala.” in order to 
complete and open the Muscle Shoals Canal in time to allow passage through the canal prior to a 
scheduled hearing on railroad rates in Chattanooga that fall.  Goethals complied and assumed 
local control of the Muscle Shoals Canal on August 11, 1890, less than one week after Barlow’s 
combative rebuttal had been printed in the Herald.51  
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   In addition to the lingering need to install hydraulic machinery at each lock, tests of the 
canal over the summer had revealed major structural problems.  Sections of the canal walls and 
embankments were unable to retain water when the canal was filled to maximum capacity.  The 
problem was most extreme below the highest lock in the system, with a lift of thirteen feet, 
where water passed freely through the embankment and threatened the structural integrity of the 
canal’s retaining walls.  The necessary repair work had been underway since shortly after the 
problems were discovered, but Goethals found that the work was not being carried on with a 
sense of urgency.  He organized two shifts for twenty-four hour operations on the canal and took 
personal charge of the night shift to complete the repairs.52   
By October, the repairs were mostly complete and tests validated the structural integrity 
of the canal.  Having learned from Barlow’s negative example the importance of fostering open 
and cordial relations with the interested public, Goethals invited several journalists and residents 
of Florence to tour the canal, and observe preparations to open it for navigation.  To much local 
acclaim, Goethals and his crew of engineers and laborers filled the entire length of the canal 
system from the Elk River Shoals to Big Muscle Shoals with water on November 8, and opened 
the system for commercial navigation on November 10, 1890.  The same day, the steamer R.T. 
Cole crossed the canal with a shipment of grain bound for Chattanooga.  It arrived before the 
hearing on railroad rates.53 
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Goethals spent the next few weeks ensuring the routine of daily operations at the canal 
were established before heading north for leave to visit his family and to appear in New York 
City to stand for examination to become eligible for promotion to captain.  The trip was well 
timed; his second son, Thomas Rodman Goethals, was born in December 1890 in New Bedford, 
Massachusetts, where his wife had been staying, as doctors had advised her that the northern 
Alabama climate was not suitable for her pregnancy.  This extended Goethals’s leave to attend to 
family affairs.  Once all was settled, he took and passed the promotion examination, becoming 
eligible for promotion to captain, and saw to the details of securing a home and moving his 
family to Florence.  By March 1891, the canal was open and running smoothly, the Goethals 
family had welcomed a new member, and Lieutenant Goethals was eligible for promotion to 
captain, although he would have to wait until January 1892 to be promoted.54 
The good news kept coming.  Effective on March 18, 1891, the Corps of Engineers 
created a new district at Florence, responsible for all improvements on the Tennessee River 
between Chattanooga and Colbert Shoals.  Rewarding his efforts to finally open the canal, the 
Chief of Engineers placed Goethals in charge of the district.55 
This was Goethals’s first independent command.  When he was originally sent to 
Florence to assume local control over work on the Muscle Shoals in August 1890, he was still a 
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subordinate of Barlow’s and a part of the Nashville District.  Having always been subordinate to 
a nearby commander, Goethals’s previous duties had been almost entirely within the technical 
realm of engineering problems.  These would no longer be the only problems he needed to solve.  
He would have to worry about organization, administration, logistics, and advocacy.  The 
experience would teach him much in all of these areas, providing practical instruction on 
problems he would face on much larger levels later in Panama and in Washington during World 
War I.56 
By placing Goethals in charge of the Florence District, the Chief of Engineers was taking 
a risk.  Although he had graduated from West Point and accepted his commission nearly eleven 
years before, and although he had already demonstrated proven abilities and potential for 
continued success, Goethals was still a lieutenant – a junior officer with a relatively limited base 
of experience.  Of forty-nine Corps of Engineers districts dedicated to river and harbor 
improvements in 1891, only sixteen were commanded by officers below the rank of major.  And 
only two of these, including the newly-created Florence district, were commanded by 
lieutenants.  By giving a district to Lieutenant Goethals, Casey was not only demonstrating his 
confidence in that officer’s abilities, but presenting him with opportunities that almost none of 
his peers shared.  In 1892, after Goethals had been promoted to captain, and after the Corps had 
consolidated some of its districts, only fifteen out of forty-five districts dedicated to river and 
harbor improvements were commanded by officers below the rank of major.57 
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There was always the risk that both the faith and the opportunities were misplaced in 
inexperienced hands.  Placing comparatively junior officers in charge of significant projects or 
districts was not a new practice.  The post-Civil War demobilization and reduction of the Army 
was at odds with the steady increase in demand for internal improvement projects that the Corps 
of Engineers faced throughout the half-century following the war.  The ratio of experienced 
engineer officers to projects that demanded seasoned engineers began to tip in favor of the 
projects, forcing the Corps of Engineers to appoint junior officers to billets involving significant 
projects.  At first, the Chief of Engineers tried to keep them within arm’s reach.  By the mid-
1880s, so many young, junior officers were in charge of public works along the mid-Atlantic 
coast that the area became known within engineering circles as “the kindergarten,” a place where 
junior officers trained under eye of the Chief of Engineers to become qualified to serve as district 
engineers.58 
Casey and his predecessor, Brigadier General James Duane, were not entirely 
comfortable with this.  They understood that even the best young officers still needed 
supervision and guidance.  Since district engineers reported directly to the Chief of Engineers, 
whose own workload was heavy and who could never visit all districts in a single year, junior 
officers serving as district engineers had no senior officer to supervise and mentor them 
effectively.  To address this problem, Duane experimented with a new concept in 1884.  Placed 
over “the kindergarten,” a “supervising engineer” was in charge of multiple districts, overseeing 
and guiding junior officers in the mid-Atlantic region.  Duane judged the program a success.  
When Casey became the Chief of Engineers in 1888, one of his first acts was to institutionalize 
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the concept.  He assigned all the districts in the country to regionally-aligned engineering 
divisions and appointed the most experienced colonels in the Corps of Engineers to serve as 
division engineers.  Division engineers were charged with supervising and mentoring district 
engineers below the rank of lieutenant colonel within their divisions.59 
   This concept was admirably forward-thinking, as it not only acknowledged that the 
Corps of Engineers had an implicit responsibility to take active measures to develop its junior 
officers, but it also implemented organizational reform in an attempt to achieve that end.  But as 
with most good first steps, this was not a perfect solution.  In practice, those junior officers on 
the geographic fringe of their divisions realized almost no benefit to having a division engineer.  
As it turned out, Goethals was one such junior officer.  The Florence District did not fit neatly 
into any of the new divisions and was haphazardly assigned to the Southwest Division, under 
Colonel Cyrus B. Comstock.60   
Comstock was a talented officer, but his headquarters was in New York City.  He was 
extremely busy and prohibitively distant from Florence.  Most of the time Goethals needed to 
consult with Comstock, he did so by letter.  In Goethals’s three years running the Florence 
District, Comstock made two visits and tours of inspection to Muscle Shoals.  Generally pleased 
with what he saw on these trips, Comstock saw no need for more frequent visits.  Although 
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provided in concept with a mentor and supervisor, Goethals remained in a position in which he 
had to develop on his own.61    
The challenges of the Florence District presented plenty of opportunities for Goethals to 
learn and grow, both as an engineer and as a leader.  Under his charge, the Florence District 
worked along four lines of effort on over 260 miles of the Tennessee River.  Closer to 
Chattanooga, from the area known as “the Suck” downriver to Guntersville, Alabama, the district 
worked to clear natural obstructions from the river and improve the channel by blasting and 
dredging in the shallows.  At Elk River and Muscle Shoals, the engineers and laborers under 
Goethals would stay busy operating, improving, and maintaining the canal system.  At Lower 
Muscle Shoals, the Florence District investigated and recommended courses of action for a 
canal, but would never see the funding for such a project and limited their efforts to channel 
improvement by blasting and dredging the riverbed, and constructing wing dams along the river 
embankments.  Farther downriver, Goethals and his engineers drafted and implemented plans for 
a canal around Colbert Shoals and Bee Tree Shoals.62   
Simultaneously managing multiple projects across 260 miles of river was an excellent 
practical lesson in organizational leadership.  As Barlow demonstrated to Goethals in 1889 and 
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1890, a district engineer could not become personally involved in all of the minute details of one 
project without losing sight of the others.  An effective leader must be able to identify the critical 
points that require personal involvement and attention and be willing to delegate direct 
responsibility for other points, with clear guidance and general supervision, to trusted 
subordinates.  When Goethals first arrived in Florence in August 1890, he was extremely 
involved in minute details, going so far as to personally oversee the night shift.  This was entirely 
appropriate; the project was at a point of crisis and he had been sent expressly to see the Muscle 
Shoals Canal through to a rapid completion.  Goethals would not be able to sustain that approach 
as the chief engineer of the Florence District.   
Like Major King at Muscle Shoals from 1876-1886, Goethals subdivided his district.  He 
organized his divisions around each of the four lines of effort and placed one of his civilian 
assistants in charge of each division, effectively making one subordinate in charge of each of his 
principal lines of effort.  This allowed Goethals to manage the entire district more effectively and 
gave him the flexibility to focus his personal attention on points of friction as they arose.  Such 
was the case when plans were drafted for the Riverton Lock in the canal around Colbert and Bee 
Tree Shoals in 1892, and when there were significant problems with contractors at that canal in 
1893 and 1894.63   
This approach also was the catalyst for the beginning of one of the more meaningful 
professional and personal relationships in Goethals’s life.  Sydney B. Williamson was a civilian 
engineer who came to join the Florence District at the behest of his brother, another engineer 
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who had been hired as one of Goethals’s assistants and installed as the division chief responsible 
for improvements between Elk River Shoals and Chattanooga in 1891.  Williamson proved his 
worth on a survey upriver, and Goethals brought him into the district headquarters to help create 
plans for the canal at Colbert and Bee Tree Shoals.  On the job, Williamson was never happier 
than when his supervisors allowed him to “do the work in my own way except as to the 
regulations and general policies of the Engineer Department.”  He thoroughly enjoyed working 
for and with Goethals.  In turn, Goethals developed great trust in Williamson and eventually sent 
him to resolve a crisis at Colbert Shoals in 1894.  It was the beginning of one of his few lifelong 
friendships, and of a close professional relationship.  Goethals would bring Williamson in as a 
principal deputy in every major engineering assignment he held in the future.64   
As his first independent command, the Florence District also exposed Goethals to 
problems of logistics and personnel administration that he had not previously experienced.  
Goethals managed a permanent workforce of approximately seventy people dedicated to 
operating and maintaining the canals at Elk River Shoals and Muscle Shoals.  These numbers 
increased dramatically when some projects at Little Muscle Shoals and Colbert Shoals were 
undertaken not through contractors, but with hired labor under district supervision.  Goethals was 
not only responsible for planning and executing the projects within his district but also for 
paying salaries; acquiring and maintaining tools, river vessels, machines, and a small railroad; 
feeding, housing, and looking after the health of the workforce; and projecting and managing an 
annual budget.  Although proficiency in administration and logistics was an essential element of 
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high command, most Army officers in the nineteenth century were never actually trained in these 
areas.  Those who became proficient administrators and logisticians learned through practical 
experience.  Administering and supplying the Florence District was the foundational experience 
that taught Goethals concepts, techniques, and procedures he would employ against much larger 
administrative and logistical problems in Panama and during World War I.65 
This independent command also gave Goethals quite a bit of public relations experience, 
teaching him skills that were uniquely necessary in the Corps of Engineers.  The engineers’ 
highest priority was its civil engineering mission, bringing officers into frequent and intimate 
contact with communities, groups, and individuals with legitimate interests in their work.  
Goethals had already demonstrated that he had learned from Barlow’s negative example by 
inviting several local journalists and residents to tour the canal immediately prior to its opening.  
He made a habit of such behavior, and he became very popular because of it.  
Goethals continued to impress the residents of Florence with his hospitality throughout 
his stewardship of the Florence District, making a point to extend all possible kindnesses to any 
visitors.  In one example from April 1891, the Herald reported that a party of thirty men and 
women visited the town, and had “a very pleasant time indeed.  Lieut. Goethals kindly furnished 
them a special train which took them from the foot of the canal to Lock 3, at the canal 
headquarters, where a splendid dinner was prepared for them.  The entire party are loud in their 
praise of Lieut. Goethals, and should that gentleman run for president, he would get a handsome 
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vote from the ladies.”66  Several months later, when a college president arranged a tour of the 
canal for a group of professors and students, “a committee composed of the three press 
representatives present was instructed to offer suitable resolutions of thanks to Lieut. Goethals 
for his courtesies . . . and remark that for uniform politeness and accommodation, Lieut. Goethals 
is not excelled by any man in the service.”67   
While Goethals had a knack for public relations and genuinely wanted to keep the 
interested public informed and maintain close relations with the communities he served, the 
experience as a district engineer also taught him to leverage his good standing to advocate for his 
projects.  Worried that low usage of the Muscle Shoals canal would decrease the amount of 
funds, Goethals published an article in the Chattanooga Times urging businessmen in 
Chattanooga to organize a steamboat line and make greater use of the canal in order to influence 
Congress to continue appropriating funds for Tennessee River improvements.  The article further 
suggests that Goethals had previously discussed and coordinated this strategy with Congressmen 
Joseph Wheeler.68  While certainly getting into ground that was at best murky with respect to 
proper civil-military relations, Goethals was learning valuable lessons in the complicated arts of 
advocacy and the politics of influence.  These lessons would pay enormous dividends years later 
when he had to continually strive to convince a large and diverse workforce, an American public, 
and a Congress to support his ideas and methods during the construction of the Panama Canal. 
Lastly, this independent command provided Goethals with an invaluable opportunity to 
refine his technical skills and his project management abilities to levels that ultimately shifted the 
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boundaries of what was then considered possible.  Although managing the daily maintenance and 
operation of the canals and channel improvement projects occupied much of the district’s time 
and resources, the most significant project planned and implemented in the Florence District 
between 1891 and 1894 was the canal around Colbert and Bee Tree Shoals.  With Elk River 
Shoals and Muscle Shoals opened by a canal system, and with channel improvements at Little 
Muscle Shoals, the Colbert and Bee Tree Shoals were the last notable hazards for river 
navigation in northern Alabama.  More of a low-water obstacle for navigation than an 
impediment to navigation, the Colbert and Bee Tree Shoals constituted a nearly continuous 
eight-mile long hazard that was the natural next project for the district after the Muscle Shoals 
canal opened.  Anticipating this, Goethals ordered surveys of the area to be completed in August 
and September 1890, and developed a plan for “the construction of a canal on the south bank of 
the river, 7.8 miles long, 150 feet wide at the water surface, and a depth of 7 feet.”69  
The canal required a system of locks at its lower end, near Riverton, Alabama, to mitigate 
the twenty-foot fall in the river from the head of the Colbert Shoals to the foot of the Bee Tree 
Shoals.  Common wisdom at the time called for two locks.  Goethals believed it could be 
accomplished through single lock with an unprecedented twenty-five-foot lift.  In consultation 
with Sydney B. Williamson, Goethals developed the plan and pitched it to his superiors in 
Washington.  His audience was skeptical that such a lock, with nearly double the lift of the 
highest locks in the United States, could be built.  A centralized board of more conservatively-
minded officers forced the plan to be changed in 1892 to two locks separated by a mile-long 
pool, with respective lifts of twelve and thirteen feet.  Undeterred, Goethals continued to 
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advocate for his plan for a single lock, feeling free to do so because the lock was not yet under 
construction.  By 1893, he had successfully convinced the Chief of Engineers.  The plan was 
approved and construction began at the lock site that summer.70 
The effort did not go smoothly.  Excavation of the lock site was extremely problematic 
because the site was mired in quicksand that seemed to have a knack for breaking equipment 
used against it.  Goethals sent Williamson to the site to come up with a solution, and he 
eventually had to resort to employing a large force of laborers with shovels and wheelbarrows to 
slowly excavate the site.  In the meantime, a board of engineers awarded a contract for the 
construction and installation of the lock to Terre A. Clark over Goethals’s strenuous objections.  
Clark had been the lowest bidder, but Goethals believed the bid was irresponsibly low and that 
Clark could not possibly apply enough resources to solve the quicksand problem.  He became 
more convinced of this when he received reports that Clark had a poor reputation and worse 
credit in his hometown of Quincy, Illinois.  As it turned out, Goethals was right.  Clark failed to 
secure the lock’s foundation to the bedrock, causing the foundation to slide and the quicksand to 
flow back into the lock site.  Having made what Williamson could only describe as “a terrible 
mess,” Clark walked off the job.  The contract was annulled, laborers were hired, and 
Williamson was put in charge of construction.  His and Goethals’s efforts to design and build the 
Riverton Lock at the foot of the canal around Colbert and Bee Tree Shoals established a 
precedent for the mega-locks they would design and build years later in Panama.71 
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Goethals did not stay in Florence long enough to see the completion of the canal and its 
innovative high-lift lock.  By opening the Muscle Shoals Canal, successfully managing an 
independent district for more than three years, then designing and doggedly advocating for the 
25-foot Riverton Lock, Goethals had caught the attention of the Chief of Engineers, Brigadier 
General Thomas L. Casey.  When Major Thomas Turtle, an officer on his staff in Washington, 
died unexpectedly in September 1894, Casey recommended Goethals to be assigned to fill the 
vacancy.    In early October 1894, Goethals received orders that his district would be 
consolidated back into the Nashville District, and that he was to report to Washington 
immediately for duty on Casey’s small staff of three engineer officers.72 
Florence howled when the orders were published in the first week of October.  The first 
reports indicated not only that Goethals was to be transferred, but also that the Corps of 
Engineers office in Florence would close.  Locals moved first to prevent the loss of the office, 
and then to keep Goethals, to whom they had become rather attached.  Business leaders 
immediately telegrammed to “Fighting” Joe Wheeler in Congress that they feared “the removal 
of Government headquarters from this city at this time would greatly retard work on the river, 
which is of the utmost importance to all towns in the Tennessee Valley.”73  Another constituent 
implored Wheeler, “I understand Capt. Goethals goes to Washington.  I am truly sorry as is 
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everyone here.  Please look into this and if true, see if you can have the office still retained at 
Florence.  It is worth considerable to us.”74  That same day, Wheeler sent word to General Casey 
that the “people of north Alabama earnestly appeal that [the] engineer office remain in 
Florence,”75 and went on to note that “if Capt. Goethals is taken away, we shall all be very 
despondent.”76  The Florence Herald summed up local opinion in a commendatory article 
published on the day Goethals departed for Washington: 
Captain George W. Goethals, engineer in charge of this Tennessee River Improvements, with 
headquarters in this city, has been transferred to Washington city.  Captain Goethals will be 
greatly missed in Florence as he has made a host of friends in this city.  His transfer at the present 
time is particularly unfortunate as it will tend to retard the work on the river which was well 
under way since the recent River and harbor appropriations . . . . The River improvements were 
never in better condition and the work has been progressing nicely under the able and efficient 
supervision of Capt. Goethals.  Capt. Goethals is an engineer of unusual ability and skill and his 
suggestions have been of great value to the department in prosecuting the work.77 
General Casey attempted to assuage these concerns in a letter to Congressman Wheeler 
on October 4, 1894 making it clear that Florence would not lose its Corps of Engineers office.  
While Florence would no longer be the seat of an independent district, the Nashville District was 
ordered to station a lieutenant in Florence to oversee work and canal operations in the Muscle 
Shoals area.  With regard to Goethals, he would not bend.  “Captain Goethals’ services were 
needed here,” he wrote, “and his relief will not in any way embarrass the work on the 
Tennessee.”78  Although residents of northern Alabama were satisfied that they could maintain a 
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Corps of Engineers office at Florence, they would continue to unsuccessfully petition for 
Goethals’s return for the better part of the next year.79 
Goethals was not to return to Florence as a district engineer.  That phase of his career was 
over.  In fact, the phase of economic life in the region that demanded canals in that part of the 
Tennessee River was also coming to an end.  The improvements with which Goethals was 
involved on the Tennessee River were short-lived.  Not long after he left Florence, trade and 
traffic on the Tennessee began to decline.  By the turn of the century, many in the Muscle Shoals 
area came to see more opportunity in the river’s capacity to produce energy.  By the turn of the 
century, a number of large dams and a major hydroelectric project were under way on the river.  
These efforts would join forces with New Deal programs and produce the Tennessee Valley 
Authority in 1933, which constructed even more dams on the river.  Today, the problems that 
Goethals and his contemporaries faced at Muscle Shoals, and the solutions they came up with, 
are submerged deep below the now placid surface of the Tennessee River.80 
 His experiences in Florence are significant for what they reveal about how Goethals 
developed the skills needed to succeed in the later years of his career.  Observing in Barlow at 
Nashville an excellent example of how not to run an organization, Goethals went on to practice 
his own style of organizational leadership at Florence.  In the process, he learned about 
administration and logistics, public relations, the art of advocacy, and how to push the perceived 
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technical limits of engineering.  Even if the physical products of his labor would not long 
survive, these were especially important and fruitful years in Goethals’s career. 
 Goethals’s experiences at West Point and on the Tennessee River between 1885 and 1894 
constitute a distinct and intermediate phase in his career.  In this phase, training mattered not at 
all.  He did benefit from serving as an instructor at West Point when the academy’s prevailing 
pedagogical techniques and the introduction of a new engineering text forced Goethals to study 
and memorize the most up-to-date engineering theory and methods.  But this was more luck than 
training, as Goethals would not have had to heed the new material had he not been detailed as an 
instructor at that moment in time.   Personal connections shaped this phase of Goethals’s career 
in the form of Professor Mercur’s request to bring Goethals to West Point.   
Talent and ability were far more significant forces shaping Goethals’s career in these 
years than either training or personal connections.  Goethals was an exceptionally talented 
engineer.  His demonstrated aptitude as a cadet paved the way for his appointment as an 
instructor at West Point.  His notable achievements at Muscle Shoals and Colbert Shoals were 
driven primarily by his own resourcefulness, technical engineering abilities, and managerial skill.  
Furthermore, these achievements paved the way for his next developmental opportunity in the 
office of the Chief of Engineers.   
Luck, however, played an at least equally significant role in this phase of Goethals’s 
career.  Work on the Tennessee River was arguably the single most important portion of 
Goethals’s first twenty years of service because of the many significant lessons Goethals took 
from his experiences, and because it was the first major opportunity for Goethals to showcase his 
talents and set conditions for his ascent within the Corps of Engineers.  Interestingly, what was 
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most directly responsible for Goethals’s assignment on the Tennessee and eventual experiences 
at Muscle Shoals was the unfortunate Lieutenant Graham Fitch’s illness in 1889.  Without that 
illness and the subsequent order for Fitch to Washington to stand before a medical board, a less 
beneficial tour of duty on the Ohio River’s tributaries, in which Goethals would not have had the 
experience of an independent command, would have followed his assignment at West Point. 
Goethals had grown significantly as an engineer and as an Army officer between 1885 
and 1894.  As he departed Florence and made the journey to Washington, he was no longer 
merely finding his way in his chosen career.  Armed with invaluable lessons from his recent 
experiences, Goethals was beginning the final ascent to the peak of his profession.
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CHAPTER 3 
Master, 1894-1907 
 
After departing his station at Florence, Alabama, George W. Goethals embarked upon a 
new phase in his career.  The next thirteen years exposed him to the larger issues of the Corps of 
Engineers and the Army; issues on a level that made much of his previous work and concerns 
seem almost trivial and parochial.  By consistently challenging him to think beyond immediate 
priorities and the relatively local problems of one major project, Goethals’s assignments between 
1894 and 1907 were a unique practical education in executive management, the problems of 
logistics on a grand scale, and the processes of military adaptation.  These experiences prepared 
and positioned him well for future challenges, and that were unique in a generation of officers 
making its way through the Army’s slowly evolving systems of training and professional 
development. 
When Goethals reported in October 1894, the office of the Chief of Engineers was the 
central administrative authority for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.  It programmed and 
managed congressional appropriations totaling nearly thirty-five million dollars, and coordinated 
the efforts of 118 officers throughout the country engaged in the construction and improvement 
of coastal fortifications, river and harbor improvements, various bridging and aqueduct projects, 
and the construction and renovation of public buildings.  It was also the higher headquarters to 
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which the post of Willets Point, the Army’s only engineer battalion, and the Engineer School of 
Application reported and received guidance. 1   
The office was manned by four officers, including the Chief of Engineers, and a small 
staff of civilian clerks.  Those assigned to the office ranged widely in their duties.  Some work 
was completely administrative, involving the disbursement of funds, production of orders, and 
the printing of manuals.  Other duties were more technical in nature.  As needed, these officers 
sat on engineering boards and commissions, reviewed plans and contracts, and advised 
congressional committees.  Frequently, they served as a brain trust for the Chief of Engineers, 
weighing in informally on special projects and questions of general policy. 2  These officers were 
so exceptionally busy that Brigadier General William P. Craighill, who replaced Thomas L. 
Casey as the Chief of Engineers in May 1895, successfully lobbied the Secretary of War to 
authorize an additional engineer officer to be assigned to his office staff in 1895.3 
When Captain Goethals reported to the Office of the Chief of Engineers in October, 
1894, he was the most junior officer present, and he would remain so even after the team was 
authorized an additional officer.  As such, many of Goethals’s duties during his assignment with 
the Chief of Engineers were menial administrative tasks.  He managed the routine daily 
administration of the office itself, printed circulars, and drafted orders.4  He also served as the 
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disbursing officer, distributing money to compensate officers’ official travel expenses, and also 
evaluating bids and awarding funds to the contractors who supported various improvement 
projects nationwide.5  Goethals was also assigned as a member of the relatively inconsequential 
Board of Geographic Names, which was charged with naming as-yet-unnamed things, manmade 
or natural, that appeared on engineers’ maps and charts.6 
Not all of Goethals’s work as an assistant to the Chief of Engineers was trivial and 
inconsequential, though.  In one of his earliest acts as the Chief of Engineers, Brigadier General 
William P. Craighill altered the department’s system for training West Point graduates 
commissioned as engineer lieutenants.  He believed that the practice of sending officers straight 
from graduation leave to the School of Application at Willets Point, which had by now expanded 
its curriculum to almost two-and-a-half years of material, “was not entirely advantageous.”  
Craighill designed a new program based upon a firm belief in the educational benefits of 
experience.  Beginning in October 1895, new lieutenants assigned to the Corps of Engineers first 
spent a year working on coastal fortifications or river and harbor projects before reporting to 
Willets Point, “having then had the benefits of a year’s rest from severe study and of a year’s 
experience in engineering work.”7  Goethals had the opportunity to weigh in two years later 
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when Craighill was considering whether this was an effective concept, and if the interim year of 
experience would allow a reduction of the curriculum at Willets Point to a two year program.8   
Revealing a similar belief in experience as education, Goethals urged that the new system 
be continued, arguing that the year of experience between West Point and attending the School 
of Application “cannot but impress him [the new officer] of how little he really knows, 
notwithstanding any preconceived notions to the contrary.”  At the same time, Goethals 
demonstrated some appreciation of theoretical education, arguing that if the Willets Point 
program was to be reduced to two years, it ought not to be at the expense of instruction in civil 
engineering.  Goethals reasoned, “The course in Civil Engineering at West Point is necessarily 
very elementary; the year following graduation is limited more to practical experience, and while 
of material assistance in the theoretical course at Willets Point, this should not be abridged 
because of such experience.  The graduate of Willets Point will find much use for his course in 
Civil Engineering when called upon to perform the duties of a Military Engineer.”9 
In addition to weighing in on important policy matters, Goethals was placed on a few 
more significant civil-military boards.  On the strength of his record in Florence, the Chief of 
Engineers looked to Goethals when he was asked to detail an officer to provide technical advice 
to a Senate select committee considering the possibility of constructing an interoceanic canal in 
Nicaragua.10  In 1897, Goethals was tasked to confer with the U.S. Civil Service Commission to 
ensure that civilians hired by the Corps of Engineers adhered to rules and regulations established 
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by the commission.11  Finally, in April 1898, the Chief of Engineers selected Goethals to 
represent the Corps of Engineers on a board convened by the Secretary of War to designate 
articles that would be prohibited for export as the nation mobilized for war with Spain.12  Each of 
these duties gave Goethals invaluable exposure to the nature and mechanisms of the relationship 
between the Army and civil government – a rare opportunity given to very few junior officers in 
the late-nineteenth-century Army, and one that helped condition Goethals for important aspects 
of his later work in Panama and his service in the War Department during World War I. 
In addition to indirectly teaching him critical professional lessons, Goethals’s assignment 
to the office of the Chief of Engineers was significant for the exposure it gave him within his 
branch and within the War Department.  Between 1895 and 1898, Goethals worked for three 
successive Chiefs of Engineers:  Brigadier Generals Thomas L. Casey, William P. Craighill, and 
John M. Wilson.  As he impressed each one, his reputation increased within the Corps of 
Engineers.  Craighill regarded him as “a man of more than usual ability and capable of 
performing very well any duty to which he is likely to be assigned.”13  Wilson extolled him as “a 
man of the highest type of character, an engineer of marked ability and excellent judgment; I 
believe him to be peculiarly fitted for any duty that could be entrusted to any officer of the 
Army, however high may be his rank.”14   
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Within the office, Goethals worked with two future Chiefs of Engineers, Lieutenant 
Colonel Alexander Mackenzie and Captain William Black.  Goethals particularly impressed 
Mackenzie, who served as the principal assistant to the Chief of Engineers between 1895 and 
1898, and who would be serving as Chief of Engineers in 1907 when Secretary of War William 
H. Taft consulted him prior to sending Goethals to assume control of the construction of the 
Panama Canal.15  Duty in Washington allowed Goethals to further improve his reputation and to 
be seen as one of the most promising junior engineer officers.  This would set conditions for him 
to be assigned to highly selective positions, both in the very near and also the distant future. 
Regardless of the opportunities afforded to him, Goethals was unsatisfied with his duty as 
an assistant to the Chief of Engineers.  Partly, this was because of loneliness.  Although the first 
year of his assignment to Washington brought him back into close proximity with his good 
friends Gustav and Julia Fiebeger, it kept him in the humid South, from which his wife Effie and 
their two boys would escape early each summer in favor of the home Goethals had built for them 
on Martha’s Vineyard several years earlier, much as they did when he was stationed in Alabama.  
“The house seems very quiet,” a forlorn Goethals wrote to his nine-year-old son in the dog days 
of 1895, “without you and Tommy playing engine, you singing, quarreling, etc.  You must write 
to me and tell me what you do and also what Tommy does.”16  While he could dispense parental 
wisdom from afar, telling his son, “I am very glad to hear from Mommy that you are . . . trying 
hard to be good, and I hope you will succeed,”17 and, later, “I am glad that your new shoes fit 
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you so well, and I hope that you won’t run into salt water with them and get them all spoiled 
before your return,”18 it was never as satisfying for Goethals as when his family was present.   
Goethals’s dissatisfaction with his assignment in Washington, however, was more rooted 
in the nature of the work.  Like most officers of the nineteenth century, Goethals subscribed to a 
heroic vision of leadership that was frequently at odds with the managerial style that was rapidly 
emerging in an increasingly industrialized society and economy.  Goethals and many of his 
contemporaries believed that an officer’s true place was at the front with his unit – or in the case 
of the Corps of Engineers, personally involved in some active project – and not in an office or a 
headquarters coordinating the myriad of logistical and administrative requirements that the Army 
and its Corps of Engineers required in the modern age.  Thus, when his own name was being 
mentioned as a candidate to become the Chief of Engineers as a reward for his work in Panama, 
Goethals could reply in complete honesty, “I am not an applicant, nor do I care of the position, 
the work not being to my liking.  These views are not new, for I held them during my service as 
Assistant to the Chief, and have not changed my mind.”19 
Knowing his most junior assistant was getting restless, Brigadier General Wilson 
arranged in the fall of 1897 for Goethals to relieve the instructor of Practical Military 
Engineering at West Point when that officer’s assignment expired the following summer.  The 
Secretary of War agreed, and Goethals was set to move to West Point in several months’ time.20  
This transfer did not happen on schedule; it was interrupted by events in Cuba.   
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Tensions between Spain and the United States had been rising since the outbreak of the 
Cuban Insurrection in 1895.  While the American public generated vocal and sometimes passive 
support for the Cubans, the American government’s official position was neutral.  At the same 
time, the Cleveland administration and subsequently the McKinley administration pressured 
Spain to pacify Cuba and grant it political autonomy.  Sensing that they were nearing the point of 
victory, Cuban revolutionaries rejected autonomy, opting instead to continue fighting in order to 
win independence.  Violence continued.  The ineffective and at times heavy-handed Spanish 
response prompted increasing support among the American public for the Cuban revolutionaries.  
Tensions devolved into a full-blown crisis in early February 1898, when in a single week 
newspapers widely published a stolen letter from the Spanish ambassador to the U.S. that 
insulted President McKinley and the U.S.S. Maine mysteriously exploded while in Havana’s 
harbor.  As the American public clamored for war and Spanish officials became increasingly 
convinced that a war abroad was the only way to avoid a possible political revolution at home, 
policymakers on both sides lost the ability to pursue effective diplomacy.  On April 25, 1898, the 
United States declared war against Spain, and the Army began to mobilize for war.21 
Through Congressional authorization to expand the Regular Army, a presidential call for 
volunteers, and broad popular enthusiasm, the Army rapidly expanded.  Units were formed so 
quickly that the headquarters staffs to command and control them were formed on an ad hoc and 
frequently personal basis.  In early May a letter arrived on the Brigadier General Wilson’s desk 
from the recently designated commander of the 1st Army Corps, Major General John R. Brooke.  
It read, “I would respectfully ask for the assignment of an engineer officer at my headquarters.  If 
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agreeable to the Chief of Engineers, I would like very much to have Captain George W. Goethals 
assigned to this duty.”  Wilson needed no convincing, writing that the position of Chief Engineer 
for a corps was “a position for which he [Goethals] is thoroughly qualified by his high character, 
soldierly ability, and scientific attainments.”22  On May 20, 1898, Goethals received orders to 
report to General Brooke at Chickamauga National Military Park, Georgia for duty as the Acting 
Chief Engineer Officer of the 1st Army Corps and a temporary promotion to serve as a 
Lieutenant Colonel of Volunteers while serving in that capacity.23 
 The reputation within the Corps of Engineers and within the War Department in general 
that Goethals had developed since 1894 put him in high demand as the war broke out.  Shortly 
after General Brooke secured Goethals’s assignment with the 1st Corps, Brigadier General 
William Ludlow, having recently been designated Chief Engineer of all armies in the field and 
preparing to accompany the expedition to Cuba then assembling at Tampa, attempted to steal 
Goethals.  “He was applied for by General Brooke at Chickamauga, but his services are much 
more needed at this time in connection with the forces organizing at Tampa . . . Goethals is an 
extremely valuable and energetic man and I would rather have him for my assistant.”24  
Furthermore, in June, General Wilson nominated Goethals to serve as a lieutenant colonel in the 
first of three regiments to be raised in a brigade of volunteer engineers that Congress had 
authorized in the middle of May.25   
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Goethals learned of the competing requests shortly after reporting to Brooke at 
Chickamauga on May 30.  The request from Ludlow was passively rejected; the Adjutant 
General replied that while Goethals was assigned to 1st Corps, a transfer to Ludlow’s staff was 
possible if Brooke agreed and wrote the orders, but Brooke proved unwilling to let him go.26  
The Chief of Engineers left the transfer to the volunteer engineer regiment up to Goethals.  He 
was torn, commenting to his son that “Genl. Brooke doesn’t want me to go and I don’t reckon 
what to do.”  Ultimately, he acceded to pressure from Brooke and declined the appointment in 
favor of maintaining his position as Chief Engineer of the 1st Corps.27 
Goethals may have immediately regretted that decision when he was shown to his 
assigned campsite and found that it was a short distance downhill from a slit trench used as a 
latrine.  “During the heavy rains,” he testified after the war, “our sink [latrine] was flooded out, 
and naturally the drainage was toward the tents.”28  Such amateurish and unsanitary mistakes 
were endemic to the Army’s mobilization for the Spanish American War.  Mobilization camps 
generally poorly sited and became pestilent breeding grounds of disease.  The Army’s 1st and 6th 
Corps mobilized at Chickamauga Park, which was among the more notorious Spanish-American 
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War mobilization centers as scandalous reports, some accurate and some exaggerated, filled the 
pages of widely-read muckraker newspapers.29   
Experiences at Chickamauga underscored to Goethals the importance of preventive 
health measures and strict enforcement of sanitation regulations when large organizations live 
and work in the field.  To his family, Goethals reported only, “It is awfully dirty out here.”30  He 
was more candid to postwar investigators, recalling, “I did not think the camp was particularly 
clean.  Riding through the woods, for instance, there were evidences of the men having defecated 
all through the woods without reference to sinks.  My attention was particularly called to our 
own headquarters, which were not in a very good condition as far as policing was concerned.”31  
Goethals further testified that many commanders at the camp selected bivouac sites in unhealthy 
locations because they deemed healthier locations to be more useful as training and drilling 
grounds.  Bivouac sites were dangerously overcrowded as inexperienced leaders failed to 
comprehend the relationship between dispersion and sanitation.  Units were frequently encamped 
in and among their own filth, encamped upon ground that was too rocky to permit digging 
adequately deep latrines.  Beyond this, Goethals’s testimony suggests that a fundamental error 
was made in selecting Chickamauga Park as a mobilization site for two entire corps, as the sole 
uncontaminated water supply that was available to provide water to the camp could not support 
both corps if they were fully manned.32 
                                                          
29 An excellent overview of sanitation and related supply problems at mobilization centers during the Spanish-
American War can be found in Graham A. Cosmas, An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-
American War (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1994), 266-278. 
30 George W. Goethals to “Dodo” [George R. Goethals], June 10, 1898, George W. Goethals Papers, LC. 
31 Report of the Commission Appointed by the President to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department in the 
War with Spain, 56th Congress, 1st Session, 1900, vol. 6, 2683. 
32 Report of the Commission Appointed by the President to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department in the 
War with Spain, 56th Congress, 1st Session, 1900, vol. 6, 2683-2686. 
97 
 
Mobilization at Chickamauga was mostly uneventful for Goethals.  He spent much of the 
month of June working to improve the water supply.  He conducted the necessary surveys and 
ran a line to a supplemental source at Crawfish Springs, but General Brooke ordered work on the 
water supply to be stopped when he heard a rumor that 15,000 soldiers were to be diverted to the 
5th Corps at Tampa.33  With newfound downtime, Goethals visited nearby Chattanooga and hiked 
Lookout Mountain.  Seeking to make more appropriate use of his time, he began visiting the 
camps of the various volunteer regiments at Chickamauga and instructing their officers on how 
to conduct reconnaissance, and continued doing so throughout late June and July.34  Seeing that 
his reliable assistant from Florence, Sydney B. Williamson, had been commissioned as a captain 
in the 3rd Regiment of volunteer engineers and was conveniently also mobilizing at 
Chickamauga, Goethals persuaded Brooke to assign Williamson as his assistant.  Otherwise, he 
watched the war unfold in newspapers, followed the Santiago campaign with great interest, and 
waited for 1st Corps to receive orders.35 
Despite being on the very small headquarters staff of the 1st Corps, it was from the 
newspapers that Goethals first learned that he and a portion of the corps were bound for Puerto 
Rico.36  Having heard unconfirmed rumors at the end of June of a possible campaign, General 
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Brooke asked Goethals to procure maps and information concerning Puerto Rico.  Goethals sent 
a request for both maps and information to the Chief of Engineers on June 29, who promptly 
forwarded the request to the War Department’s Bureau of Military Information.  Receiving no 
positive response, Goethals telegrammed the Bureau of Military Information directly on July 8, 
and shortly thereafter “received by return mail a copy of a map of Puerto Rico, but no 
information whatever concerning that island.”37  The corps continued to prepare blindly until it 
was confirmed in the middle of the month that General Brooke would lead a detachment of 
approximately 5,000 men from the corps in the Puerto Rico Campaign.38 
Following the Spanish surrender to General William R. Shafter’s 5th Corps at Santiago de 
Cuba on July 17, Secretary of War Alger ordered General Nelson Miles to assume command of a 
previously planned expedition to Puerto Rico.  Because Shafter’s soldiers were too affected by 
disease to participate in the campaign, the War Department selected a bevy of units from the 1st 
and 4th Corps encamped at Chickamauga and near the ports of Charleston and Tampa to join 
Miles and nearly three thousand soldiers who had never debarked from their troop transports in 
Guantanamo Bay.  In sum, this cobbled together a force of approximately 17,000 men.  Although 
the plans previously drawn up and approved by the Secretary of War called for Miles to land at 
Cape Fajardo in the northeast and make a quick strike to the west to capture San Juan, Miles 
elected to change course after sailing out of Guantanamo Bay.  Suspecting that the Spanish 
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expected him to land as close to San Juan as possible, Miles chose instead to land on Puerto 
Rico’s southern coast.39   
As Miles and sailed from Cuba, the War Department coordinated to move the remainder 
of his invasion force to their ports of embarkation and transport them to Puerto Rico.  The 
portion of the 1st Corps selected to participate in the campaign departed Chickamauga Park to 
await transportation at Newport News, Virginia on July 23, 1898.  They were fortunate; cases of 
typhoid fever in the unsanitary Camp Thomas climbed dramatically beginning in late July, and 
doubled in number by the middle of August.40  But Goethals was unaware of his comparatively 
favorable luck.  When he boarded the U.S.S. St. Louis at Newport News on July 28, he noted that 
“the bedding was foul, very bad; ventilation, none at all, and the meals were simply 
abominable.”41 
Additionally, the 1st Corps had a woefully inadequate understanding of Puerto Rico.  The 
War Department had failed to send anything more than one map of Puerto Rico in response to 
Goethals’s requests in July.  General Brooke, however, noticed that a small detachment of Puerto 
Ricans were also taking passage on the U.S.S. St. Louis to rendezvous with General Miles to 
serve as scouts and guides for the invasion.  He quickly sent his engineer to interview them.  
Goethals spent most of the voyage collecting from them “all the information concerning the 
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island, roads, etc., needed by the Commanding General for intelligent operations.”42  Although 
better than nothing, this was no way to prepare effectively for an invasion.  
Landings commenced on Puerto Rico’s southwest coast at Guánica on the morning of 
July 25.  After a minor skirmish, American soldiers had established a secure beachhead.  That 
beachhead was expanded on July 26, and at the same time Miles landed a division at Ponce, near 
the center of Puerto Rico’s south coast.  More reinforcements landed on July 31 at both Ponce 
and Guánica.  After a few small-unit actions, the outnumbered Spanish troops, recently 
abandoned by the Puerto Rican militia who deserted for their homes or defected outright to the 
American side, were retreating.  When the St. Louis and accompanying transports steamed into 
Ponce on July 31, Miles directed Brooke to collect his forces and prepare to land forty miles to 
the east, near a village named Arroyo.43 
Goethals splashed ashore with the lead elements of the 1st Corps on August 2, 1898, 
meeting no opposition.  Brooke took three days to disembark all of his men.  For the first two 
days, he placed Goethals in command of the perimeter of outposts securing the beachhead, 
during which time occurred no action more severe than the ultimately harmless exchange of a 
few potshots.44  As the disembarkation reached its final stages, Goethals, along with Sydney B. 
Williamson, was pulled back to the beach and for two days was “charged with building a wharf 
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to facilitate landing supplies – the rough surf was preventing landing supplies on the beach 
itself.” The dock was a relatively simple project and took little time to complete.45    
By August 5, all of Brooke’s soldiers had landed, and supplies were starting to move 
ashore in bulk as well.  Expanding the base of operations, one of the 1st Corps regiments had 
seized the nearby town of Guayama after a brief skirmish, and Brooke was poised to support a 
general offensive, although he still required more intelligence about the position and disposition 
of the Spanish.46  With the dock complete, Brooke looked to Goethals to conduct reconnaissance 
to prepare for the pending offensive.  Taking along his trusted friend Williamson, Goethals 
executed several thorough reconnaissance missions, finding that the Spanish had “occupied the 
heights three or four miles inland from the town that commanded the highway leading to San 
Juan.”  It was risky work on both ends of these missions.  Williamson later recalled that “the 
most dangerous feature of the reconnaissance was getting back through our own outpost 
composed of green volunteer troops that were liable to shoot first and investigate afterwards.”47 
Meanwhile, General Miles had completed his plan for the conquest of Puerto Rico.  He 
envisioned four assaulting columns converging on San Juan.  In the west, two columns starting 
from Guánica and Ponce would move from south to north, converging at the town of Arecibo on 
Puerto Rico’s northwest coast, and then moving east against San Juan.  In the center of the 
island, one column would move northeast from Ponce against the main Spanish defensive 
position at Aibonito, a village in high ground on the southern end of a mountain range that 
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bisects the interior of the island from east to west.  There, 1,300 Spaniards blocked the main 
highway leading to San Juan.  The 1st Corps constituted the fourth assaulting column and was 
assigned to support the attack against Aibonito by moving against Cayey from Arroyo and 
Guyama, then cutting across the highway behind Aibonito, isolating its defenders.  After 
Aibonito fell, Miles intended the two columns to move north along the highway against San 
Juan.48 
The offensive began on August 9, 1898.  The Spanish were ill prepared to mount an 
effective defense.  Because the Puerto Rican militia had gone home or defected, the Spanish 
mustered only 8,000 defenders, less than half the strength of the American forces under Miles.  
Furthermore, as their colleagues did on Cuba, the Spanish erred in attempting to defend too 
many points at once.  As a consequence, they failed to mass enough combat power at any point 
to effectively defend against any of the four assaulting columns. 49  
The 1st Corps watched idly as the three columns to their west opened the offensive, with 
the westernmost units making the most rapid progress.  A reconnaissance in force on August 8 
by the 4th Ohio Volunteer Infantry Regiment, belonging to the 1st Corps, produced a skirmish 
that indicated Spanish forces were entrenched in the high ground near Cayey.50  Brooke spent the 
next few days planning his attack.  He hoped to delay the attack until the corps could be 
reinforced by an additional regiment of volunteers, but was forced to take earlier action when he 
learned that Wilson’s column was making unexpectedly rapid progress toward Aibonito.51   
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On the evening of August 11, Brooke issued orders to his soldiers to advance on to Cayey 
shortly before dawn the following morning.  But inexperienced leaders of the volunteer 
regiments failed to coordinate their movements properly, and the 1st Corps began its movement 
two hours behind schedule.  Brooke sent Goethals and Williamson ahead to conduct a final 
reconnaissance of the Spanish line, then relied on them to post the lead battalion of skirmishers.  
With this task accomplished, and with anxiety mounting as his first taste of combat drew near, 
Goethals returned to his commander, who was positioning a battery of light artillery that he 
intended to use to open the battle.  Brooke directed Goethals and the rest of his staff to observe 
the artillery fire and adjust it as needed.  As the last artillery piece was being unlimbered and 
hauled into position, afternoon was giving way to early evening, and the moment of battle had 
arrived.  But it passed as quickly as it came.  At that moment, as Goethals wrote to his wife two 
days later, “a messenger came galloping up and shouted that he had an important dispatch.  The 
General read it, abused the messenger for not caring more for his horse and telling him never to 
ride so hard again, after which he told us there would be no fight as peace had been declared.”52  
“Five minutes more,” Goethals lamented, “and the first shot would have been fired and 
then there could have been no stopping until after the Spaniards had been driven away . . . Thus 
ends the war, I expect, and I haven’t been under Spanish fire at all, I’m sorry to say, for the 
outpost firing doesn’t count for anything as there were only a few shots fired on us.”53 Somehow, 
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Goethals felt cheated out of a genuine experience of the war.  While it seems inconsistent with a 
rational sense of self-preservation, Goethals was expressing a genuine sentiment.  His generation 
of officers had been educated at West Point and reared as junior officers by Civil War veterans in 
a time when veterans and society alike were constructing an idealized and romanticized memory 
of the Civil War. 54  Goethals, like his peers, was heavily influenced by this and held an almost 
Victorian sense of war and officership in general.  Describing General Brooke preparing for 
battle, he wrote to his wife in terms reminiscent of the earliest phases of the earlier war: “The 
General was just magnificent; he was in khaki uniform, in the front, and had no fear for anyone 
but his staff.”55  
Like most officers of his generation, Goethals’s perception of the ideal officer – from a 
lieutenant up to a general – was a fearless veteran in the thick of the action, leading from the 
front.  In his view, his wartime service was cheapened by not experiencing battle.  For Goethals, 
this would be a constant source of insecurity as his career progressed.  For the Army, this 
mindset among Goethals’s generation would be a significant aspect of an incongruity between 
the Army’s culture and its organization as it adapted to meet the managerial and logistical 
requirements of modern industrialized warfare. 
But for now, Goethals was stuck in Puerto Rico with no war to fight.  Immediately after 
the armistice, Goethals was busy repairing two bridges on the highway to San Juan that had been 
blown by the Spanish in an effort to slow down the American advance.  Beyond this, Goethals 
could only report, “I performed various routine duties assigned to me by the Major General 
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Commanding [General Brooke] and more particularly that of inspecting the fortifications of San 
Juan.”56   
In reality, Goethals had very little to do.  He passed time by touring the island and 
collecting Spanish stamps and other relics of the war to send back home to his sons.  He was not 
enamored with the inhabitants, whom he viewed in racialized terms, observing to his oldest son 
that “the little boys and girls about here run around naked until they are about 7 or 8 years old – 
nearly all the men and women go barefooted . . . They are awfully dirty too – and I don’t think 
there are any full blooded whites.”57  When General Miles returned to the United States, Brooke 
was placed in charge of the occupation of Puerto Rico, and brought Goethals with him to serve 
on his staff in this new capacity.  There remained, however, little for Goethals to do.  Always 
uncomfortable with idleness, Goethals wrote home, “Genl. Brooke wants me to stay here with 
him, but I don’t care to unless I have something to do and to keep busy.”58  By the middle of 
September, he was miserable.  “I want to get back very much,” he wrote to his family, “I have no 
work to do, [and] everything is so filthy and dirty that I just cannot stand it here for any length of 
time.”59 
As it turned out, Goethals did not have to wait any significant length of time.  In the 
second week of September, Brigadier General James Wilson, Chief of Engineers, began agitating 
to move him to the Department of Practical Military Engineering at West Point, as had been 
                                                          
56 George W. Goethals to John M. Wilson, April 13, 1901, File 39037, Box 915, Entry 103, RG 77, NARA I. 
57 George W. Goethals to “Toodles” [George R. Goethals], August 22, 1898, and August 28, 1898, Box 3, George 
W. Goethals Papers, LC.  The quotation is from the August 22 letter. 
58 George W. Goethals to “Toodles” [George R. Goethals], August 28, 1898, Box 3, George W. Goethals Papers, 
LC. 
59 George W. Goethals to “Toodles” [George R. Goethals], September 15, 1898, Box 3, George W. Goethals Papers, 
LC. 
106 
 
originally arranged prior to the outbreak of war.60  Brooke was opposed to losing his engineer, 
protesting loudly and, ultimately, unsuccessfully.61  Goethals was officially relieved of his 
responsibilities in Puerto Rico on October 20, 1898, and was soon on his way back home to 
move his family once again to the United States Military Academy.62 
The Department of Practical Military Engineering was an important part of cadets’ 
military training while at West Point.  This department ran exercises that taught cadets how to 
design and dig field fortifications and entrenchments, conduct reconnaissance, execute 
topographical surveys, construct pontoon and simple trestle bridges, operate signaling and 
communications equipment, and employ siege materials.  Because such training was always 
conducted outdoors, it was generally scheduled between the months of April and October.63 
As the head of the Department of Practical Military Engineering, Goethals had several 
other duties to attend to that kept him busy throughout the year.  Having reverted back to his 
Regular Army rank of captain, he was the commander of Company E of the Army’s battalion of 
engineers.  This company was responsible for providing a daily guard for the West Point 
garrison, maintaining the artillery batteries and their emplacements at West Point, and supporting 
field training for the cadets.  In addition, Goethals served as the post engineer, directly under the 
superintendent’s command.  In this capacity, he increased West Point’s water supply by adding 
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more pipelines and purification systems to handle water from additional local sources, and 
supervised the renovation of the academy’s library.64 
Goethals did not linger at West Point.  General Wilson, still serving as the Chief of 
Engineers, ordered him to appear before an examination board scheduled to convene in New 
York City in December 1899.  The board examined Goethals on December 6 and recommended 
him for promotion to major.  He was formally promoted on March 6, 1900.65  Because the 
Department of Practical Military Engineering was a captain’s position, General Wilson 
recommended to Elihu Root, the new Secretary of War, that he approve orders to transfer 
Goethals to the engineer district based at Newport, Rhode Island, responsible for fortifications 
and river and harbor improvement in Rhode Island and southeastern Massachusetts.66 
 Wilson made a conscious decision to send Goethals to Newport for reasons of 
professional development.  General Leonard Wood, a future Army Chief of Staff who was then 
commanding the American forces still occupying Cuba, had requested Goethals’s services on his 
own staff.  To Wilson, he wrote, “I want a moderately young man, active and thoroughly tactful.  
The situation is difficult and requires great judgment and tact . . . I should prefer above all others 
Major George W. Goethals if he is available . . . My next choice would be Captain David DuBois 
Gaillard, then Captain H.F. Hodges, Captain J.J. Morrow, and Captain McKinstry.”  Wilson 
replied, “Of the names you sent me, I have selected Capt. Hodges; he has had every class of duty 
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nearly, river work, harbor work, fortification work, canal work, and was Lt. Col. of one of the 
Volunteer Engineer regiments during the Spanish war.”67   
While Goethals had significant experience with river improvement, he had none at all 
with coastal fortifications, which had been the primary mission for which the Corps of Engineers 
had been originally organized in 1802, and to which the corps dedicated a quarter of its 
personnel at the beginning of the twentieth century.68  Wilson was already convinced that 
Goethals was an outstanding officer, but wanted him to gain experience in fortifications work so 
that he could truly be a master of his trade.  The decision would benefit Goethals in ways beyond 
what Wilson likely imagined, as Goethals’s work in Newport served as a critical catalyst for his 
ultimate selection to lead the construction of the Panama Canal. 
Goethals was probably delighted to be sent to Newport, as it would allow for much more 
time with his family than any of his other assignments had.  The lengthy annual sojourns of Effie 
and the two Goethals boys to the Rodman home in New Bedford, Massachusetts and the 
Goethals’ house on Martha’s Vineyard would no longer be so lengthy nor so distant.  Both New 
Bedford and Martha’s Vineyard were part of his district and within his scope of responsibility.  
As indicated from the complete lack of correspondence with his family during his time in 
Newport, these were some of the least lonely years of his career.69  
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Goethals officially assumed his responsibilities in Newport on August 31, 1900.70  The 
district now under his charge was large and multifaceted, responsible for both fortifications and 
improvements of rivers and harbors throughout Rhode Island and southeastern Massachusetts.  
As district engineer, Goethals managed simultaneous efforts to establish or deepen anchorages 
and create more navigable channels in and around harbors in Martha’s Vineyard, Nantucket, 
Cape Cod, Woods Hole, and Rhode Island’s Narragansett Bay, as well as dredging river 
channels in the Taunton River in Massachusetts.  In addition to this, the district was responsible 
for removing unfortunate vessels that routinely wrecked or sank and obstructed navigation in 
channels frequently used by fishermen and commercial shipping, especially near Buzzards Bay, 
Nantucket, Martha’s Vineyard, and Block Island.  Much of this work, however, was conducted 
by contractors.  While Goethals and his supporting staff of one lieutenant, four clerks, one 
draftsman, six engineers – including the seemingly ever-present Sydney B. Williamson, four 
inspectors, and ten skilled workers spent a fair amount of time monitoring and inspecting 
progress and disbursing funds for the contracted projects, they directed most of their effort to the 
coastal fortifications near Newport, Rhode Island and New Bedford, Massachusetts.71 
Since its earliest days, the United States viewed the wide Atlantic Ocean as both a 
blanket of security that separated it from potentially hostile powers and a vulnerable avenue of 
approach over which those same powers could transport a raiding party, invasion force, or naval 
fleet to attack or impose a blockade at points of their choosing on the long American coastline.  
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In the first few decades after the Revolution, this was not a completely paranoid point of view, 
grounded on the recent memory of threats and capabilities demonstrated by British raiding 
parties and expeditionary forces.  With the problem of coastal defense in mind, even as he moved 
to reduce the aggregate size of the military, President Thomas Jefferson supported legislation in 
1802 that created the Corps of Engineers.  But the fortifications created by this new arm of the 
Army in its first decade of existence did little to deny the British freedom of action along the 
coastline during the War of 1812.72 
After a period of study in the wake of the war, the Corps of Engineers submitted to 
Congress in 1821 a report that laid the foundation for the “Third System” of American coastal 
defense.  The report articulated that the purpose of the coastal defense system was to deny the 
enemy access to important harbors, deny the enemy access to potential bases of operations from 
which it could launch offensive operations along the seacoast, defend major American cities, 
prevent blockades of major rivers that the United States could use as interior lines of 
communication, protect coastal and internal trade, and defend naval bases and important 
commercial harbors.  This statement of policy would govern the Army’s contribution to 
American coastal defense for more than a century.  The 1821 report also specified that the vast 
majority of fortifications in the system would be large, casemated, brick-and-mortar structures in 
three classes of size.  In all, the Corps of Engineers envisioned constructing fifty fortifications 
within and around the major harbors and trade routes of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts at a 
projected cost of $18,000,000.  This was an ambitious scheme that only became more ambitious 
as time progressed.  By 1851, the Chief of Engineers reported that 186 fortifications were 
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needed, with a total projected cost of $67,500,000 to build and arm the works.  For the Army 
Corps of Engineers, this cemented coastal defense as its highest priority mission in the 
nineteenth century.73 
Progress on the Third System proceeded very slowly, limited somewhat by an 
unenthusiastic Congress, but most of all by the engineers’ own relatively small base of human 
and material resources.  The simple fact was that the scope of the Third System was vastly 
disproportionate to the means with which the Corps of Engineers could execute the program.  
The pace of work was therefore necessarily slow.  Three decades after the 1821 report was 
published and the program began, fifty-nine forts were complete and another ten were in 
progress.74  This strikingly slow pace developed a characteristic distinct to coastal defense that 
would persist even into Goethals’s time.  Ambitious national fortification programs took decades 
to complete.  Naturally, then, especially as time wore on, the work was inherently backward-
looking.  Engineers busily raising fortifications in the 1840s and 1850s based their work on 
principles and doctrines established in the early 1820s, not recognizing that technological 
innovation had rendered many of those principles and doctrines irrelevant.  They toiled on, 
blissfully unaware that they were waging a losing battle against time and technology, even as the 
Crimean War of 1853-1856 provided hints that the still incomplete Third System had already 
faded into obsolescence.75 
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The Civil War left no doubt that advances in technology had invalidated three key 
assumptions upon which the Third System had been built:  that forts necessarily outmatched 
ships, that large casemated structures could withstand bombardment from the most powerful 
artillery of the day, and that fortifications alone could stop a hostile fleet before it reached a 
major port or city.  Forty years of improvements in ship design, ordnance, and steam propulsion 
had changed the situation.  In November 1861, a Union fleet decisively defeated Confederates in 
two forts defending Port Royal, South Carolina, demonstrating that an unimpeded fleet could 
have the requisite armor and armament to make it more than a match for coastal fortifications.  In 
April 1862, the Union Army decisively demonstrated the ineffectiveness of casemated 
fortifications made of brick and mortar at Fort Pulaski near Savannah, Georgia.  New rifled 
artillery allowed the Union to engage the fort from previously unheard of ranges, and to fire 
shells with such accuracy and such force that a large portion of the fort’s southeast wall was 
reduced to rubble after less than two days of bombardment, forcing a Confederate surrender by 
exposing the powder magazine to incoming fire.  Later that month, after an ineffective naval 
bombardment, Union Admiral David Farragut simply bypassed the two fortifications guarding 
New Orleans from positions down the Mississippi River to capture the city.  Steam propulsion 
allowed ships to move faster and more directly than the architects of the Third System imagined 
in 1821, and the Admiral was able to push thirteen ships through the forts’ engagement areas 
quickly enough to avoid major damage.  As if to underscore the point, he repeated the feat to 
capture Mobile, Alabama in August 1864.76 
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The Corps of Engineers responded to the lessons of the Civil War in a muddled fashion.  
The older generation generally clung to the concept of coastal defense anchored by major 
fortifications and concentrated batteries.  Younger officers then rising in the organization may 
have had new ideas, but had not yet risen high enough in the organization to exert real influence.  
A board met in 1866 and recommend that forts should be strengthened with armored plating, but 
did not recommend any substantive conceptual changes.  Congress, however, was reluctant to 
pour money into a system of coastal defense that had already proven ineffective.  Appropriations 
throughout most of the next two decades were so low that the Corps of Engineers could do little 
more than repair and maintain existing fortifications.  During these years, however, the corps did 
begin to experiment with electrically-controlled submersible mines.  By the middle of the 1870s, 
the Chief of Engineers was advocating for a new system of fortifications in which underwater 
minefields would be integrated to hold enemy ships within forts’ engagement areas.  This, 
however, represented a relatively simple shift in methods of coast defense, not in the basic 
concepts of a coast defense system.77 
In the early 1880s, however, political leaders interpreted European wars and British naval 
expansion as possible threats, and became increasingly alarmed at the state of American coastal 
defenses.  In 1885, Congress passed legislation requiring Grover Cleveland to appoint a board 
led by Secretary of War William C. Endicott to consider and make recommendations on the 
problem of coastal defense.  The board made its report ten months later, in January 1886.  
Viewing the threat of raids against or even the capture of a major American port or coastal city 
as a real possibility, the board ratified both the rationale for and general principles of coastal 
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defense outlined in the 1821 report.  The most significant changes recommended by the Endicott 
Board were, like those advocated by the Chief of Engineers a decade earlier, in the methods of 
coastal defense.  The board outlined a new system to protect the twenty-seven harbors that it 
considered most significant, in which multi-tiered casemate forts would be converted to or 
replaced by fortifications of cement and earthworks armed with the newest ordnance.  These 
fortifications would be part of a layered system of defense that would also include floating 
artillery batteries, torpedo boats, and submerged, electrically-triggered minefields.  These 
minefields would in turn by covered by additional artillery emplacements on shore.  The final 
report of the Endicott Board stated that this new system would cost over $126 million, with an 
initial appropriation of $21.5 million and subsequent annual appropriations of $9 million until 
work was complete.78 
A shocked Congress refused to accept such an exorbitant price tag and a system of 
fortifications that required a manpower complement of three times as many soldiers as were in 
the Army at the time.  While Congress appropriated funds to develop and produce improved 
weapons systems for coastal defense, it did not pass any significant appropriations for 
fortifications until 1890, and even then, as well as in subsequent years, funded construction at a 
lower rate than was envisioned by the Endicott Board.  As with the Third System in the 
antebellum years, work on the Endicott System progressed slowly.  Unlike the Third System, the 
delays did have a positive side effect.  Some of the technology on which the board based its 
recommendations was untested, unproven, or underdeveloped in 1886.  Research and 
development continued while construction was stalled.  Accordingly, improvements such as the 
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development of procedures to reinforce concrete and the invention of a disappearing gun carriage 
– which enabled an artillery piece to be raised over a crest or wall to be fired, then retract to a 
protected position for reloading – could be incorporated before substantial progress had been 
made in building the forts and artillery emplacements envisioned by the Endicott Board.79   
Nevertheless, the engineers were once again locked in an inevitably losing battle with 
time and technology.  Appropriations and the pace of construction increased as the nation moved 
toward war with Spain and continued at an accelerated level in the immediate aftermath, but the 
new system was already on the path to obsolescence.  The Endicott Board had crafted its entire 
concept of defense around rifled artillery powerful enough to pierce up to twenty inches of armor 
on a warship at a range of 1,500 – 2,000 yards.  At the time Goethals reported for duty at 
Newport, the leading navies of the world already possessed ships armed with heavy cannon that 
were effective at ranges exceeding 3,000 yards, and were only a few years away from beginning 
work on a new class of battleship that would boast heavy guns that could accurately engage 
targets up to 16,400 yards distant.80 
Consequently, fortifications work within the Corps of Engineers when Goethals arrived 
in Newport, Rhode Island in 1900 was a backward-looking mission.  District engineers 
responsible for fortifications work were ordered to carry out a program then based on strategic 
principles and theories more than seventy-five years old, and on tactical systems and doctrine 
nearly two decades old.  The Chief of Engineers, General Wilson, had done Goethals no favor by 
assigning him to work on fortifications.  Due to the nature of the work, the vast majority of those 
employed on fortifications missions were merely completing an obsolete program, and could 
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gain no experience that would keep them abreast of cutting edge developments in their 
profession.  However, Wilson had unintentionally set Goethals up for success by sending him to 
Newport.  Within a month of his arrival, unique conditions arose at Newport that put Goethals in 
the unusual position being able to do something new in regressive program. 
The Army and Navy planned to hold joint maneuvers near Newport in late September 
1900.  The Navy intended to exercise its North Atlantic Squadron and test its tactics for 
penetrating coastal defenses to raid a port.  The Army wanted to test its defenses at the mouth of 
Narragansett Bay and was particularly interested in testing its use of the searchlight.  Although 
searchlights had been included in the Endicott Board’s report as required pieces of equipment to 
facilitate observation of underwater minefields at night, little had been done to develop the best 
use of the searchlights in a tactical situation, or to specify doctrine as to how many lights a fort 
should have, where they should be placed, or how they should be controlled.  Among the 
reporting requirements for both the Army and Navy elements participating in the exercise were 
observations of the most effective use of searchlights in the Army’s defense.81 
In his first week on the job in Newport, Goethals began installing searchlights and the 
power plants needed to power them at Forts Adams and Greble, and to repair the artillerists’ 
range finding equipment at Ft. Adams.  Knowing that the Navy’s “red force” would open their 
attack at some point between September 20 and September 30, Goethals reported that he would 
post his lieutenant at Ft. Greble and himself at Ft. Adams for the duration of the exercise to 
render any needed engineering assistance and to observe the exercise.82  The Navy launched its 
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attack at 9:40 P.M. on the night of September 24, and it lasted until midnight.  After the Army 
and the Navy both loudly claimed victory in letters to superiors, and in some cases, in reports to 
newspapers, the observers began reflecting upon the lessons learned and consolidating their 
reports on the exercise.83 
Army observers emphasized the utility of searchlights and the need for more of them.  
“One thing that was very apparent,” wrote one, “was the necessity for a search-light for each 
battery besides one for the commanding officer.  One torpedo boat escaped our observation until 
after it had gotten by, simply because we had but one search-light on our side of the channel and 
we could attend to but one boat at a time.”84  Another focused on the surprising versatility of the 
lights.  This observer reported:  
It was clearly demonstrated that Search Lights are to be considered from three points of 
view.  1st, as Search Lights proper to search the Mine Field for entering boats.  2nd, as 
Illuminating Lights used to illuminate the target to be fired at.  3rd, as Blinding Lights, 
intended to blind the eyes of the pilots, and force the vessel to slow down . . . It may be 
said that Search Lights are as important for Harbor defense as Guns.  The greater the 
number of Search Lights, the more effective will be the defense of the Harbor.85 
Goethals drafted his own report of the exercise and sent it to the Chief of Engineers.  The 
vast majority of this report focused on searchlights, strongly recommending that fortifications be 
equipped with multiple lights.  “That there cannot be too many search lights was very evident,” 
he reported.86  He also emphasized the diverse roles they could play in the defense.  In addition 
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to searching for ships approaching a minefield, Goethals honed in on a more active role for the 
searchlights: 
The effect of the one search light bearing on the east passage was admitted by the naval 
authorities to have materially increased the difficulty of navigating this straight channel, 
one officer (Capt. Walker, U.S.N.) going so far as to assert that an additional light would 
have been as good as another battery to the defense.  As it was, the torpedo boat Stiletto 
which had escaped was so confused by the light that she lost her bearings and ran into the 
Engineer wharf sustaining slight damage, throwing the umpire aboard of her into the 
water and slightly injuring two of the men.  The one light, it was also admitted, interfered 
with the proper sighting of the guns aboard the ship except those in turrets . . . Prior to the 
manoeuvres [sic] it seemed to be the consensus of naval opinion that a search light on 
shore would make an easy target and that, therefore, it would be easily disposed of . . . 
[afterwards,] this opinion seems to have undergone a change as the glare was too strong 
to enable the gunners to get the range.87 
General Wilson received Goethals’s report enthusiastically, immediately circulating it 
within the Corps of Engineers.88  But these recommendations created a complicated problem.  
Existing power demands of forts’ artillery emplacements – whose range finding equipment, 
auxiliary ammunition hoists, and disappearing gun carriages were usually electrically powered – 
and of the buildings within forts’ garrisons usually maximized the generating capacity of the 
forts’ simple power plants, which were originally designed to provide intermittent power only to 
artillery emplacements when they were actively in use.  Existing power generation systems were 
insufficient to support multiple high-power searchlights at the forts.  To address the problem, 
Wilson created a board of engineers consisting of Goethals and two other officers.  Together, 
they created a larger central power station that became the standard for coastal fortifications.89 
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Goethals spent most of the rest of his time in Newport on the power generation issue.  
The two new power plants that he needed to construct in Newport and New Bedford were 
complete by the end of 1902.  Additionally, he wrote and presented a paper entitled “Electricity 
in Permanent Seacoast Defenses” to the American Institute of Electrical Engineers in May 1902.  
The paper was well received within both the engineering community and the larger coast defense 
community, and was reprinted in the Journal of the United States Artillery in 1903.90 
Goethals’s reputation was on the rise inside and outside of his branch at exactly the right 
time.  In the spring of 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt and Secretary of War Elihu Root 
ordered Major General Samuel B.M. Young to convene a board to select forty-two officers to be 
detailed to the Army’s first General Staff.  Major George W. Goethals made the cut.91  
Power and authority within the Army had long been split between the Commanding 
General and the autonomous and influential chiefs of supply and administrative bureaus, such as 
the Adjutant General, Quartermaster General, Chief of Ordnance, Judge Advocate General, and 
Chief of Engineers.  The relative power of the Commanding General waxed and waned 
according to the personalities of both successive Commanding Generals and successive 
Secretaries of War.  On two occasions in the nineteenth century, relations between the 
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individuals holding those two offices were so poor that the Commanding General went so far as 
to remove his headquarters from Washington, DC.92   
The bureau chiefs were more constant presences and more consistent forces to be 
reckoned with.  Generally less hierarchical than their colleagues of the line branches – over 
whom the Commanding General reigned supreme – the bureau chiefs were more comfortable 
with a broadly consultative approach to managing the military and jealously guarded their 
respective spheres of expertise, influence, and authority.  The bureau system suffered in 
efficiency because the scopes of responsibility of the several bureaus frequently overlapped.  For 
example, when Goethals worked on the problem of power generation in coastal fortifications, 
different aspects of his work fell under the purview of five different bureaus:  the Corps of 
Engineers for construction and power generation, the Quartermaster Department for lighting the 
buildings of the forts’ garrisons, the Signal Corps for power requirements of communications 
equipment, the Ordnance Department for power requirements of the ammunition hoists, and the 
Artillery for power requirements of the gun emplacements, range finding equipment, and battery 
commanders’ stations.93 
In the three decades after the Civil War ended in 1865, the Army approached a critical 
turning point.  For its entire prior existence, except in times of war, the Regular Army’s reason 
for being was to serve as a constabulary for the expanding frontier and as a coastal defense force.  
By the end of Reconstruction, it was clear that the day was rapidly approaching when there 
would be no frontier to police.  Forced to reconsider the proper role of the Army, an increasing 
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number of officers came to believe that the proper role of an Army at peace was to prepare for 
war.  Reflecting the trends of an American society whose conception of professionalism was 
evolving, officers began to debate the future of their profession in newly organized professional 
associations and journals. Many looked to European nations perceived as potential threats and 
future adversaries and determined that the Army was structurally and doctrinally ill-prepared for 
modern warfare. 94   A faction, led by Civil War hero and William T. Sherman protégé Emory 
Upton, pushed for radical reforms, including a centralized system of command and 
administration headed by a Chief of Staff and a General Staff, modeled after Upton’s 
understanding of the Prussian military’s system.95 
Upton, and those of his followers who carried the argument forward after his death in 
1881, failed in their endeavors to overturn the existing system of command and administration.  
Their ideas did not gain enough traction because they exceeded the parameters of what was 
considered possible and acceptable at the time.  Although American society was increasingly 
accepting consolidated professional authority in other professions, such as medicine and law, it 
had not shaken off its long-held distrust of centralized military authority.  Furthermore, nothing 
had occurred to shake confidence in the bureau system.  For much of the late-nineteenth century, 
officers and political leaders alike basked in the afterglow of the Union victory in the Civil War, 
and saw little reason to modify systems that they believed had led to success.  Crisis is the 
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mother of all motivators, and it would take a severe one to shift the parameters of what was 
considered possible and acceptable.96 
That crisis came with the Spanish-American War in 1898.  Goethals’s experience of a 
problematic mobilization for war was no exception.  Mobilization camps were ill-sited, ill-
supplied, and ill-supervised, leading to scandalously preventable epidemics of disease.  The War 
Department selected ports of embarkation serviced by limited, sometimes solitary, and generally 
underdeveloped rail lines, leading to congestion and confusion at the ports and troops embarking 
without much-needed supplies.  While en route, most units, like Goethals, found that the War 
Department could not supply them with even rudimentary information about their objectives or 
the disposition of Spanish forces, or even with adequate maps.  Furthermore, war plans were 
virtually non-existent and events in both the Caribbean and the Pacific theaters took on a 
strikingly improvisational air.  In fact, then-Captain Peyton C. March, who would later serve as 
Chief of Staff of the Army during World War I, was instructed to decide for himself to which 
theater of the war his light artillery battery would be deployed.97   
These blunders, as well as plenty of fabricated ones, came to light in almost real time in 
the age of muckraker journalism.  Public opinion turned heavily against the War Department, 
leading President McKinley to appoint the Dodge Commission to investigate the conduct of the 
war.  Although the Dodge Commission’s report balanced criticism of the War Department’s 
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most blatant errors with praise for what it was able to accomplish in managing the first 
substantial American overseas military expeditions, the public continued to demand 
accountability.  In the summer of 1899, McKinley acted, sacking Secretary of War Russell Alger 
and appointing a corporate lawyer from New York, Elihu Root, in his place.98 
That Root would implement the most significant institutional and organizational reforms 
in the Army’s history to that date would come as something of a surprise.  McKinley did not 
select Root to lead the War Department so that he could change the Army.  Rather, McKinley 
believed Root’s excellent reputation as a lawyer made him well qualified to run a War 
Department wading into unprecedented legal territory, charged with administering the military 
occupation and civil reconstruction of Cuba, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam in the wake 
of the Spanish-American War.  But a close study of the report of the Dodge Commission and a 
closer association with the influential and reform-minded Adjutant General Henry C. Corbin and 
his assistant Lieutenant Colonel William H. Carter made Root a devoted convert to the cause of 
military reform.  Significantly, Root recognized that the controversies surrounding the Spanish-
American War had shifted the parameters of what both the Army and the American public 
considered possible and acceptable, and that conditions were ripe for reform.  Perhaps most 
importantly, his legal background and excellent relationships with the nation’s political elite 
gave him the political acumen to manage the legislative effort to turn reformers’ theories into 
policy.99 
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The most important reforms of Root’s tenure were the establishment of the Army War 
College, the overhauling of the militia system in the Dick Act of 1903, and the establishment of 
the General Staff in the General Staff Act of 1903.  The War College came first, as Root 
discerned that this would be not only the least controversial of the major reforms he had in mind, 
but also one that he could institute without seeking the approval of Congress.  He convened a 
board in February 1900 to consider the proper scope of the War College.  Based on its 
recommendations and the persistent advocacy of William H. Carter, Root published orders in 
November 1901 that established the Army War College and established the principle that the 
War College would be the pinnacle of a formal, rationalized, and tiered system of professional 
education.100  The Dick Act of January 1903 represented the first fundamental overhaul of the 
militia system since 1792.  It created the National Guard and imposed standardized tables of 
organization and equipment upon the National Guard, as well as established a formal training 
and support relationship between the Regular Army and the National Guard. The crowning 
achievement of Root’s program of reforms came a few weeks later with the passage of the 
General Staff Act.101 
Root had become convinced of the need for a General Staff early in his tenure.  He took 
as the most important lesson of the Spanish-American War that the Army desperately needed an 
agency responsible for developing war plans and coordinating the complex array of activities and 
resources required to mobilize and deploy the Army.  His first attempt at General Staff 
legislation in 1902 failed due to an excess of ambition.  Not only did this bill attempt to create a 
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planning and coordinating agency in the form of the General Staff, but also it called for closing 
and consolidating several of the powerful bureaus.  At the same time that Commanding General 
Nelson A. Miles railed to a sympathetic Senate Military Affairs Committee filled with veteran 
volunteer officers of the Civil War that no General Staff was necessary because the existing 
system had succeeded in defeating the Confederacy, the bureau chiefs, with the notable 
exception of Henry C. Corbin, also closed ranks and argued that the proposal would deprive the 
Army the benefit of their technical expertise.  Root remained committed to the cause and 
orchestrated an intensive lobbying campaign in support of a second attempt.  Securing the 
support of a critical mass of senior officers and political leaders, and dividing the opposition by 
backing away from his proposal to consolidate the bureaus, Root finally secured passage of the 
General Staff Act in February 1903, despite the continuing vocal opposition of General Miles.102 
In a nod to Miles, the General Staff Act – which abolished the office of the Commanding 
General, replaced it with the Chief of Staff, and established the General Staff – was set to 
become effective on August 15, 1903, exactly one week after Miles’s retirement.  In the 
meantime, Secretary Root directed the War College Board to prepare recommendations on how 
to select officers for detail to the General Staff.  Although the War College had been formally 
established a year and a half previously, only its administrative board had been established so 
far, and Secretary Root had taken to using it as an informal General Staff until such time as he 
was able to establish a formal one.  The board recommended that “the personnel of the General 
Staff Corps should be selected with great care and should comprise the most competent officers 
in the Army at large . . . and that the proportion to be selected from the existing staff corps and 
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departments shall number 12, and from the line 30.”  The board, consisting of six generals and a 
lonely major, convened in Washington on March 30, and published their selections in the middle 
of April.103  With orders in hand to report for duty with the new General Staff, Goethals formally 
transferred charge of the Newport District to his successor on May 22, 1903 and moved his 
family to Washington.104 
Establishing the General Staff did not end the bureau system.  After the failed legislative 
effort in 1902, Root knew that he would have to accept some level of coexistence between the 
General Staff and the bureaus in order to secure support within Congress and within the Army.  
In fact, he came to believe that the coexistence would be a good thing, as it would enhance the 
General Staff’s ability to plan for war by freeing it from the minutia of daily administration.  The 
General Staff Act, as drafted by Root and his advisors, and approved by Congress, stipulated: 
. . . the duties of the General Staff Corps shall be to prepare plans for the national defense 
and for the mobilization of the military forces in time of war; to investigate and report 
upon all questions affecting the efficiency of the Army and its state of preparation for 
military operations; to render professional aid and assistance to the Secretary of War and 
to general officers and other superior commanders, and to act as their agents in informing 
and coordinating the action of all different officers who are subject, under the terms of 
this act, to the supervision of the Chief of Staff; and to perform such other military duties 
not otherwise assigned by law as may be from time to time prescribed by the President.105 
Root intended the General Staff to be a planning and coordinating agency, but the extent to 
which it could coordinate anything depended upon the extent to which the bureaus felt that they 
were “subject . . . to the supervision of the Chief of Staff.”  Events in the early years of the new 
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organization would prove that this was very much a function of the personalities occupying the 
key positions.106   
Perhaps recognizing that he had the ability to change the Army’s systems and 
organization rapidly but not the culture of the officer corps, Root relaxed his grip on the reins 
after the General Staff was formally established.  Beyond what was specifically stipulated in the 
law, he would not dictate how the General Staff would organize, operate, or relate to the other 
agencies of the War Department.  The officer corps would have to figure out on its own how to 
integrate the new organization into the Army.  As William H. Carter later recalled, “the General 
Staff Corps was established and began to function officially, but without expectation of reaching 
its full usefulness in the immediate future,” and the early years of the General Staff took on a 
highly uncertain and improvisational character.107  Accordingly, Secretary Root reported to 
Congress in the summer of 1903 that when the selected officers first assembled in Washington:   
They were then organized as an experimental or provisional general staff, and directed to 
work out a permanent organization and distribution of duties for the General Staff Corps, 
a draft of new regulations, and a revision of old regulations made necessary by the new 
departure.  This work was done upon full consultation with the chiefs of bureaus and 
taking the opinions of general officers commanding departments, and was accompanied 
by reference to the provisional staff organization of many tasks and problems to be 
worked out which were appropriate for General Staff action, in order that they might 
become familiar with their work, and test by experiment the best methods of 
accomplishing it.108 
The newly established General Staff organized itself into three divisions.  The First 
Division considered problems and policy related to organization, doctrine, and training for the 
infantry, cavalry, and field artillery units; regulations; training maneuvers; and mobilization.  
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The Second Division, also known as the Military Information Division, was responsible for 
collecting and developing intelligence on foreign armies, procuring and producing maps for 
potential theaters of war, and coordinating the efforts of military attaches stationed abroad.  The 
Third Division was charged with studying possible theaters of war and developing war plans, 
and also dealt with organization and doctrine for the Army’s technical branches, coast defense, 
and combined maneuvers with the Navy.  Given his recent experience in coast defense, Goethals 
was assigned to the Third Division, where he was simultaneously a member of the section 
responsible for developing war plans and the section responsible for working on issues related to 
coast defense.109 
In short order, the Third Division became an arm of the Army War College.  From his 
first year in office as Secretary of War, Root had envisioned that the War College would be a 
dual-purposed institution.  One the one hand, Root intended the War College to “direct the 
instruction and intellectual exercise of the Army, to acquire the information, devise the plans . . . 
and to advise the Commander in Chief upon all questions of plans, armament, transportation, 
mobilization, and military preparation and movement.”  On the other hand, it would serve as a 
school in which officers would “receive instruction . . . in the science of war, including the duties 
of the staff, and in all matters pertaining to the application of military science to national 
defense.”110 Development of the War College concept stalled in 1902 and early 1903 as its board 
functioned almost entirely as an informal general staff for Secretary Root in the effort to secure 
passage of the General Staff Bill.  After the bill was passed, the War Department put more 
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thought into the War College and its relationship to the General Staff, and eventually determined 
that because both organizations were at least partly intended to consider and develop war plans 
and mobilization systems, the War College would be an adjunct component of the General Staff.  
Given the fact that it was tasked with developing war plans, the Third Division was a natural 
selection to carry out the mission of the War College.  By October 27, 1903, all officers in the 
Third Division, now nicknamed the “War College Division,” were assigned to the War College 
under the newly promoted Brigadier General Tasker H. Bliss, assigned in 1903 to serve as its 
first president.111 
Bliss was an uncommon officer.  He was raised by academics, and the intellectual nature 
of the parents rubbed off on the son.  He entered West Point after having already studied for a 
year at Lewisburg University, where his father was a professor of classical languages.  He 
graduated from West Point in 1875, and spent only three of the next 23 years with his artillery 
regiment, with the rest of his career spent in unusual assignments teaching French and artillery at 
West Point, teaching strategy at the Naval War College, serving as an aide to Commanding 
General John Schofield and Secretary of War Daniel S. Lamont, and serving as the military 
attaché to the U.S. ambassador to Spain immediately prior to the Spanish-American War.  Once 
the war came, he returned from Spain to serve as the 1st Corps Chief of Staff, during which time 
he undoubtedly got to know Goethals.  Subsequently, he was assigned as the collector of 
customs for Havana.  His herculean efforts in that position reformed a corrupt bureau and 
increased the revenue for the military-run government of Cuba during the postwar occupation.  
His service caught the attention of Secretary Root, who in 1902 rewarded Bliss with a promotion 
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to brigadier general, despite the fact that he was at the time only a major in the Regular Army.  
Bliss was an intellectual whose career experiences to date had kept his mind occupied with 
matters on a much higher plane than most of his peers.  He was the natural choice to lead the 
new War College.112 
It is surprising, then, that Bliss countered Secretary Root’s vision for the War College 
with a somewhat anti-intellectual plan of his own.  As president of the War College, Bliss was 
responsible for all professional education in the Army.  When he issued orders in November 
1901 establishing the Army War College, Root helped consolidate a formal, rationalized, and 
tiered system of professional education that began at West Point, progressed to schools of 
application for technical training, continued onward to post schools and lyceums for regimental 
officers, then advanced to the Leavenworth schools, and culminated at the War College.  In 
formalizing this system, Root initiated a fundamental change in the processes of professional 
development within the Army, by tacitly acknowledging that education, not self-study but formal 
education, was a legitimate component of professionalism and professional development.  While 
the intellectual side of Bliss applauded this new system, nearly thirty years of experience in an 
Army that valued practical experience far more than education had conditioned him to hesitate to 
hesitate to completely embrace Root’s model.113   
He first broached the subject in a lengthy memo to the Secretary of War in August 1903, 
in which he wrote: 
An examination of the curricula of these schools [post schools, schools of application, 
and Leavenworth schools] show that they go, or are intended to go, to the limit in the 
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matter of direct theoretical instruction of officers.  It is evident that if instruction is to be 
continued on this general line at the War College, it will involve a repetition of what has 
been given at the other service schools.  We can have lectures upon strategy, upon the 
tactics of the three arms, upon the service of security and information, or the study of text 
books upon these subjects.  Manifestly all this will be a waste of time and a degradation 
of the institution from its true function.  When an officer has passed through the course to 
which he must have been subjected before he comes to the War College he must have 
learned, (unless there be a great fault somewhere) all that he needs to know of the theory 
of the art of war.  From that time on he should learn things by doing things.114 
Bliss was either successful in convincing Root, or was allowed to carry on because the 
Secretary of War was preparing to retire in early 1904 and hand control of the War Department 
over to William H. Taft.  He received no argument when he further elaborated on this point in a 
report early the following year, in which he stated that the echelons of the education system 
below the War College “go to the limit of useful training by the ordinary scholastic 
methods.  After passing them there is no further need for professors, instructors, and text books, -
- although the limit of useful training has not been reached.”  Continuing, he asserted that 
collaborative planning with experts from various branches constituted “an essential part of the art 
of war and which can be learned not from books and professors but only by patient and 
unostentatious labor in doing these things themselves.”  Bliss believed that the primary purpose 
of the War College was to serve as a planning and supplemental staff agency, with a useful side 
effect of allowing its members to train on planning and problem solving through sheer 
repetition.  “Thus,” he concluded, “the scholastic work of the War College will not consist in the 
study of general principles but in the application of these principles to the details of a specific 
plan.”115 
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In advocating for the War College to ignore its educational mandate, Bliss was not alone.  
The Naval War College, which had been conceived at its beginning as a more educational 
institution, had since the late 1890s acted in a more utilitarian role as a planning agency for the 
Navy.116 The matter of professional military education was taken up for study by the entire Third 
Division, including Goethals, in the spring of 1904.  Its final report held “that the duty of a 
student of the War College will rise to the full stature of his intellect and experience . . . [The 
War College] is not a place for academic instruction.  It is a place for the work of well-qualified, 
capable and intelligent officers.”117   That the division’s final report ratified Bliss’s position is 
particularly surprising because the division chief at the time was Colonel Arthur L. Wagner, 
whose revolutionary work in developing schools for line and staff officers at Fort Leavenworth 
in the late 1880s and 1890s did much to legitimize formal education in the Army.118  
Nevertheless, anti-intellectualism within an officer corps that had been taught to learn by 
experience, and whose leaders had succeeded under such a system, proved to be hard to shake 
off.  As George C. Marshall, who entered the Army’s post-graduate schools at Ft. Leavenworth 
in 1906, later recalled, within the officer corps at the turn of the century, “the opposition to any 
studious preparation of the older officers was very decided.”119 
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Root’s conception of the War College had outpaced the thinking of the reformers who 
were assigned to implement the policy.  As a result, the War College would not begin to even 
resemble an academic institution until 1907 and subsequent years, well after Bliss had moved on 
to other assignments.120  The first active session of the War College ran from fall 1904 to spring 
1905 under the leadership of Bliss as president, and Colonel Wagner and Lieutenant Colonel 
William W. Wotherspoon as directors.  Nine officers were detailed as students.  From the Third 
Division, five officers, including George Goethals, were detailed as War College staff, and 
another two were detailed for administrative duties.121  That Goethals was detailed as War 
College staff rather than for administration was likely due to his talents and prior relationship 
with Bliss in the 1st Corps during the Spanish-American War.  Goethals’s revolutionary high-lift 
lock design at Colbert Shoals during his assignment in Florence, Alabama and innovations in 
power generation for coastal defenses while in Newport, Rhode Island demonstrate an inquisitive 
mind.  As an intellectual, Bliss would assuredly have recognized and appreciated this quality, 
and sought to use it to maximum advantage in the War College. 
This first session proceeded very much according to Bliss’s conception of how the War 
College should function.  Officers assigned to the War College considered problems, most of 
which related to President Theodore Roosevelt’s more active Caribbean policies, including 
developing plans to prevent foreign intervention in Haiti and mobilizing expeditionary forces for 
operations in Santo Domingo, Venezuela, and Panama.  Additionally, a series of fifteen lectures 
was established in which officers from the General Staff and the War College addressed the 
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whole War College on current events or their areas of technical specialty within the Army.  The 
ongoing Russo-Japanese War was the topic of seven of these lectures, delivered by officers 
recently returned from assignments as attachés or observers with the belligerent armies.122  For 
his part, Goethals served as a member of the Strategy Board, was the chairman of the committee 
considering problems related to the defense of the Philippines and military operations in the 
Pacific, and was a member of a special committee planning combined Army-Navy maneuvers 
scheduled for 1905.  Demonstrating the non-academic nature of the War College, students and 
staff alike were declared to be graduates of the inaugural War College class of 1905.123 
Because the construction of its building at Washington Barracks had not yet been 
completed, officers assigned to the War College between 1903 and 1907 crammed into whatever 
office space they could improvise in a home the Army rented from a well-known Washington 
socialite.  The four-story brick townhouse at 22 Jackson Place sat off of the northwest corner of 
Lafayette Square, mere yards down the road from the White House and its more sprawling, 
dourly Victorian-looking neighbor the State, War, and Navy building, where the rest of the War 
Department and General Staff were situated.  Although those who secured workspace in one of 
the townhouse’s rooms whose tall, slender windows gave excellent views of the park outside 
may have been content, the officers of the War College, especially the unhappy and unfortunate 
four who were forced to work in the attic, found that the pleasant home made for an 
uncomfortably cramped workspace.124 
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For Goethals, the work environment was especially uncomfortable because it exacerbated 
his insecurities.  The reformers who organized the first General Staff were careful to select only 
those officers who represented the cream of the crop.  As General Carter recalled in later years, 
“The type and character of officers detailed in the General Staff . . . was of the highest, and were, 
I am sure, unexcelled in any other army.”125  Nearly 75% of the first General Staff were officers 
from line branches whose only opportunities to stand out as junior officers were in combat with 
in the West during the Indian Wars, in Cuba or the Philippines during the Spanish-American War 
and subsequent Philippine Insurrection, or in China during the allied intervention to end the 
Boxer Rebellion in 1900.  Many of Goethals’s colleagues on the General Staff and within the 
War College had distinguished combat records.126  Like most officers of his generation, Goethals 
maintained a heroic conception of the ideal officer.  Surrounded daily by combat veterans and 
undoubtedly subject to their stories, reminiscences, and yarns, Goethals found his lack of combat 
experience to be utterly discomforting, even embarrassing.  He even went so far as to write in his 
own individual service report in 1903 shortly after reporting for duty with the General Staff, “[I] 
have participated in no battles, engagements, or actions,” in a section in which he was supposed 
to describe his areas of expertise and special qualification.127 
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Goethals’s insecurity turned out to be unfounded.  If any of his colleagues or superiors 
thought any less of him because of he had not seen combat, they were quickly won over by his 
engineering expertise and his dedicated and energetic work ethic.  Arthur L. Wagner found 
Goethals to be “well informed on all military subjects, and especially in regard to Military 
Engineering.”128  Lieutenant Colonel William W. Wotherspoon, who would briefly serve as 
Chief of Staff in 1914, reported in 1905 that Goethals “had shown marked ability in all the work 
entrusted to him.”129  In private correspondence, Brigadier General James Franklin Bell, another 
soon-to-be Chief of Staff, included Goethals in a list of a select group of individuals “who, by 
application and industry, have acquired such special qualifications that their services are always 
in demand, because those who want them really need their assistance and talent.”130  By 1905, 
Goethals had more than proven himself and was rewarded by being designated to serve as the 
junior director of the War College, with Wotherspoon as senior director, for the 1905-1906 
session.131 
He did not serve as a director of the War College for long; by the winter 1905 and 1906, a 
new coast defense board was taking up too much of his time to allow him to maintain any 
significant responsibilities at the War College.132  Due to his work in the Newport District, 
Goethals was considered the General Staff’s coastal defense expert.  Under the original plan of 
organization in 1903, he had been designated as the head of the Third Division’s section 
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responsible for considering problems and questions related to permanent fortifications and 
submersible mines.  Later, General Bliss assigned Goethals to deliver a lecture to the officers of 
the War College titled “The Tactics of Coast Defense, with Special Reference to Submarine 
Defense.”133   
In 1904, President Roosevelt halted appropriations for the construction and improvement 
of seacoast fortifications because it had finally become apparent that technological advances had 
rendered aspects of the program recommended by the Endicott Board in 1885 obsolete.  He 
ordered his new Secretary of War, William Howard Taft, to convene a board of general officers 
in early 1905 to come up with recommendations on what changes needed to be made in order to 
address the implications of two decades of technological innovation.  When Taft asked the 
General Staff to provide him an officer to serve as the board’s secretary and recorder, Goethals 
was the natural choice.134 
Working closely together on the National Coast Defense Board, informally known as the 
Taft Board, Goethals and Taft developed a warm bond.  Goethals may have been surprised to 
find that he enjoyed the jocular Secretary of War’s company so much, as he tended to bear a 
mean prejudice against overweight people.  Later in life, he would tell his daughter-in-law that 
the famously rotund Taft “was the only clean fat man he had ever known.”135  The two shared a 
similar sense of humor and found common ground in jokes, often at the Navy’s expense, while 
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on tours of inspection of coastal fortifications in 1905 and 1906.136  For his part, Taft was 
quickly impressed by the knowledgeable and hardworking engineer, who in addition to his duties 
with the board found time to write and present a paper on fortifications for the International 
Congress of Engineers and publish it in Transactions of the American Society of Engineers.137 
Accurately gauging Goethals’s abilities and potential, Taft began to see a role for 
Goethals in the nation’s most significant ongoing engineering project.  “I am convinced,” he 
wrote to the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Engineers in the summer of 1905, “that Major 
Goethals can be of great use in the construction of the Panama Canal . . . I desire that he be 
retired from the General Staff and be assigned to this work in any capacity that the [Isthmian 
Canal] Commission may designate.”138  The commission did not request Goethals’s services.  
Only one year later, however, Taft was pressing the case again.  Writing to Roosevelt, Taft called 
attention to “Major Goethals, one of the ablest of our army engineers,” whom he wanted to send 
to Panama because the current Chief Engineer at the canal, John Stevens, “would find him so 
useful that they could work together, and that Goethals might be Stevens’ understudy, should he 
for any reason fail us.”139  Still, the Isthmian Canal Commission expressed no interest, and 
Goethals was not sent to Panama. 
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Only a few months later, however, the Isthmian Canal Commission began to slide into 
crisis.  For reasons he never fully disclosed, Stevens grew irritable and dissatisfied in Panama in 
the winter of 1906 and 1907.  When Theodore Shonts resigned from his position as Chairman of 
the Isthmian Canal Commission on January 22, 1907, Stevens grew more despondent, appearing 
to crack under the strain of his duties.140  On January 30, 1907, he sent a letter to Roosevelt.  “I 
never sought this position,” he complained, “on the contrary, [I] declined it twice, and finally 
accepted it against my better judgment.”  Continuing, he stated that “the idea of being constantly 
before the public, whether in a favorable or unfavorable light, is extremely distasteful to me.  
Particularly, I object to be placed in a position, where I am . . . continually subject to attack by a 
lot of people, and they are not all in private life, that I would not wipe my boots on in the United 
States.”  Stevens went on to complain that his salary was too low, that the job required too much 
time away from his family, and that he was rapidly losing interest in the work.  “The ‘honor’ 
which is continually being held up as an incentive for being connected with this work,” he 
declared, “appeals to me but slightly.  To me, the canal is only a big ditch, and its great utility 
when completed, has never been so apparent to me, as it seems to be to others.”  Coming to his 
conclusion after six meandering pages, Stevens stated unequivocally, “From all of the above, you 
will gather that I am not anxious to continue in the service.  I feel that there are men as 
competent and far more willing to pick up and carry the burden than I am.  My desire is to take a 
rest, and then to re-enter railway service, for which I know I am best fitted by training and 
inclination.”141 
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President Roosevelt was taken completely by surprise.  He had seen Stevens in 
Washington only one month earlier and had told the chief engineer to expect to be named 
chairman of the commission if Shonts stepped down.142  After receiving the letter and digesting 
it, Roosevelt forwarded the letter to Secretary of War Taft, whose department was nominally 
responsible for overseeing the Isthmian Canal Commission.  He enclosed a cover letter that 
simply stated, “There is of course no question that Stevens must get out at once . . . If he should 
now alter his mind, as he has so frequently altered it in the past, and wish to stay, I should not 
consider it for a moment given the tone of his letter.”  He then called Taft to a meeting at the 
White House on the morning of February 13 to discuss the matter further.143  
Roosevelt wanted a drastic change.  The resignations of Shonts and Stevens constituted 
the end of the Isthmian Canal Commission.  In as many years, this marked not only the demise of 
the second Isthmian Canal Commission, but also the sudden departure of the second Chief 
Engineer from the Panama Canal.  He wanted to put the project in charge of people who could 
not quit unless they were fired or relieved.  He had decided to place a soldier in charge of the 
Panama Canal.  Roosevelt told as much to Taft and asked for his recommendation on whom to 
select to serve as both Chairman and Chief Engineer of the next Isthmian Canal Commission.144   
While Taft had already been trying to have Goethals assigned to Panama for a year and a 
half, he asked to be excused to consult with Alexander Mackenzie, who by then had been 
promoted to Brigadier General and Chief of Engineers.  Mackenzie held a high opinion of 
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Goethals from their service together in the Chief of Engineer’s office from 1894 to1898, and 
their subsequent service together on the first General Staff in 1903.  He echoed Taft’s assessment 
that Goethals was the engineer officer most fit for the job.  The two brought their 
recommendation to Roosevelt, and the matter was settled.  George W. Goethals would be placed 
in charge of the construction of the Panama Canal. 
Goethals’s experiences between 1894 and 1907, constituting the capstone of his 
professional development, prepared and positioned him well to be assigned as Chairman and 
Chief Engineer of the Panama Canal.  His time in the office of the Chief of Engineers exposed 
him to the challenges and politics of high-level administration, and his subsequent wartime 
experiences, especially of the mobilization at Chickamauga National Military Park, gave him a 
firsthand lesson in the importance of logistics and resource management.  The Newport 
assignment gave Goethals the opportunity to become known as a leading expert and an innovator 
with a mission that, although suffering from its own obsolescence, was considered a primary 
mission for both his branch and the Army.  This enhanced Goethals’s already excellent 
reputation at the right moment, setting conditions for Goethals to be selected for the General 
Staff.  There, he would be further exposed to operational, logistical, and administrative issues at 
the highest level of the Army.  Of more immediate significance, it was while serving on the 
General Staff that Goethals, once again working on coastal defense issues, caught the attention of 
William H. Taft, whose influence proved crucial at the end of Goethals’s path to Panama. 
Interestingly, Goethals’s experiences between 1894 and 1907 once again demonstrate 
that the Army as an institution played only a passive role in producing leaders capable of 
handling tasks of such great magnitude.  At no point was institutionally-driven training a part of 
Goethals’s professional development in this period, not even when he was a member of the War 
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College’s inaugural class of 1905.  Instead, Goethals once again developed as a professional 
through his experiences, which were in this period a product of the interplay of his own talent, 
personal connections, and luck.  It cannot be denied that Goethals talents as an engineer and his 
extremely dedicated work ethic made and enhanced many of the opportunities between 1894 and 
1907.  Goethals earned his way into the office of the Chief of Engineers through his own success 
at Florence, and his own talents and work ethic were at the foundation of his success at Newport 
that was so critical to his assignment to the General Staff and to the Taft Board.  At the same 
time, there were points when his talents were noticeably only as strong as his personal 
connections.  After all, it was General Wilson who pulled Goethals into the office of the Chief of 
Engineers in 1894, and it was Secretary Taft and General Mackenzie who pushed him out of 
Washington and into Panama in 1907.   
But it was luck that was the most important factor in this period.  Without his experiences 
in Newport, Goethals may not have been selected for the General Staff, and he certainly would 
not have been the coast defense expert and obvious choice for the Taft Board.  While it is true 
that General Wilson made a conscious decision to assign Goethals to Newport in order to expose 
him to the coast defense and fortifications mission of the Corps of Engineers, he stood out not 
because of his experiences in an increasingly irrelevant mission, but because unique conditions 
that had not been a part of Wilson’s decision-making process existed at Newport, and allowed 
him to innovate.  That Goethals, an officer of considerable drive and talent, stumbled into an 
environment in which he could modernize an aspect of an inherently obsolete mission was very 
unusual.  It was also very lucky, because it ultimately put Goethals on a path to Panama, by way 
of the General Staff and the Taft Board.
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CONCLUSION 
 
February 18, 1907 began ordinarily enough for George Goethals, but things quickly took 
a more interesting turn.  Late in the morning, he received a message from Taft asking him to 
come in for a meeting.  Goethals dropped what he was doing and went straight to see Taft, who 
proceeded to quiz Goethals on his background and his previous experiences in the Army.  This 
seemed unusual to Goethals because it was mostly material that they had previously discussed on 
their many tours of inspection of fortifications throughout the country.  Finally, he intimated to 
Goethals that the President had accepted the resignation of John Stevens, and that he and General 
Mackenzie had met with President Roosevelt and recommended that he appoint Goethals as 
Chief Engineer.  “He could not assure me I would be selected,” Goethals recalled eight years 
later, “but I probably would be summoned to the White House that evening and should be 
prepared for such a call.  In the meantime nothing was to be said concerning the matter to 
anyone.”1 
Later that night, Goethals and his wife were at their Washington home three blocks north 
of DuPont Circle, entertaining their close friend Gustav Fiebeger.  Well into the evening, a 
message arrived from the President’s personal secretary asking Goethals to come to the White 
House at 9:30 the next morning.2  Remembering what Taft had told him, Goethals immediately 
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called the secretary, who then told Goethals not to wait until morning.  Fully aware of what was 
about to happen, Goethals slipped into a dress uniform and out the front door.3 
It was around ten o’clock on a Monday evening.  Goethals would have found his most 
direct route to the White House – a twenty-minute walk from his townhouse on the corner of S 
and 19th Streets following 19th Street for three blocks until it intersected with Connecticut 
Avenue at DuPont Circle, and Connecticut Avenue all the way to LaFayette Square and the 
White House just beyond it – relatively unpopulated save for a few nocturnal passersby and 
stony, unmoving figures on monuments to exalted heroes of the Civil War.  He would have been 
alone to his thoughts, torn as the may have been between the excitement of a consistently 
ambitious man and the nervousness of an experienced and pragmatic engineer who was well 
aware of exactly how enormous the job ahead of him was.  It is not hard to imagine his thoughts 
turning to pondering just how exactly he had arrived at this position.  
Whether or not he knew it, George W. Goethals’s professional development prior to 1907 
was representative of how officers of his generation grew and learned within a changing Army.  
The active institutional influences on the trajectory of his career were typical of most officers of 
his time.  He was trained, educated, and socialized to the profession at West Point.  Like other 
engineer officers, he received supplementary technical training at the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers School for Application at Willets Point.  While attendance at a school of application 
was not typical for a member of West Point’s class of 1880, more schools of application were 
established in the following decade, and the experience became more common.  At the same 
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time, Goethals’s tour at Willet’s Point from 1880 to 1882 marked the last time he would benefit 
from any formal training program.4 
 Afterwards, Goethals found his own way within a changing institution.  Because the 
Army lacked formal systems of professional development universally applicable and available 
throughout its officer corps, it placed a high premium on learning from experience.  However, it 
did very little to standardize and control the quality and type of experiences each officer would 
receive.  Like his peers, Goethals’s career path after receiving a relatively limited amount of 
formal education and training was shaped by the interplay of his personal connections, his own 
talents, and luck.   
Personal connections were critically important to shaping Goethals’s career.  If not for his 
relationship with Nathan P. Beers, his Army career would never have been launched in the first 
place.  In subsequent years, the timely intervention of key people shaped the trajectory of his 
career in fundamental ways.  William Merrill took an innovative approach to teaching Goethals 
the technical aspects of river and canal work on the Ohio River in 1884 and 1885.  Thomas 
Casey pulled Goethals onto his personal staff in Washington in 1894, and John Wilson ensured 
that he would not languish in an unproductive assignment in Puerto Rico in 1898.  Finally, 
Goethals’s appointment to Panama was secured in 1907 on the strength of recommendations 
from William H. Taft and Alexander Mackenzie.  Not long before receiving this appointment, 
Goethals revealed that he had perceived the centrality of personal connections in his career when 
he wrote to his oldest son, then a cadet at West Point, “An officer is seldom if ever selected for 
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any duty because of special aptitude, but because he is favorably known.  All that one can do is 
to have the consciousness of doing one’s duty to the best of one’s ability.”5 
This, however, does not minimize the importance of aptitude and ability.  Goethals 
earned one of only two commissions into the Corps of Engineers available to West Point’s class 
of 1880 on the basis of his sterling academic record at the academy.  Later, his ability to 
recognize and internalize practical lessons on the Ohio River set conditions for his success at the 
Muscle Shoals Canal in Alabama, where his laudable performance led General Wilson to bring 
him to Washington.  Later yet, Goethals’s dedicated work ethic and exceptional engineering 
abilities were the forces behind his successful innovations at Newport.  These enhanced his 
reputation and contributed to his eventual selection as a member of the first General Staff, where 
he continued to create opportunities for himself with his noticeable talents and drive. 
All the same, luck proved to be the most important factor in shaping the actual path of 
Goethals’s career.  While his talent and work ethic always impressed those with whom he served 
and would most likely have ensured a successful career for Goethals, luck shaped all of the vital 
stepping stones in Goethals’s path to Panama.  Two strokes of good fortune made Goethals’s 
appointment to West Point possible:  the academic failure of Congressman Cox’s original 
nominee, and the persuasiveness of the intended replacement nominee’s mother, who did not 
want to see her only son go into the Army.  Later, Goethals was extremely fortunate that Miles 
requested his relief at the exact moment that a vacancy was opening under Merrill on the Ohio 
River.  Without Merrill’s tutelage, Goethals would have been far less likely to succeed at Muscle 
Shoals, a critical experience that would not have even been possible had the unfortunate 
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Lieutenant Graham D. Fitch not fallen seriously ill in 1889.  In 1901, when Wilson was 
determined to put Goethals in a position in which he would learn about the inherently backward-
looking mission of coastal defense, Goethals was extremely lucky to be sent to Newport only one 
month before conditions arose that allowed him to innovate and put his very relevant talents on 
display.  This remarkable success in Newport was, unintentionally, Goethals’s springboard to 
Panama.  It influenced his selection as an officer of the first General Staff, and also his duties 
within the General Staff as the resident coast defense expert, which led to his all-important detail 
to the Taft Board, putting Goethals into the orbit of the man who would, with Alexander 
Mackenzie, secure Goethals’s appointment as Chairman and Chief Engineer of the Isthmian 
Canal Commission. 
The experiences Goethals benefitted from as a junior officer not only positioned him well 
for significant future assignments, but also prepared him to overcome monumental challenges to 
succeed in these assignments.  This preparation was more by accident than by design.  Using 
Goethals’s professional development through 1907 as an archetypal model of professional 
development of officers in his generation, it is clear that the Army did surprisingly little to ensure 
that it generated from among its officer corps senior leaders prepared for and capable of leading 
the profession in peace or in war.  The Army’s processes of generating talented leaders to rise to 
senior positions were very much a role of the dice.  The rise of a high-caliber officer like 
Goethals, an expert of his trade prepared to assume senior leadership roles, depended upon 
repeated instances of the right officer being in the right place at the right time.   
 “The right officer” refers to the officer’s aptitude and abilities.  In order to be successful 
in a learn-by-doing environment, an officer had to possess the ability to reflect upon experiences, 
internalize lessons derived from experiences, and subsequently apply them.  The officer also had 
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to possess a high degree of drive and ambition in order to pursue challenging and rewarding 
assignments and push the limits of professional knowledge from time to time.  Goethals 
demonstrated throughout his early career an ability to internalize and apply lessons derived from 
both his own experiences and his observation of others’ experiences.  There were many like him, 
but because of the significant role of chance in professional development in the late-nineteenth-
century Army, it is likely that many of these officers were unable to reach their full potential.  An 
interesting question to ponder is not how Goethals developed the skills necessary to succeed in 
Panama and the War Department, but how many other equally capable officers did not, falling 
victim to the chance inherent in the next two elements of the equation. 
 “The right place” refers to the human element of a duty assignment – the people with 
whom an officer connected, and from whom an officer learned.   The quality of an officer’s 
experience under an excellent commander who took seriously his implicit responsibility to teach 
and mentor a subordinate was markedly superior to the quality of an officer’s experience under a 
less-well-intentioned commander.  For example, Goethals grew exponentially more as a result of 
his time with William Merrill at Cincinnati than as a result of his time with John Barlow at 
Nashville.   
 “The right time” refers to conditions at a given assignment.  An officer could not gain 
much of value from an assignment where no or few opportunities existed that could challenge 
and develop him.  Goethals arrived at the Nashville District shortly before a crisis that would 
propel him to the Muscle Shoals Canal and an independent command, providing him with a set 
of experiences that made possible his path to the Panama Canal.  His career would likely have 
turned out much differently if his orders at the end of his tour of duty at West Point in 1889 had 
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sent him instead of poor Lieutenant John Millis to the Third Lighthouse District.6  Similarly, had 
he not been assigned to the Newport District one month before an exercise would reveal a need 
to reformulate standard power generation designs in coastal fortifications, that assignment would 
not have been so beneficial to Goethals’s professional development. 
 If the right officer happened to be in the right place at the right time frequently and 
consistently, that officer was well on his way to being positioned and prepared for senior 
leadership positions within the Army.  Such instances were sheer strokes of luck for both the 
officer and the Army.  The officer in question only had some control of the first element, as it 
has everything to do with his own qualities and abilities.  “Right place” and “right time” were 
naturally outside of an officer’s sphere of influence.  They were also beyond the Army’s 
influence, because the institution did not have in place any standardized procedures for 
determining transfers and assignments.  This process depended upon the personalities of those in 
a position to produce the orders.  As Goethals’s career demonstrates, some generals factored only 
convenience and utility in making decisions on assignments.  Others were more forward-thinking 
and weighed officers’ developmental needs.   
But even these few who did consider professional development when deciding upon 
assignments generally lacked mechanisms to see the full picture and recognize the variable 
conditions at different assignment locations.  They were therefore unable to ensure that they sent 
the right officer to the right place at the right time.  In an example from Goethals’s career, it is 
extremely unlikely that the person who wrote the orders that sent Goethals to Cincinnati knew 
both that Goethals was so lacking in field engineering experience and also that Merrill would 
                                                          
6 Report of the Secretary of War, 51st Cong., 2nd sess., 1890, vol. II, 4. 
150 
 
take innovative and effective measures to remedy the deficiency.  An officer with such 
knowledge would, from his perch in Washington, have to know Goethals, Merrill, and Captain 
Frederick Mahan – Merrill’s most recent pupil at the time of Goethals’s assignment – intimately 
enough to connect all of the dots.  This is a highly unlikely scenario, given the fact that Goethals 
and Mahan each had a very limited amount of prior assignments – and thus a limited amount of 
exposure within the corps – and no systematic performance evaluation system yet existed to fill 
in information naturally lacking when the officers in question are not personally known entities. 
Interestingly, the practice of relying upon unstandardized and unregulated experiences to 
train and develop the officer corps appears to have been self-reinforcing.  Those officers who 
achieved high rank and position did so in careers shaped mostly by their own abilities, as well as 
the good fortune to have come into contact with quality mentors and to have encountered some 
challenging and rewarding developmental experiences.  Those composed of balanced amounts of 
pride and humility were more likely to ascribe their success to the quality of their experiences 
than to their own natural abilities or the actions of interested mentors and generous benefactors.  
The officers who succeeded in the learn-by-doing system, then, became strong believers in and 
advocates for experiential professional development.  Goethals revealed as much in 1922, when 
he told Samuel Crowther, “The best man is the one who regards each difficulty overcome as in 
the nature of an educational degree . . . He learns in the only school that is worth anything – 
experience.  He may be able by reason of training to skip a few grades, but he cannot skip the 
whole course.  For in the end it is the test of experience that counts.”7 
                                                          
7 Crowther, 16. 
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Goethals and officers of his generation who entered the Army in the 1870s and 1880s 
emerged on the far side of the Root reforms still committed to the nineteenth-century norm of 
unsystematic and informal professional development.  This reveals a fundamental problem in 
interpreting those reforms as the line of demarcation between the “old Army” and the new.  
Further demonstrating the reluctance to let go of old ideas were the heroic conceptions of the 
ideal military officer, heavily influenced by the memory of the Civil War, to which Goethals and 
his generation still subscribed.  By creating the General Staff and the War College, Elihu Root 
transformed the Army’s organization and infrastructure, but he could not so quickly change the 
culture of the officer corps.  Goethals and others of his generation had come of age in the “old” 
Army, and then were tasked with implementing the transition to the “new” Army as the 
nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth.  In that role, they served as the bridge between old 
and new, forging organizational and infrastructural change with familiar tools and old concepts 
in which they still deeply believed and to which they were still committed.  The dichotomy of 
old concepts and new systems limited the effectiveness of Root’s reforms until after World War 
I, when the aging warriors of Goethals’s generation gave way to a younger generation whose 
attitudes and values were fundamentally altered by the nearly catastrophic crises of the first year 
of the American war effort.8  Only then would the culture of the officer corps catch up to the 
organizational and structural changes of 1899-1903, finally completing the long institutional 
transformation of the United States Army.
                                                          
8 On the challenges and limited effectiveness of the General Staff prior to World War I, see Hewes, 12-21; Nelson, 
73-186; and Weigley, 323-354.  On the crises of the first year of the U.S. war effort, see Edward M. Coffman, The 
War to End all Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I (Lexington, KY: The University Press of 
Kentucky, 1998), 20-85 and 121-158.  For shifting attitudes in the younger generation, see Pogue, 190-282; Betros, 
243-246; and Muth, 115-148. 
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